This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

+ *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.

+ *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.

+ *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.

+ *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at `http://books.google.com/`

NYPL RESEARCH LIBRARIES
3 3433 07437338 6

ESSAY ON LANGUAGE,

AS CONNECTED WITH THE

Faculties of the Mind,

AND AS APPLIED TO

THINGS IN NATURE AND ART.

SOCIA MENTIS LINGUA.

By WILLIAM S. CARDELL.

NEW-YORK.

CHARLES WILEY, No. 3 WALL-STREET.

1825.

231868
B 1900

Southern District of New-York, ss.

BE IT REMEMBERED, That on the sixteenth day of February, A. D. 1825, in the forty-ninth year of the Independence of the United States of America, William S Cardell, of the said District, has deposited in this office the title of a Book, the right whereof he claims as author, in the words following, to wit :

"Essay on Language, as connected with the Faculties of the Mind, and as applied to things in Nature and Art. Socia mentis lingua. By William S. Cardell"

In conformity to the Act of the Congress of the United States, entitled, "An Act for the encouragement of Learning, by securing the copies of Maps, Charts, and Books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned." And also to an Act, entitled "an Act, supplementary to an Act, entitled an Act for the encouragement of Learning, by securing the copies of Maps, Charts, and Books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned, and extending the benefits thereof to the arts of designing, engraving, and etching historical and other prints"

JAMES DILL, *Clerk of the Southern District of New-York*

J. SEYMOUR, PRINTER, JOHN-STREET.

CONTENTS.

Introductory dissertation, - - - - - 1
General view of language as intimately combined with the mental powers, the instruction and welfare of nations, and the whole social and commercial intercourse of rational beings, - - - - - *ib.*
Structure of speech in its earliest known forms, deduced from the nature and wants of man, and the condition of savage life, - - - - - - 7
Brief history of the progress of letters, from the time of their invention, with a slight notice of the changes to which language has been subjected from political and moral causes, - - - - - - 13
General character of the English language, and its history, from the invasion of England by Julius Cesar, to the present time, - - - - - 24
Philosophic exposition of speech in its practical adaptation to the purposes of life, - - - - 34
Elementary principles and definitions, - - 39
Classification of words, - - - - - 44
Names of things grammatically considered, - *ib.*
do. do. philosophically do. - - *ib.*
Pronouns or substitutes, - - - - - 62
Words of relation and description, adjectives, - 66
Actions or affirmations—verbs, - - - 107
Logic and philosophic elucidation of moods and tenses, 121
Etymons and practical explanations of the words erroneously called auxiliaries, - - - - - 138
Verb *to be*, - - - - - - - 141
Participles always adjectives by use, - - - 165
Contractions in terms and in construction, - - *ib.*
Adverbs, - - - - - - - - - 178
Conjunctions, - - - - - - - - 180
Prepositions, - - - - - - - - 182
Irregular articulations called interjections, - - 184
Structure of sentences, - - - - - - 185
Lessons in parsing, grammatical, - - - - 187
do. do. philosophic, - - - - - 193
Specimens giving a slight view of the changes in language, 194
Examples of errors in practice, - - - - 203

PREFACE.

THIS Essay is not offered as a finished work; though the opinions advanced have not been hastily adopted, and it is believed they are substantially correct. The writer is sensible he has not done justice to his own principles; and the work would not have been made public, with all its present defects, if other arduous and indispensable engagements had not precluded the hope of devoting attention to this volume, for a considerable time to come.

A few preliminary ideas will indicate the general design of this treatise, and will show that, however its doctrines may differ from those heretofore taught, they are not advanced without regard to existing facts.

Language, the chief instrument of all knowledge, must itself be the subject of interesting inquiry on scientific principles. Instead of treating words as the theme of contempt, and explaining them according to the metaphysics of the twelfth century, it is time that the modes of investigation, adopted in other philosophic researches should be applied to the structure of speech. A comprehensive plan of induction was attempted; and as the proper means to be employed for this purpose, a careful attention

was given to etymology; to the comparison of various languages, in the literal, transitive, idiomatic, and figurative meanings of words; and to the best systems of logic and mental philosophy, compared with the consciousness of what is passing in the mind. The evidence which limited means could draw from these sources, was constantly referred to the civil and moral history; the physical and social condition, of man, in relation to which, all language is formed.

This volume may be regarded as a sketch of general principles, rather than a set of special rules. It is addressed chiefly to the reasoning faculties; not to the memory, as an arbitrary form of words; and is, in its general plan, purposely confined to the plain and literal modes of speech.

The author has, in practice, witnessed its effects in expanding and invigorating the minds of the young; in leading to habits of philosophic scrutiny, and to the application of language to its legitimate purposes.

If it should be thought, by some, that too much freedom is used, in this work, in speaking of the prevailing course of instruction in language, it is not from intentional want of candor; but from deliberate conviction, that a large portion of what is received as the exposition of speech, is alike opposed to fact, to science, and to common sense: for under no other name, but that of grammar, could such

gross inconsistencies be admitted in schools of the present day, and pass for instruction.

The real principles of speech are simple, beautiful, and extensive in their application, to a degree which must excite the admiration of every enlightened investigator. How could it be supposed that a nation of plain men could agree in the adoption and use of a form of speech, the essential rules of which should bear any considerable resemblance to the artificial, perplexing, contradictory, and impracticable, systems taught in colleges and schools ?

It may be asked, then, why England and other nations of Europe, with all their wealth, enterprise, and general intelligence, should, in this particular branch of learning, adhere to a theory which is really so absurd. In this, as in other instances of human imperfection, it is more easy to adduce a parallel than to offer a justification. The mind may be unsuspectingly led to great extravagance, by the influence of commanding authority; and doctrines, which, according to the institutions of a country, would expose an individual to contempt, or lead him to the stake, are received without question, when sanctioned by tribunals of acknowledged pre-eminence.

Why, it may be asked, did Egypt, the instructress of nations, bow to dogs and bulls, with the reverential awe due to the living God ? Why were Greece and Rome, in their proudest days, the

slaves of a lunatic mythology; the degraded attendants on soothsayers and gladiators? and why does Spain, at this age of the world, and after what Spain has been, choose to lie down at a tyrant's feet, and solicit the chains and tortures of a dungeon?

Should this Essay, in its crude outline, be favorably received, a second volume will be printed, designed to exemplify the principles of figurative language, in connexion with logic and rhetoric; natural and moral philosophy; including a slight view of the appropriate influence of a national tongue, on public literature, sentiments, pursuits, and character.



ESSAY ON LANGUAGE.

INTRODUCTORY DISSERTATION.

1. LANGUAGE has been long considered as a subject of great interest, and has occupied the ablest writers among most civilized nations. Yet, after all the learning employed in its investigation, a slight research will show, that most of the contradictory systems which have been proposed are radically defective, and that much remains to be done. It is not expected that the expositions about to be offered will be free from defect. The intention is to present, in a new point of view, a branch of learning deeply interesting to the literary world, and particularly to the American States, under existing circumstances.

2. The plan of the present treatise differs, probably, from what has been attempted in any country. The ideas advanced will vary in several important particulars from the received doctrines of the schools, and the prejudices of inwrought sentiment. Novelty, however, is not sought for the sake of innovation. The leading object is simple philosophic truth.

3. Many obvious difficulties are presented in connexion with such an undertaking. If the principles advanced should be considered just, it may not be easy to make them entertaining, and reconcile them to the prejudices resulting from a different course of instruction. These difficulties, however, do not consist in the want of interest in the nature of language itself, but in the want of skill properly to explain it.

4. Among persons of more conceit than intelligence, it is not uncommon to hear the study of language represented as being, under almost any form, a dull and frivolous pursuit. It may be so to those whose attention is confined to arbitrary rules, founded on the mere forms of words: but when we consider the faculty of speech as the distinguishing gift of the Creator to our race: as inwoven with all the wants, enjoyments, and improvements of man: as the index to the progress of society from barbarism to refinement, and of its downward course through luxury, imbecility, and crime to the depths of national degradation; contemplating the structure of speech as blended with the whole internal organization of society; with instruction, laws, religious sentiments, moral conduct, and habits of thought; when we consider it as the means of the Christian's present consolation and future hope, and still extend our views to the faculty of speech as the medium of social bliss for superior intelligences in an eternal world: what benighted man, rejecting the bounty of his Maker, shall come forward and say that the study of language is dull, or low, or unprofitable?

5. Speech is to mind what action is to animal bodies. Its improvement is the improvement of

our intellectual nature, and a duty to God who gave it.

6. As a subject of philosophic contemplation, and as parts of physiological or anatomical science, the structure and use of the organs of speech are among the most wonderful of the Creator's works. There is, perhaps, no exercise of mechanical skill among men equal to what is produced in the organs of speech in rapid utterance. The precision with which definite sounds are produced, in all their various complication, almost without the consciousness of effort; the nice distinctions, which are so infallibly preserved, by variations almost inconceivably minute, render the human articulation, to those capable of attending to its principles, an unceasing theme of admiration. Yet, the learned Dugald Stewart justly observes: "Many authors have spoken of the wonderful mechanism of speech; but none has hitherto attended to the far more wonderful mechanism which it puts into action, behind the scene." How wonderful indeed are those complex and subtile springs of thought, which every one feels himself to possess: whence originate the distinctive powers and glory of man; but which no acumen in philosophy has yet been able to explain. An attention to the intimate connexion between ideas and words will exhibit something of that wonderful influence which language exerts over our inmost sentiments and strongest associations.

7. The dispute of the mental philosophers whether ideas are innate, intuitive, or wholly acquired through the medium of the senses, has no necessary connexion with the structure of language. Whether *the rational* faculties have their seat in

the medullary substance of the brain or not, there is no need of stopping to inquire. The position assumed as the foundation of the present treatise is, that whatever may be the origin of our ideas, there is no possibility of constructing elementary language, to transmit them from one person to an other, but by reference to sensible objects, consentiently known. This is a leading principle, to which our general train of reasoning will refer, and which, suitably attended to, will explain many of the seeming mysteries of speech.

8. Most of the philosophers who have attempted to explain the wonderful structure of the human intellect, have been evidently entangled by the false theories of language; and though some of them have been aware of the difficulty, they have not attempted to apply the remedy. Mr. Locke has many allusions to the absurd and mistaken systems of the professed writers on language; but when he attempts to particularize, shows that he is himself grossly misled by the errors of false teaching.

9. This truly great philosopher, adopting the doctrine which he had been taught, that a large portion of the English language lay beyond the reach of practical investigation, yet too clear-sighted to suppose numerous words used without meaning, introduces the following remarks. "The '*particles*' are all marks of some action or intimation of the mind, and therefore, to understand them rightly, the several *views*, *postures*, *stands*, *turns*, *limitations*, and *exceptions*, and several other *thoughts of the mind*, for which we have either none, or very difficult names, are diligently to be studied."

If Mr. Locke had even suspected, what is the *unequivocal* fact, that these *marks of actions* or *in-*

tinations of the mind, are names of *sensible objects*, or of *obvious actions*, with direct reference to *things* in the *material world*, capable of being traced to their origin, and clearly defined as *nouns* and *verbs*, his comprehensive intellect would hardly have been satisfied with the metaphysical approximation to which his views were so mistakingly confined. A deeper and broader knowledge of comparative etymology, would have led him, instead of studying the meanings of words in the unseen *stands*, *limitations*, and *exceptions* of the mind, to seek them in the real *views*, *postures*, and *turns*, of the early framers of speech.

10. Lord Bacon, speaking of the advancement of learning, says—"And lastly, let us consider the false appearances that are imposed upon us, by words, which are framed and applied according to the conceit and capacities of the vulgar sort: and although we think we govern our words, and prescribe it well—*loquendum ut vulgus, sentiendum ut sapientes;** yet certain it is, that words, as a Tartar's bow, do shoot back upon the understanding of the wisest, and mightily entangle and pervert the judgment. So as it is almost necessary in all controversies and disputations, to imitate the wisdom of the mathematicians, in setting down *in the very beginning*, the definitions of our words and terms, that others may know how we accept and understand them, and whether they concur with us or no. For it cometh to pass, that we are sure to end there where we ought to have begun, which is in questions and differences about words."

Profiting therefore by the suggestions of so able a counsellor, we shall lay down a few elementary

* Speaking as the vulgar, thinking as the wise.

principles, as the general foundation for a course of reasoning.

11. As far as possible the regions of mere conjecture will be avoided. To Lord Monboddo and the learned Dr. Wilkins may be left the fine-wrought theories, respecting the first name which an untutored savage would give to bread: or what a language might be made by a nation of philosophers, taking it from its elements. These are suppositions which can never be brought to the test of experiment. Neither will it be profitable to dwell on a useless inquiry whether language was the immediate gift of the Creator to man, or, like his other faculties, left to his own industry to improve. One thing, however, may be observed respecting an opinion which has been sustained with unnecessary zeal. If at the creation any portion of language was directly communicated to man by his Maker, it must have been such a language as was suited to his then condition, and consequently very different from the speech of a numerous society, with all its complex regulations.

12. In perusing the most elaborate works on language, we are some times struck with what may be considered a waste of learning, employed with very little of practical good sense. Volumes are filled with disquisitions which are of no importance, or which can lead to no beneficial result. Though we may say with Chancellor Bacon, that "knowledge is power," and add, that its general increase is the advancement of our nature, yet there are instances in which it is best for men to content themselves with that share of information which they can easily acquire. In the facetious question, whether the little children in the ancient city of Athens cried

when they were whipped, it seems better to admit the fact from the inferences of common sense, and the ordinary principles of human nature, than to make a troublesome search for proofs in antiquated books.

13. Persons of requisite intelligence can hardly fail to perceive how much the labor of study is simplified by ascertaining the true elements of each subject, and the just principles of their combination. With this suitable preparation, the whole way becomes pleasant; and the want of this has led to much confusion in treatises on grammar.

14. Explanations will be made with special reference to the English language. As far as possible awkward pretensions to learning will be avoided; and where allusions are occasionally made to the tongues of other nations, it will be for the sake of supplying facts, and of illustrating rules by comparison; for though we may not fully agree with the Emperor Charles V., that "As* many languages as a man understands, so many times he is a man;" yet there is much of truth in the observation of Ascham, "Even as a hawke fleeth not hie with one wing, even so a man reacheth not to excellency with one tongue." This remark applies particularly to those philosophic principles of language, the proper understanding of which depends on a comprehensive view of human speech, in its general nature, and its comparative merits and defects.

15. Language, in the nature of its expression, has a three-fold relation to man: the sensations of

---

* Autant de langues que l'homme sait parler autant de fois il est homme.—*Charles V. as quoted by* Brantam.

Brantome.

the body, the affections of the heart, and the operations of the understanding; in other words, there are these three kinds of excitement, action, or instrumentality, by which ideas are interchanged between one percipient being and an other.

16. The bodily sensations are manifested, perhaps, in some degree, by all organized beings. The writhing or the groans of pain, the cries of hunger, and other evidences of feeling, are manifested in different modes and degrees by most animals. The young bird raising its open mouth for food, is the natural indication of corporeal want. Man has the various bodily sensations and their outward signs, in common with brutes, and has some expressions of sensation which they have not: of these are laughter and weeping. This class of signs is the lowest in order, least extensive in application, and most remote in its nature from conventional language.

17. It is doubtful whether any portion of what we understand as the affections of the heart, can properly be ascribed to inferior animals. The attachment of brutes for their young, is a wise ordination of Providence for the preservation of the species: but it extends no farther than is necessary for this specific purpose. The fidelity of a dog for his master, is the instinct or attribute of his nature; and this obsequious trustiness is as readily subservient to the highwayman or pirate, as to the person of most upright conduct.

It is only in the human species, that the moral and social affections assume their expressive signs, and become an intelligible and powerful language. The indications of sentiment assume a variety of forms, as they appear in the countenance, attitudes,

and gestures. The dejection of sorrow, the smile of joy, the scowl of contempt, the frown of anger, are a universal language, read and understood alike by all nations. These natural signs may exist, independent of conventional language; but they generally concur with it, and add greatly to its force. These natural signs of mental feeling are capable of being refined and extended, to a considerable degree, as in the ancient pantomimes, and appear to be more or less practised by all nations. The open arms of friendship, the fist clenched in anger, and a multitude of others, are of this class.

18. An attentive investigation will show, that there is no way in which the individual mind can, within itself, to any extent, combine its ideas, but by the intervention of words. Every process of the reasoning powers, beyond the immediate perception of sensible objects, depends on the structure of speech, and in a great degree, according to the excellence of this chief instrument of all mental operations, will be the means of personal improvement, of the social transmission of thought, and the elevation of national character. From this, it may be laid down as a broad principle, that no individual can make great advances in intellectual improvement, beyond the bounds of a ready formed language, as the necessary means of his progress. The ideas, therefore, as well as the vocabulary of the savage, are necessarily limited; but his words being comparatively few, are often repeated, and become familiar by use. They are also generally expressive, for they have immediate relation to objects of sense; and it is farther observable, that where vocal language is restricted, men have recourse to violent and significant gesticulations to remedy its defects.

19. The cultivation of the mental powers depends chiefly on social institutions; but all establishments of a public nature are very closely connected with the individual intelligence in which they originate, and on which their maintenance must necessarily depend. It is the reciprocity of action and reaction, at every step, and these two principles cannot long be greatly out of proportion to each other. Such is the nature of man, that no government can far extend its influence and power, without laws, religious doctrines, or rules of moral conduct, contained in some written form. The union and consequent elevation of large communities, depend on the concentration of the public sentiment. All people, ignorant of writing, are, by necessary consequence, divided into small tribes, and can make but a slow progress in civilization. The consistency and elevation of public sentiment, for any length of time, depend on education in some form or other; but instruction is not likely to acquire much system or extent, while left to depend wholly on oral communication. It is with propriety, therefore, that the knowledge of letters is generally recognized by philosophic writers, as the first important advance in the career of social refinement, and all nations destitute of written records characterized as barbarian.

20. Written as well as spoken language, is exceedingly important to man, in his social condition; and the unlettered tenants of the forest must, at times, strongly feel the want of some means to extend their ideas beyond the immediate objects around them.

21. Many evidences exist of the proneness of men to devise visible signs in aid of oral language;

and of all the systems of this kind, none can compare with the Egyptian hieroglyphics, either for systematic skill, or for the extent of their application.

22. The Egyptians possessed extraordinary advantages for their peculiar system of writing. The astonishing fertility of their country furnished an easy means of livelihood, to a vast population. The numerous body of priests were, by their large landed revenues, freed in a great degree, from pecuniary care, while they held sufficient political influence to inspire them with ambition. Though their hieroglyphics must have been extremely complicated and unwieldy, compared with modern letters, yet it appears to have been, for the initiated class, the great business of life, and means of distinction, to become exceedingly familiar with their principles and use. Under these special, favoring circumstances, it is less wonderful that Egypt, with a cumbrous form of written language, rose to great comparative excellence in arts, sciences, policy, and laws.

23. There is one kind of advancement, however, to which the system of hieroglyphics, must, from its nature, have opposed an absolute barrier. The Egyptians, with this species of writing, could not have excelled in works of a high order of genius and taste. Accordingly, we find they are not credited by their cotemporaries, or immediate successors, for any thing of this nature. And again, if a few individuals of extraordinary intellectual powers could have produced a masterly performance, in poetry or oratory, it could not have been transmitted to posterity, through a medium of writing unintelligible to all subsequent ages. All,

therefore, which we are able to learn of this interesting nation, is from others, and not from their own writers. Our information concerning them is a partial detail of prominent facts, in science, history, and civil policy; but extends not to their internal intercourse, their turns of expression, moral feeling, and social habits of life; for these could only have been learned from their own books.

24. And here it is proper to call the reader's attention, for a moment, to the important philosophic difference, between all hieroglyphic or arbitrary characters, and the letters which represent elementary sounds and their combinations, as employed by the civilized world at the present day.

25. It is a general law, that in all subjects of human inquiry, their principles may be easily understood and effectually applied, in proportion as their elements are few and simple. The system of Egyptian hieroglyphics must have been one with which it required a large portion of human life to become familiar; because their original elements must have been very numerous, and liable to great variations, on metaphysical principles.

26. The system of writing, with our ordinary letters, is, on the contrary, reducible to complete mathematical calculation. This is a most important fact in the science of language, and was remarkably exemplified during the late war in Europe. When the struggle for power was at its height, and kingdoms were the stake contested, it became an object of vast importance to transmit intelligence, with the greatest possible secresy. The ablest men were employed to write in characters, *which*, without the proper key, should defy

all human talent to read. These letters were intercepted, in several instances, forwarded to the French emperor, and handed over to the mathematicians to decipher. By assuming any language, at discretion, selecting a single character of the mysterious document, and proceeding by repeated trials, they ascertained what letter it was, by its relative position in words. Having found one, the next became more easy, and so on progressively, through each subsequent approximation.

27. To Cadmus of Phenicia is generally ascribed the immortal honor of inventing the letters; a device of more importance in human affairs than any other, for which our race has ever been indebted to an individual. It is proper, however, to observe, that this subject is one on which learned men are far from being universally agreed. It is maintained by some that the letters introduced into Syria by Cadmus, and thence into Greece, had been in use, in India, for a long time previous. The Phenician letters were at first sixteen in number. They were soon introduced into most of the neighboring countries, and were considerably modified, according to the fancy of the different people, or from unavoidable circumstances. Their number was also soon increased. Their application appears to have been, at first, exceedingly limited, both from the want of skill in their use, and of the necessary materials on which they could be employed

28. A new era now dawned on the world, and instead of mere oral traditions, greatly perverted in the transmission, the chief events were recorded on tables of marble, lead, or brass. To these suc-

ceeded parchment, the papyrus of Egypt, and the inner bark of trees, as the first crude materials in the composition of books. The splendor increased. Poets and orators arose; till all which was great in conception, brilliant in action, or attractive in moral feeling, found advocates to record and transmit them, as models for imitation, to admiring posterity. These early productions are now lost, with the exception of a very small number; but those few will never be lost, while mankind continue to cherish genius, or hold in honor the most striking models of human character. If these writings were not intrinsically excellent, they would still be of vast interest, as the intellectual records of our race, at a time so remote, and under circumstances so different from the present condition of the world.

29. Of all the writings which have been transmitted to us, through the long train of ages, the book of Job is generally allowed to be of the greatest antiquity. The locality and the writer of this work are unknown; but the character of its style is of an extraordinary cast. Independent of its theology, the energy of thought, the original and bold imagery, the development of the early human character, displayed in this book, render it one of the most interesting pieces of composition, any where to be found. To whatever time or place it may be referred, it must have been written where written language had previously made very considerable progress. Whatever doubts may exist on other points, the book of Job itself affords evidence, that at the time of its composition, more than one kind of writing was known; for in the 19th chapter, we read the following passage: "O that my words were now *written*. O that they

were *printed* in a *book!* that they were *graven* with an *iron pen*, and *lead*, in the *rock* for ever."

30. One of the immediate consequences of written language, was to increase the sphere of civilization; to give greater extension and system to governments; and to subject the mere personal strength of men, like that of horses and elephants, to the higher powers of intellect.

One set of writers attribute the first letters to Moses, either as his own invention, or as divinely communicated to him, for the purpose of writing the ten commandments. They allege, in support of this presumption, that the commandments, as written by the Jews, contain all the letters of the Hebrew alphabet, except the *teth*. An other argument offered by these writers, in favor of their position, is the supposed fact that no book was previously written; but they appear to have overlooked the 21st chapter of Numbers, where we read: "Wherefore it is said, in the *book of the wars of the Lord*, what he did in the Red Sea, and in the brooks of Arnon, and at the stream of the brooks that goeth down to the dwelling of Ar, and leaneth upon the border of Moab."

Wherever the letters may have been invented, there appears to be no doubt that among those who early adopted their use, were particularly the Chaldeans and the Jews. The languages of these two nations were doubtless of common origin. Large specimens of both, in their early forms, are still preserved. They were very similar, in the mode of writing, from the right hand to the left, in the form of letters employed, and in their grammatical structure.

31. There is one important quality of the mind,

which is to be particularly noticed, in attending to language, under any of its forms. There is, every where, an aptitude in human talent, to conform to the necessity of circumstances. Our species, destitute of the best means of prosecuting desirable objects, resort to expedients, and acquire a degree of skill, which, without the trial, would seem beyond the compass of human power. A person deprived of sight or hearing, arrives at an acuteness in the exercise of his remaining senses, which excites the admiration of beholders. These principles apply, in a considerable degree, among a people destitute of written language. A great variety of devices have, at different times, been adopted, to remedy a want, which, in every unlettered community, must be severely felt. In addition to the various accounts handed down from antiquity, on this subject, the native Americans furnish many examples of recent date.

32. The emblematic paintings, the knots in strings, and various symbolic characters, among the Mexicans and Peruvians, displayed a considerable degree of mental refinement. Picture writing, in some form, has prevailed in nearly every age; and the present written languages of China and Japan are hieroglyphic, to a considerable extent, and not entirely arbitrary, as has been represented, in their structure and modifications.

The hieroglyphics of Egypt, from a common principle, must have had a tendency to retard the immediate adoption and progress of letters. This previous system of theirs must have been of course combined with their settled habits and prejudices. Being made familiar by use, they would not be likely to reject it, for a new system, though it might be one intrinsically better. For some reasons of

this kind, it doubtless happened that the Coptic alphabet was one of the latest formed, of any among the contiguous nations. It is probable also that the habits gained from hieroglyphic writing, tended to increase this Egyptian alphabet to the inconvenient number of two hundred and two letters, a large proportion of them representing syllables, instead of elementary sounds.

33. An other fact is very important, as explaining an extensive principle, running through the first forms of written language. The Syrians, and most of the contiguous nations, looked to the Egyptians, as teachers, in most of the sciences then known; and their communications to others were almost entirely through the medium of hieroglyphics. This system very naturally extended its influence to letter writing, as is strikingly shown in the names given to the alphabetic characters, and their adaptation, on hieroglyphic principles, to the great leading words in various ancient tongues.

Thus all the names of the letters themselves, in these languages, were pre-existing, significant words. *Aleph* in Hebrew, and *Alpha* in Greek, were only a modification of the same noun, and signified *leader*, *precursor*, *chief*. This first letter was also the number one, and represented the general idea of unity. In composition it entered into the name of the *Deity*, of *light*, *wisdom*, *priority*, and *being* in general. The other characters used in the early writings were also alphabetic and hieroglyphic at the same time.

34. Among nations destitute of any kind of writing, various devices are used, to aid the memory in preserving the knowledge of events. Among the ancient nations, the conditions of trea-

ties were recited before large bodies of people; remarkable formalities were used to give them solemnity, and such standing monuments were erected, as might serve to keep them in remembrance. The old became the teachers and guides of the young; for the wise Author of Nature, here, as in all the dispensations of his providence, left not his rational creatures without some means of instruction. Those who had passed the vigor of manhood, delighted in recounting the scenes of former days, which were listened to with delight, by the eager curiosity of the young. Specimens of rude carving were resorted to, as memorials of important events. Under such circumstances, mere oral language acquires a form and consistency, of which, reasoning upon abstract principles, we should hardly conceive it capable. All these operative causes were necessary to secure the farther progress of human improvement; for considerable advances must have been made, in language and mental cultivation, before men could invent an alphabet and bring it into use.

35. The instruction to be gained from the intellectual contrivances of savage life, is a very interesting theme to the mental philosopher. Among the Indians of North America, it is common, in complex transactions, for the chief orator to recite the conditions, article by article, and on the statement of each, to deliver a string of wampum, to a chosen witness, in token that he is to keep that particular portion in strict remembrance.

36. Though alphabetic characters appear to have been, soon after their invention, adopted by several nations, their progress was very unequal. *In some* countries, their use for ages was exceed-

ingly limited; and in others they appear to have been entirely lost, after being once introduced.

37. The confederated republics of Greece, rising in their own energies, with a language intrinsically excellent, compounded of its own elements, unimitative, unborrowed, rose to a pitch of excellence, in works of genius and taste, which modern nations are contented to imitate, and would hardly dare attempt to surpass.

The unrivalled excellence of the Grecian language and literature, sustained the mental dominion of these people, long after their civil power had failed; and the hardy Roman warriors, who had subjected the country to their arms, became enamored pupils of the foes they had conquered. The history of the world affords many analogous instances of the triumph of intellect over physical force. A conspicuous example of this is the conquest of China by the Tartars, the effect of which was simply to conform the victors to the customs of those whom they had nominally subjugated. The conquest of Greece tended greatly to improve the literary taste of Rome, while the wealth and luxury introduced, at the same period, from the east, was undermining its political power. The hordes that soon poured in, from the north, on this devoted land, exercised their ferocity alike on the monuments of virtue and the productions of genius; and the consequent intellectual degradation is hardly more evident, from historical facts, than from the declining style of the writers who record them.

38. The models of excellence which escaped the general devastation, at the downfall of the Roman empire, were collected for a time in Constantinople.

This city in its turn was doomed to yield to the dominion of barbarian foes, and a series of revolutions followed, in disastrous succession. The history of this period is a history of violence and crime; but even these bloody revolutions, so frequent and desolating, assume a melancholy interest, as connected with the scanty remains of learning in the world.

In the seventh century, an extraordinary individual, founding a religious system, on the love of show, and the sensual appetites of men, had given an impulse which was overspreading the fairest portion of the earth. His Arabian followers invaded the fertile plains of the Nile. After an obstinate siege of fourteen months, Alexandria, then one of the most splendid cities in the world, was taken by Omrou, general under the Caliph Omar. The Mahometan banners were every where displayed on the ancient walls of Egypt; and the Saracens, like the locusts of a former age, overspread the land. This monarchy had become, for the second time, the general center of science, and for centuries, the royal library of Alexandria had been the pride of successive kings. Every exertion of learning and power had been employed to enrich this great storehouse of intellectual wealth; which now exceeded half a million volumes; the choicest remains of preceding times. The barbarian general knew not how to dispose of this stupendous pile, and sent to his more barbarian sovereign for orders. The answer was, "If these books of the infidels contain only what is conformable to the Koran, they are useless; if contrary to it, they are mischievous and should be destroyed." The work of ruin was begun. It was a ferocious warfare on all the embellishments of human life. For weeks these

volumes served as fuel for the Alexandrian baths. They were carried out in huge piles, and burned in bonfires, the scene of savage sport. Hopeless Egypt saw the flames of her conquerors, gleaming far distant, through the darkness of her midnight, brightening her temples, pyramids, and towers, with a splendor more solemn than the deep contrasting shade. In the terrific brilliancy, so soon to pass away, the accumulated wisdom of ages, the pride of human genius, the glory of nations, the reward of heroes, were sinking for ever, in oblivious night.

39. These violent commotions among the nations of the earth, though shocking to the moral sensibilities of our nature, are deeply instructive in the knowledge of our fellow-beings. The astonishing contrasts presented, in various instances, impress the mind most strongly with the force of education and early habit, in forming the characters of men. The civilian, the linguist, the philosopher may gain important instruction from this contact of nations, the most opposite in customs and degrees of improvement. The savage conquerors of Italy erected their huts, in sight of Roman palaces unoccupied. The costliest utensils of luxurious refinement they regarded as the playthings of children; and preferred the wooden spoons of their native forests to the table furniture of the Cesars.

But amidst all the revolutions of human affairs, there have been a chosen few, in every age of the world, favored by genius, who have delighted in cultivating the better qualities of our nature, and have cast their intellectual light on the circle around them. Religion, however obscured and perverted, in particular instances, has in its general

course, been the great preserver and promoter of letters among mankind. The volumes deemed sacred have been spared, in the most shocking changes. Copies of these were multiplied; their original forms preserved; and amid all the mutations of worldly fashion, held more sacred for their antiquity. Of this kind were the Zendavesta of the Persians, the Jewish Scriptures and Talmud, the sacred Edda of Scandinavia, and the Gospel of the Messiah to the Christian world. It is particularly in the history and comparison of languages, that the original copies and various translations of these writings are invaluable to mankind.

40. A train of centuries succeeded, called the dark ages, when general ignorance prevailed, and all regard for liberal improvement seemed nearly lost. In this period of bigotry, under all the evils of the prevailing gloom, the monasteries were, in one respect, of vast importance to the cause of learning. They were sanctuaries from the violence of the times, and the fragments which remained from the general commotion were here preserved.

41. Many interesting facts might be adduced from this portion of mental history. A single instance must suffice for the present occasion.

About the year three hundred and seventy-six, christianity was introduced among the Visi-Goths, on the borders of the Euxine Sea. The scriptures were, not long after, translated into their language, by Ulphilas their bishop, a man of uncommon learning and virtue, for the age in which he lived. Nearly a thousand years after, a portion of this work, containing the four Evangelists, was found in the convent of Werden, in Germany It is a most valuable relic of the Teutonic lan-

guage, considered the best of ancient tongues, in their pure barbarian form, and the basis of most of the northern tongues of Europe. This work obtained the name of the silver book, from the color of its letters, written on pages of deep black. Copious specimens of this work, as quoted by different European philologists, appear to exhibit uncommon excellence in the structure of the language. We find in these Teutonic terms the radicals of many Saxon words, which are important roots of our modern English derivations.

42. After many convulsions, learning took another direction, and received a new impulse from a quarter least expected. The Saracens, by their conquests in Egypt, Asia, and the empire of the Greeks, became possessed of the most valuable writings which remained, and, under Mostanser, founder of the college of Al Madrasa, Haroun Al Raschid, and a succession of distinguished Caliphs, of the race of Abbas, Bagdad became the great center whence the glimmerings of intellectual light were diffused over a benighted world. Coarse paper made of cotton was in use; and for pens, the calamus reed was employed, as it still is in Syria, Egypt, and the Barbary States.

43. It is a high credit to the sovereigns and savans of Arabia, that in this age of prevailing ignorance and error, great pains was taken to cultivate their language in its purity, and particularly, that their alphabet exhibits better knowledge of the science of elementary sounds, than any other ever formed. The trifling remains of learning in Europe had fled with the monks to the cloisters, its only safe asylum, in the general superstition. Some degree of re-action now took

place. By way of Venice, or through Morocco and Spain, a portion of Arabian science was carried to the west, and with it many of the technical terms which it employed. The elements of Algebra and the figures of Arithmetic, wholly unknown in Europe before, were derived from the same source.

PART SECOND.

BRIEF SKETCH OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE.

44. In ancient Britain and Celtic Gaul, the language of the people was intimately combined with their religion. The Druids were the teachers of both, and were the rulers of the country. Every thing, of binding force over the public mind, issued from the sacred groves. Such was England, when Cesar's legions raised the Roman eagles on its shores. This distinguished scholar, as well as conqueror, has told us that these contiguous nations had the same religion; a similar form of government and laws; and the same general features of character. Their speech was like themselves, rude, energetic, irregular, and little known in writings of any kind.

The Roman dominion in this country, which in some form, lasted more than four hundred years, introduced a change which is still descernible in the old books; but the rude state of these early times, and the great subsequent revolutions, have left us no authentic records of their precise nature or extent.

45. The invasions by the Picts and Scots greatly harassed the inhabitants of South Britain, but

produced no essential change in their language; because these invasions did not lead to conquest and eventual union of the people; and because, though hostile to each other, their language was nearly the same. It was when the Saxons came to establish themselves in Britain, and from the thrones of their various kings, to wield their dominion, that the whole moral order was changed. Their language of Gothic origin was commingled with the Gaelic; and of the rough strong materials of both, the foundation of our modern English was formed. A portion of those native inhabitants who escaped the slaughter of conquest, disdaining a foreign yoke, retired to the mountains of Wales and of Scotland, where their ancient language and distinguishing features of character may still be plainly traced.

46. The Saxons and original Britons remaining in England, were united under the heptarchy, in all the intercourse of social life, and on the consolidation of that confederacy, became completely one people. There was very little of exterior influence to effect the regular progress in their language. Their acquaintance with the Danes was, like that of the Picts and Scots, chiefly in the clashing of arms, and not in the connexions of domestic life.

47. The reign of Alfred, which immediately succeeded, presents an other great epoch in the literature and language of England. This Prince, under the numerous disadvantages which surrounded him, appears to have been, as to all personal qualities, one of the greatest monarchs that ever wielded a scepter. He wrote several works with his own hand, some of which still exist, and are

the standard specimens of the language at that time. To him Oxford is chiefly indebted for its subsequent splendor; and it is not too much to say, that the national greatness of England has taken a higher course from the impulse given by this extraordinary man. He shines as a brilliant star, seen through the cloudy mantle of the night; and we cannot read his history without a powerful feeling of admiration for his talents and his virtues.

48. The next important epoch is the Norman conquest. This produced an essential change in the character of the English language, and the Norman French, being formally introduced by an edict of William the Conqueror, continued to be the language of the court, and of legal proceedings, for three centuries, down to the time of Edward the Third.

49. The discovery of America and of the eastern passage to India, during the reign of Henry the Seventh, opened new scenes to the wondering inhabitants of Europe, and gave a direction to commerce; to the intercourse and policy of nations, unknown before.

These recent events, with the art of printing, have greatly increased the means of knowledge, and opened various channels to improvement, mental, physical, and social, beyond those possessed by former ages. They have also extended their irresistible consequences to the English language; but this subject has not hitherto received that attention, as a great concern of public interest, to which, by its relative importance, it is so justly entitled.

50. One circumstance of great interest in relation to our language, seems not to be at all adverted

to by the British writers: and they continue to publish its vocabulary, as if chiefly made for London alone. But the man of enlarged mind can hardly fail to perceive that this language, instead of being, as formerly, limited to England, has, within a comparatively short period, been spread over vast regions in the four quarters of the globe; and by the joint influence of the two most commercial nations, is still extending with increased rapidity. From every human probability it is soon to be the language of more than a hundred millions of people, and perhaps of one-third of the human race. It is the common property of these extensive communities, so widely separated. from each other; the instrument of their intellectual improvement, their social enjoyment, their commercial transactions: the great mental attendant, from which the dearest ties of domestic life derive their highest gratification: the handmaid of science in all its walks: the medium of instruction, civil, moral, and religious: the basis of all the relations of war and peace: of public security, and personal right: of jurisprudence, and the decisions of life and death. This whole composition of individual elevation and national glory, so interwrought with every ligament of social existence, all this amazing system of intellectual machinery depends on the combinations of twenty-six little marks, of different forms, made on paper, and called letters.

51. The astonishing number of changes capable of being produced by the varied uses of a few elementary materials, afford so many instances of the simple sublime, in the plans of Divine wisdom. All that music ever did, or ever can perform, depends on the variations wrought on seven notes. Nine figures, with a cipher, in their combinations,

give all possible powers of number, and the whole machinery on earth is reducible to the five distinctive forms of the wedge, the lever, the wheel, the pulley, and the screw. All these analogies, drawn from the principles of other branches of science, point to a course almost directly opposite to that so long pursued in grammar schools: for though language, especially the English, in its present structure, is too irregular to be reduced to mathematical precision, its elements may, to a considerable degree, be analyzed, their combinations discovered, their anomalies lessened, and a basis laid for gradual improvement, according to general and consistent laws.

52. Scarcely any idea appears to have prevailed, among English scholars, that their language has an origin and a character of its own. So little was known of independent English rules, that the celebrated Milton, may, in the following passage, be considered as in some degree the interpreter for the British universities in his time. "The scholars should begin their studies with some good grammar, either that now used or any better: and while this is doing, their speech is to be fashioned to a distinct and clear pronunciation, as near as may be to the Italian, especially in the vowels; for we Englishmen, being far northerly, do not open our mouths in the cold air wide enough to grace a southern tongue: but we are observed by all nations to speak exceeding close and inward; so that to smatter Latin with an English mouth is as ill as hearing law French."

53. It is only by an attention to the elementary structure of our own language, on scientific principles, that rational improvement can be expected.

A train of circumstances has led to a general system of false teaching in England, which Americans have hitherto submissively followed. It is comparatively a short time since all the learned works of Europe were written in Greek or Latin. The latter was connected with religious faith and religious prepossessions, when all depended on the church of Rome. Though these tongues had ceased to be any where spoken, they were emphatically called the learned languages, and what they styled the vulgar tongue was made an object of secondary concern, or rather of absolute contempt. However excellent the literature of Greece and Rome may be, there was great pedantry in the English colleges, in attempting to graft the original branches of their language upon these foreign stocks. There is certainly a strange ignorance, both in England and America, of the real fountains of our native speech. All that has been done in exploring these sources is by a very small number of unaided individuals. The necessery consequence is, that so far as public patronage has extended, good English has always been sacrificed to bad Latin and Greek; and attempts to explain our mother tongue have been by arbitrary and partial analogies from foreign languages, with which it has but a remote affinity. The English tongue is, in its original structure, one of the most easy in the world to learn and follow; but made one of the most difficult by the errors of false practice.

54. On the subject of making any change in spirit or form in the English language, the most opposite opinions prevail. It is said, on one hand, that it is already fixed, and can admit no change: that Dr. Johnson has settled its vocabulary: Walker, Sheridan, and Jones, its pronunciation; and

Murray its grammatical rules; and that every attempt at improvement is fraught with mischief. This opinion appears to prevail to a considerable extent in the United States. An other opinion is that a living language can neither be arrested nor guided in its course, more than the wind can be chained; and this is the prevailing doctrine in England. Neither is true to the extent to which it is carried. Mr. Todd tells us, in the London editions of his dictionary, that he has added 14,000 words, not found in any vocabulary before. The simple fact that one individual can add a fifth part to the entire body of the language, may give some idea how far it is fixed, so as to need no change.

55. It is not within the plan of the present work to attend to pronunciation. It is known to be in a very confused state in England. The writings of Italians and Frenchmen to explain English to their people, give a more scientific and correct exposition of the sounds of our letters, than any work by a British author, ever yet published. These remarks are thrown out without comment, that we may come at once to the consideration of our own country, in reference to its present condition, and its future prospects.

One of the first ideas presented to the mind, in relation to the United States, is the peculiar situation in which we are placed, differing from that of every other community which has existed on earth; for we have no account of any nation, a prime object of whose government was to diffuse instruction among the entire body of their people. The attempt has never been made, on a national plan, to produce uniformity, among all classes of people, in the speaking of a national language. Both these objects are of prime importance in the *United States*.

56. All that concerns our public happiness, our union and peace, within ourselves; all which tends to develop our resources, improve and perpetuate our institutions; all which may give us wealth, strength, and glory, among nations, depends on the general course of instruction: that instruction, in a great degree, on the goodness of our national language, which is the instrument of all. Our population has increased from 2,500,000 to 5,000,000, and from five millions to ten, in 44 years. We are still proceeding at the same rapid rate of increase, which is beyond all parallel in ancient or modern days. Our course of moral and physical progress is greater than that of our numbers. This impulse, extending to hundreds of millions of people, must take its direction from the general literature of our country, connected, to a greater extent than most persons would believe, with the degree of cultivation given to our speech. The principles of language, therefore, necessarily blend themselves with all our prime interests as a nation; and to those who are prepared to enter on this investigation, it is a source of unceasing admiration, that while the great leading rules of speech are few and simple, the minor variations are endless. The relative changes of words, connected with the workings of thought, adapt themselves to every imaginable form of utterance, and run into each other by such nice gradations, as are hardly obvious to the keenest observations of philosophy. Instead of considering the study of language as the mere task of the schools, there is reason to believe that a better understanding of its elements will lead to great improvements in mental and physical researches. The structure of speech, as exhibited in different conditions of society, is an exhaustless

store of practical facts and principles, which go far beyond all abstract reasoning, in teaching to man the great lesson, "*Know thou thyself.*"

ESSAY, &c.

CHAPTER I.

PRELIMINARY EXPLANATIONS.

57. One of the greatest difficulties in language, is the loose manner in which terms are frequently used, even by writers of distinguished reputation and influence. The word *perfect* refers only to the "highest conceivable excellence, that which is neither defective nor redundant, absolutely faultless;" yet we find Dr. Johnson, contrary to his own definition, Dr. Blair, and most other British authors, of the highest reputation, habitually comparing this word, which properly admits of no comparison. One thing may be more excellent than an other, because excellence is always a relative term; but to go beyond perfection, is for the rider to jump over the horse, instead of seating himself in the saddle. More perfect is the same as less; because it is not most perfect, and consequently not perfect at all.

58. The same observations will apply to *insurmountable*, *unattainable*, *supreme*, *extreme*, *immense*, *insuperable*, and a multitude of others, which contain the total affirmation or negation in the simple meaning of the term.

Ex. "The whole library [*that of Christina Queen of Sweden*] is contained in an *immense* gallery, 214 feet long, and 48 feet broad."—*Dr. Brewster.*

It requires but little reflection to perceive the absurdity of speaking of an immeasurable or boundless room of two hundred and fourteen feet long.

"Ignorance of the signification of words, which is want of understanding, disposeth men to take on trust, not only the truth they know not, but the errors, and which is more, the nonsense of them they trust; for neither error nor sense can, without a *perfect* understanding of words, be detected."—*Hobbs. Leviathan, Chap. II.*

59. Language consists of words, employed by common consent, as signs of thought.

The primitive meaning of the word *language*, is the utterance of the human voice as directed by the *tongue*. The name of this chief instrument of speech has been adopted among most nations to signify language itself.

60. In a philosophic exposition of speech, the same words must be attended to in three distinct points of view.

1. Their literal, original, and strict meaning.

2. The general acceptation which they acquire by fashion and use.

3. Their different import by different relations to other words, or their manner of signification.

Thus the verb *do* signifies to *act* or *practise*; but in the familiar question, "How do you do?" the uniform understanding is, what is the state of your health; though the literal meaning is, how do you act, behave or conduct yourself.

The same idea is conveyed in the French question, "Comment vous portez vous?" how do you carry yourself.. In Spanish, "*Como lo va?*" how do you go; answering to the Saxon expression still prevalent in many places, *how fare you?* from the old verb *faran*, to travel or go.

The short familiar phrase in Latin was, "*Quid agis?*" what are you doing.

When a man is under the temporary delirium of a fever, we say in English, "he is out of his head." To express the same idea, the French say, "he is out of himself;" or otherwise, "*Il a perdu sa tete ;*" "He has lost his head ;" not meaning that the man's head is cut off, but that his senses are disordered.

So if it is said that a person is in a situation of particular difficulty, and at a loss for expedients, the common English phrase is, he does not know which way *to turn himself.* The Frenchman says, from habit and with great seriousness, "*Il ne sait sur quel pied de danser ;*" he does not know which foot to dance on. There is also, in most languages, a great number of figurative expressions, which grow into characteristic idioms, and give a turn to the general current of thought ; as the expressions of joy, "To have a light heart," "To beat the ground with a light foot ;" but the consideration of this subject will be reserved to an other part of this work.

61. An other principle of language, of considerable importance to the philosophic investigator, is the transitive meaning of words. This gradual change takes place in numerous instances, and from various causes, most commonly a change of the circumstances or opinions which led to the first application.

The words *rogue* and *villain*, according to their original use, implied merely a person of humble or *vile* condition, without associating any idea of dishonesty. The men bearing these disgraceful names were feudal dependants, who might be very well meaning men, and exceedingly faithful to their lords. The present meaning of the words, has grown up, in Europe, by imperceptible degrees, from the incidental idea, that a low condition in life is attended with greater infamy than bad character. On the other hand, *slave* originally implied a person of bad moral principles, and not one in bondage.

Leghorn bonnets were so named from the place where they were made ; but the name has acquired a farther meaning, descriptive of the kind of manufacture. A *silk bonnet*, made in that city would not be a *Leghorn bonnet* under the established meaning of the phrase ; and the time may arrive when this article may be as little restricted to a specific locality as *Morocco leather*.

62. Words also take various shades of meaning, depending on their combination. These meanings are to be learned only by practice. A *white house* is a house *painted white* on the outside. A *black horse* is one whose *coat of hair* is of that color ; but *red lead* is the oxid of that metal prepared by a particular process in a reverberatory furnace. If a man, under a contract to deliver *red lead*, should bring forward leaden bars coated with red paint, it would be a low trick, which the common sense and the moral feeling of the whole community would condemn ; yet this article would literally correspond with the *white house*.

The word sell was formerly used in the same sense in which we at present employ the verb *to*

give. It signified to bestow, without implying any equivalent return, and occurs in the form of the Lord's prayer, as written by Alfred, Bishop of Durham, about the beginning of the tenth century. "Our *loaf*, most needful, *sell* us to day."

63. Words are also frequently changed by ironical use. *Wiseacre*, as first used, signified in sober earnest, *a sage philosopher;* as appears in the examination before King Edward the Sixth, quoted in the annotations of Mr. Locke, as "faithfullye copyed, by John Leylande, Antiquarius, by the commaunde of his Highnesse."

"Peter Gower, a Grecian, journeyedde ffor Kunnynge yn Egypte, and yn Syria, and yn everyche londe whereas the Venetians hadde plauntedde maconrye, wynnynge entrance, he lerned muche, and retournedde and woned yn Grecia Magna, wacksyne and becommynge a myghtie *wyseacre* and gratelyche renowed, &c."

In plain modern English, Pythagoras travelled for knowledge in Egypt, Syria, and every land where the Phenicians had established masonry; obtaining entrance, he learned much, and returned and dwelt in Grecia Magna, becoming an eminent savan, and greatly renowned. The term wiseacre has been employed in levity and irony, till it is hardly admissible in dignified style, and when used in lighter compositions, signifies a man wise only in his own conceit. *Dunce* is from *Duns Scotus*, a man highly famed for learning in his time; and the name *Solomon* would long ago have become the most expressive word in the language to signify a downright blockhead, if the sacred volume had not fixed the meaning of the word, beyond the power of change.

This course of illustration might be greatly extended; but in all which is here said, it is not so much the design to proceed to minute detail, as to advance general principles which may serve, in some degree, as a guide to those who are inclined to pursue a farther course of investigation.

64. The meaning and application of words are also changed by a great variety of accidental circumstances and associations. Many instances of ignorance, servility, and caprice might be given in this department of speech. A single example will illustrate the gradual transition in the meaning of words, and the observing scholar may increase the number at his pleasure.

Among the numerous saints, male and female, formerly worshipped in England, was *Saint Bride*, which is a contraction of Bridget; *Latin*, *Brigitta*. A church in London is called *St. Bride*. This name was formerly applied to a *well* near Fleet Ditch. Near *St. Bride's well*, a palace was built by king Henry VIII. and called *Bridewell* Palace. This edifice was subsequently transferred to the corporation of London, and converted into a house of correction, for which the term *Bridewell* has become the general appellative word.

65. Language, in reference to the means employed for its transmission, is divided into two kinds, spoken and written.

Spoken language consists of distinct vocal sounds, modulated and arranged by progressive usage.

Written language is the representation of those sounds, by visible characters, variously combined.

A broader definition may be given to speech, as including all possible signs, by which one being makes known his ideas or sensations to an other;

but, to this extent, it cannot be reduced to settled rules, and is not the subject of grammatical explanation.

66. The interchange of thought, by a system of signs employed by deaf mutes, throws additional light on the subject of language, as connected with the operations of the mind. This new path of science is constantly leading to farther developments, under able teachers, and its principles are, doubtless, capable of extensive application. It is a new sort of artificial or conventional language; addressed to the eye, instead of the ear, and is of inestimable value to the class of persons for whose use it was designed.

GRAMMAR.*

67. Grammar is an explanation of the principles on which language is formed. The use of grammar, as a science, is to guard against deviations from the settled rules of speech.

A dispute of very little utility has been maintained, whether the word *grammar* applies, in strictness, to the essential principles of language, or the system of rules to explain them. If the explanatory system is just, the two things are virtually the same, and the application of the term grammar

* In this treatise the technical terms long used, are retained as far as they will apply. It is not the purpose to introduce a new set of words, but to endeavor to lay a basis for rectifying *false principles*.

to either, is within those moderate bounds of metonomy which must be allowed in every language.

68. Grammar is general when it treats of the leading principles common to all languages; comparative, in pointing out the coincidences, analogies, and differences between one form of speech and an other; and particular, when its investigations are confined to a single tongue. It is the design of the present work to attend to these three considerations, according to their relative importance.

69. Grammar is confined in its investigations to the formation of single sentences, and in this does not necessarily include the idea of the best diction. It has reference to the orderly arrangement of words, according to their several classes and relations.

70. It belongs to the science of rhetoric, to teach the choice of the best words, and arrange them so as to produce the highest effect.

Thus it is a perfectly grammatical expression to say, "*virtue* and *vice* are *equally commendable.*" Here the words are duly placed, according to their relation and dependence on each other; and, within the bounds of grammar rules, there is no impropriety. It is for the rhetorician to show that *virtue* and *vice* are contradictory qualities, not equally commendable, and that it is our duty to promote one and restrain the other.

71. But if we assert that "an oyster is a very sprightly animal;" it is good both in grammar and rhetoric; for the sentence is perfectly correct,

so far as *mere language* is concerned; though it asserts what is not true in natural history: it is not the business of writers on language, in character as such, to settle doctrines in science, morals, or metaphysics: though it is necessary to the effect which the speaker or writer would produce, that his principles should be at least apparently just.

72. One of the great defects of many writers on grammar, seems to be the want of proper distinction between the effect which words may have, by their relation and use in a sentence, and that which results only from the specific import of the single word. The classification of the different parts of speech depends, not on the *absolute meaning* of words, but their *manner of meaning*.

73. An other error of mischievous tendency springs from the gross ignorance which is constantly multiplying grammar rules, to explain what needs no other explanation than the proper definition of the numerous words absurdly represented as having no meaning. In this way the theories respecting articles, particles, and auxiliaries; disjunctive conjunctions, and postpositive prepositions, result from vain attempts of grammarians to supply the deficiency of lexicographers.

74. Grammar is divided into four parts, *Orthography*, Etymology, Syntax, and Prosody.

Orthography means correct spelling. It teaches the letters with their sounds, and their combinations into syllables and words.

The part of grammar which teaches the derivations, changes, definition, and classification, of single words, is called *Etymology*.

Syntax is the orderly arrangement of words in a sentence.

Prosody teaches the distribution of accents best calculated to produce harmony, and relates chiefly to the measure of poetry.

ORTHOGRAPHY.

75. This first division of grammar relates entirely to written language. It treats of the letters used in writing, the various sounds which they represent, and the combinations of these elements to form significant words.

76. In a language properly written, each letter should represent one uniform sound, and every sound should have its appropriate letter: but in the imperfection of human skill, this regularity is not to be expected. All languages have taken their original structure chiefly from the immediate circumstances and the wants of men, and not from philosophic arrangement. The number of letters used in writing has greatly varied, from 16 to 200 and upwards. Their forms also have been greatly altered, and the same letter is, at different times and places, made to represent sounds the most dissimilar.

The characters employed in the English written language are twenty-six, divided into *vowels* and *consonants*.

The *vowels* are *a*, *e*, *i* or *y*, *o*, and *u* or *w*: the remaining letters are consonants.

A true vowel is a perfectly pure and simple

sound. Two vowels, *both sounded* in the same syllable, are called a *dipthong*.

Consonants are sounded only in connexion with vowels.

77. One of the greatest difficulties in language, is the fluctuation and uncertainty to which the sounds of letters have always been liable. Mr. De Kemplin, a mechanician at Vienna, bestowed great pains, for several years, on an attempt to form an instrument which should imitate various sounds and combinations of the human voice. This he professes to have done, to a very considerable extent; but his own details of the process which he followed, show that his design was more curious than useful. He attempted too much.

One attainment which there is some reason to believe practicable, would be of vast importance to the literary world. This is the formation of a graduated standard machine, or what might, not improperly, be called a pitchpipe of simple vowel sounds. Such an instrument, if produced, might be regulated with great accuracy; transmitted from one country to an other, and handed down to future times. Those who have been at the pains accurately to learn new sounds, in different languages, within the period of their clear recollection, will need no argument in favor of the utility of what is here proposed. The necessity of such an acquisition might be farther shown, by half a dozen learned men, from as many nations, reading, each in turn, a page of Latin, as taught at their respective universities.

The notes of singing birds are imitated, with great accuracy, by machinery; and a transmissible standard of the human articulation would, next to the invention of letters, and the art of printing, be the greatest step in the advancement of language.

ETYMOLOGY.

78. The second part of grammar treats of the *derivation*, *meaning*, and *changes* of words. It also divides them into their different classes or parts of speech, according to their *manner of signification*.

Words are either *primitive* or *derivative*, *simple* or *compound*.

Primitive words are those which are not derived from any other, in the same language. The addition of letters or syllables to primitive words, to vary their meaning, forms *derivitives*; as, *American* from *America*, *bravely* from *brave*.

Compound words are the combination of two or more simple ones, as *candlestick*, *inkstand*, *penknife*.

79. There are two great classes of words, from which all others are derived, and into which they may all be resolved. These are nouns and verbs; or words of *naming*, and words of *asserting*;* but as in the progress and refinement of language, these original words receive numerous modifications, for the more prompt and specific expression of thoughts, it is found convenient to admit other classes as auxiliary to those of absolute necessity.

In English, and in languages generally, there may be reckoned *seven sorts of words*, or, as they are commonly called, parts of speech: *nouns*, *pronouns*, *adjectives*, *verbs*, *adverbs*, *conjunctions*, and *prepositions*.

---

* *Alterum est quod loquimur; alterum de quo loquimur.* *Quintil.* Lib. I. cap. 4.

Besides these, there is a sort of vague sounds, with which many writers have included occasional distinct words, called interjections. As these have, however, very little connexion with regulated speech, a separate explanation of them will be given in the proper place.

80. Nouns are names of things, real or conceivable ; as *man*, *Boston*, *cyclops*. Man is the general name of the human species ; Boston is a particular city ; and cyclops denotes an imaginary race of giants.

Pronouns are used instead of nouns, to prevent the repetition of the same word ; as, John is good ; *he* does well ; *we* must reward *him*. The pronouns *he* and *him* are substituted for the noun John ; and the pronoun *we* stands for all the persons whom the speaker represents.

Adjectives are words used with nouns, to specify or describe them ; as, *her second* and *third* daughters are *amiable* and *dutiful* children. The first three adjectives specify what particular persons are meant, and the last two describe them. Words used to show that a thing *is* or *exists* in some state, or *does* some action, are called verbs ; as, *I am* here ; he *is* well ; we *live*, *move*, and *have* our being. The bird *sings ;* Jackson *saved* New-Orleans.

Adverbs are a large class of terms, generally formed by two or more words united in one. They express manner of action, degree of quality, time, order, and other circumstances, connected with the ever-varying interchange of thought ; as, she writes *well ;* a *very* fine apple ; *for ever*, *jointly*. *severally*.

Conjunctives, or conjunctions, are used to connect words and phrases, generally under the same

grammatical relation; as, "John *and* I shall go, Monday *or* Tuesday, *and* stay two *or* three days, *but* not longer."

Prepositions are connective words, which serve to introduce a following object, with incidental reference to a preceding or correlative proposition; as, we came *from* Charleston *by* land *through* Richmond *to* Baltimore.

NOUNS.

81. Sometimes called substantives.

Noun is derived from the Latin word *nomen*, a name.

Nouns are names of *things*, real or conceivable; as, tree, Troy, blackness, Hydra of Lerné.

The word *things* is here to be taken in its greatest latitude of meaning, including all objects, qualities, and fictions of the mind, simple or complex, to which names are applied.

Some nouns express merely the negation of a thing; as nonentity, nothingness.

82. Nouns are of two kinds, common and proper.

Common nouns designate sorts of things, according to their descriptive qualities; as, chair, boy, city, quadruped.

Proper names are applied to individuals, to identify them among others of their kind; as, *Solomon Belmot*, *Albany*, *Hamilcar*.

Any word becomes a proper noun when used as an individual name; as, "*Christian Wolf*,"

"*Praise-God Barebones*," the ships "*Congress*," and "*Fair Trader*;" the race-horse "*Eclipse*," the "*Potter's Field*," the "*United States*."

On the other hand, specific names become common nouns when applied as words of general meaning; as, *Dunces*, a *Judas*, *Jack Tars*, many *Catilines*, the *Solomons* of the city; "this is a deceiver and an *Antichrist*."—2 John, 7.

The question whether a noun is proper or common, depends on the fact of its being used as a significant word, or of its being specifically applied as an individual designation.

The word God is a common noun, because it is not applied to the Supreme Being peculiarly, nor as an individual name, but in reference to his attributes, and relations as the ruler of the world. The word applies to many imaginary beings, conceived of as existing under a similar character.

To nouns belong person, number, gender, and case.

Most nouns are of the third person. They are of the second when directly addressed, as persons present, and listening to the speaker; as, "*Countrymen* and *Fellow Soldiers*." "O *Liberty!* sound once delightful to every Roman ear!"

Nouns are never of the first person, except as mere expletives, in apposition with a pronoun; as, "Now *I*, *Paul*, myself, beseech you, who, being absent, *am* bold toward you."

NUMBER.

83. Nouns have two numbers, the singular and the plural. The singular denotes one thing, as bandit; the plural, any number more than one, as bandits. This division into singular and plural, is

the general principle of language, though it is not without exceptions. The Hebrew, as written with points, the Greek, Sanscrit, all the dialects of the Teutonic, and several other languages, have each three numbers, the *singular*, the *dual*, and the *plural*. The dual speaks of two or a pair, and the plural of any number more than two. Some nouns have no plural; as, fitness, chaos: Others have no singular; as, tongs, shears. *Sheep* and *deer* are of both numbers. *Swine* is a vulgar corruption from *sowen*, the plural of *sow*, and it should not be used in the singular. Of the same kind is *kine*, plural of *ky*, the ancient word for *cow*. *Kye* is now used in Scotland for *cattle*. The word *people* stands alone in its character. Without changing its form, it is either a noun of multitude, having no plural; or, referring to individuals, it has no singular. Thus we say, "a united people." "Many people are of that opinion."

The word cattle is without change, singular in its form, with a plural meaning.

The English plural is generally formed, by adding *s* to the singular. This rule has several modifications and exceptions.

1. Words ending in ch, sh, ss, x, or z, take the addition of *es*, to form the plural, making an other syllable, which is necessary for ease and distinctness of pronunciation. *Church*, *churches*; sash, sashes; press, presses; fox, foxes; buzz, buzzes. Those also which end with the sound of *s*, *z*, or soft *g*, followed by *e* mute, make an additional syllable in pronunciation; as, *roses*, *places*, *carriages*.

Proper nouns, as well as common, admit the plural number; as, there are forty *John Smiths* in the city of New-York; the Miss *Van Nesses*; the twelve *Cesars*; both the *Senecas*: all the *Howards*.

GENDER.

84. To distinguish the sexes by some different form of words, is a general principle, common to all languages. The word *gender* is used to express this grammatical distinction. Words denoting *males* are of the *masculine gender:* names of *females* are *feminine;* and the technical word *neuter* applies to things which are of *neither sex.*

85. By a figure of rhetoric, called personification, we sometimes speak of inanimate things as having personal qualities. Of the moon, it is poetically said, "she sheds her mild beams."

This ascription of sex to things without life like most other deviations from truth and nature, leads to many inconsistencies: Thus it is said of the ship Hercules, Jupiter, or James Monroe, "*she* sails well." If ship must be considered *feminine,* it should take none but a name appropriate to the *female character.*

86. Grammarians have imagined a philosophic principle in the application of gender to inanimate things. They tell us, "We commonly give the *masculine* gender to nouns which are conspicuous for the qualities of imparting or communicating, and which are by nature strong and efficacious; and those are *feminine* which are peculiarly *beautiful* and *amiable.*" This seems like a very plausible theory, and is wrought into a fine system by Dr. Lowth, and by Mr. Harris in his Hermes. From their time it has been trustingly copied by nearly all the compilers of grammar, and volumes wasted upon it. The whole theory sprang from

the imagination of its authors. There is no such principle in the structure of those languages which refer every thing to two genders; still less in English, in which a rational philosophy is the only guide belonging to the language itself, and in which writers personify according to their individual fancy. In those tongues, in which adjectives take the agreement of number and gender with nouns, the whole application to inanimate objects depends on the mere accidental ending of the word. Not the least attention is paid to any supposed nature of the thing. Nothing is more contrary to fact, than the whole system taught in English schools respecting the application of genders to inanimate objects.

If *virtue* is *feminine* from its *beauty*, why were all the *crimes* of *Babylon* personified in the character of a *woman*? why are *vice*, *slander*, and deceitful *fortune* also *feminine*; and why have mortals been so much afflicted by *sorceresses*, *witches*, and midnight *hags*? probably in the latter case, from the *love* of mankind for what is *marvellous*, as well as what is *beautiful* and *amiable*. How would *Bellona*, *Pallas*, and the *Amazons*, be flattered by this gratuitous grammatical courtesy of their gallant friends, *Harris*, *Lowth*, and *Murray*?

87. We are told that the *sun* is *masculine*, and the *moon*, *feminine*. So they are in *Greek* and *Latin*; but it is exactly the reverse, in ancient *Teutonic*, *Gothic*, and *Scandinavian*: in the *Dutch*, *German*, *Swedish*, *Danish*, and all the northern languages of modern Europe, except the *Sclavonian*, in which they are both neuter. In the *Saxon* language, from which our mother tongue is directly derived, the words *moon* and *man* are from the same root, and mean the same thing. In their

mythology the *moon* is the representative of *Tuisco*, the father of *gods* and *men*, answering to the *Grecian Jupiter;* and the *sun* is his wife. Down to the time of Shakspeare, he calls the sun a *fair wench*, in flaming taffeta, as may be seen by reference to his Henry IV. Part I.

88. If we go to the *Hebrew*, *Greek*, and *Latin*, emphatically called the learned languages, we find the *battering ram*, *sambuca*, *testudo*, *vinea*, and *catapulta*, the most terrible engines of war which the skill of man has ever invented, are, by construction of language, in the *feminine gender:* the same may be said of the *javelin*, *spear*, and *dagger*, which are not particularly distinguished for the *delicacy* of their structure or use. In French, the word *army* is *feminine*. Most of the *instruments of war*, are also *feminine*, as *sword*, *bayonet*, and others: so are the words for *thunderbolt*, the *gallows*, and *guillotine*, which cannot be on account of their particular *delicacy*, *beauty*, or *amiableness*. In words denoting *qualities*, the terms *violence*, *rage*, *vengeance*, *deformity*, *cruelty*, *strength*, *grossness*, *ferocity*, *war*, *pestilence*, *famine*, and *death*, are all the same *lovely*, *feminine personages:* and on the contrary, the *pink*, the *lily* of the valley, the *reed*, are masculine; because, according to the same logic, they are *strong* and *efficacious*. *Charms*, *attractions*, and *smiles*, are *masculine* also, and doubtless for the same good reason. The French language has two words for *ship*, and they are both *masculine*.

90. In the *Spanish*, *Portuguese*, and *Italian* languages, which in construction make every noun *he* or *she*, the *inquisition* and most of the *instru-*

ments of *torture* used in it, are of the *feminine* gender; which, according to the grammatical logic, is on account of their very *amiable* and *enticing* qualities: but it is needless to pursue this subject any farther. So much would not have been said, if it had not been rendered necessary, by the existing prejudices of false teaching.

91. Many words apply to either sex, or both; as, parent, child, cousin, friend, bird, quadruped. These words, are said in parsing, to be of the common gender.

In some instances, the *masculine* word is extended to mean the *whole species*; as *man*, to denote the *human race*. *Horses*, in the common acceptation of the word, includes *mares* and *colts*: so *geese* and *ducks*, which strictly mean the *females* alone, are used to include the *whole kind*.

92. There are three ways of distinguishing the genders by the construction of the English language.

1st. By *different words*; as *husband*, *wife*, *brother*, *sister*, *son*, *daughter*; *buck*, *doe*.

2d. By *different ending*: as adding to the masculine *ess*, which is a contraction of the Hebrew word *essa*, a *female*; as *poet*, *poetess*, *count*, *countess*; or with a contraction of the first word; as in abbot, abbess, actor, actress.

3d. By prefixing a descriptive word; as *man* servant, *woman* servant; a *male* pigeon, *female* philosophers; *gentlemen* visiters, *lady* boarders; a *ewe* lamb, a *she* goat.

93. It is a remarkable fact that so many nations, widely separated from each other by time and dis-

tance, should have agreed in classing all inanimate things under the masculine and feminine genders. The ancient *Hebrew*, the *Syriac*, *Chaldean*, and, others, made every thing *he* or *she*. The modern *French*, *Italian*, and *Portuguese* have two genders only; and though in *Spanish* there is a nominal neuter, it is confined to few adjectives used substantively; as, *lo bueno*, which is a mere convenient contraction for *the good people;* or whatever other term of general import may be understood. *Most Greek* and *many Latin* nouns, which are neither *male* nor *female* in nature, are made so in construction of language; as, *pen*, *book*, *paper*, *house*, and thousands of others.

CASE.

94. The term *case* has been used, in several languages to denote a different *beginning* or *ending* of words to express different relations. Under this definition of the term, nouns in English have no *cases;* for they have nothing answering to the grammatical distinction of *cases* in *Greek*, *Latin*, and many other languages. The *relative positions* of English nouns in a sentence are only two, which have heretofore been described by grammarians under the name of the nominative and the objective case. In these two relations they are presented as *leading* or *led*, in a regular sentence; as *acting* or *acted upon;* as *subjects* concerning which verbs affirm, or as *objects* at which some action centers or terminates. These two relations of nouns in English, are determined by connexion with other words, and not by any change in the noun itself.

95. Writers on English grammar have made a *third case*, called *possessive:* but this noun, when put in the possessive case, necessarily becomes an *adjective* by use, and, under that class of words, where it belongs, will be explained.

The addition of an *apostrophe* and *s* forms the noun into a *specifying word*, referring to an other noun; as *Saturn's belt*, *Burgoyne's defeat.*

96. The things to which nouns are applied as names, consist:

1st. Of sensible objects, or substances perceivable by one or more of the five corporeal senses, seeing, hearing, feeling, taste, and smell. Such are a star, a flute, a thistle, an orange.

In the application of language to this class of things, we are to consider them, not as they appear to philosophic investigation; but as they are directly presented to our bodily organs: for all languages receive their main structure from plain men, judging from obvious appearances, and not from chymists, physiologists, or mechanicians. The name horse is given to a particular quadruped, as a single object, exhibited immediately to the sight, and not with any necessary reference to his aptitudes, or internal organization. Every farther idea of this animal, as a complex being, and as a link in the great chain of creation, depends on the ulterior progress and refinement of knowledge.*

* "An ordinary man sees an object just as it happens to be presented to him, and sees no more. But a man of genius takes it to pieces, inquires into its cause and effects; remarks its internal structure; and considers what would have been the result, if its members had been combined in a different way, or subjected to different influences. The man of genius gains a whole magazine of thoughts, while the ordinary man

It is not the design of this work to debate the question, what is the real nature of *light*, *heat*, and *color*, nor to engage in other subjects of scientific disquisition; but to employ these and all other words according to the best popular use.

97. 2. Qualities of matter, considered as residing in bodies, and forming different elementary parts of their aggregate nature, as, *opacity*, *color*, *weight*, *cohesion*, &c.

We speak of the *hardness* of iron; yet that certain *something* which we mean by the word *hardness* can never be extracted from the metal and shown as a separate substance. This quality exists in very different degrees; but, to some extent, is necessarily connected with every species of matter.

Illustration. We may take milk in one glass, and water in an other. If these are mingled, no skill, mechanical or chymical, can separate them; yet we continue to contemplate them as objects of distinct mental conception. We speak of the water in the milk; the milk in the water; and the whiteness it imparts to the mixture. In the same manner the mind conceives of hardness in iron, and on this principle names are applicable to inherent qualities, through all their combinations.

98. 3. The third order of *things*; to which names

---

has received only one idea; and his powers are multiplied in proportion to the number of ideas upon which they are to be so employed. Now there is perhaps nothing that contributes more eminently to this subtilizing and multiplication of mind, than an attention to the structure of language."

Godwin, on the Study of the Classics.

are applied, is the class of *mental objects*, or *incorporeal beings;* as *mind, soul, spirit, angel, God.* This class of existences is entirely different from material things: known indeed with no less certainty, but by a totally different kind of evidence. The mind is the immortal part of man; endowed with reason, consciousness, memory, and other faculties, of which each person has the knowledge within himself. We are certain that we have reasoning or thinking faculties, because we think. This class of being therefore, is ascertained by our inward consciousness, as clearly as material objects are exhibited to our bodily organs.

The knowledge of *spiritual existences*, must in the earliest ages, either have been the subject of *divine revelation*, or it is a *conscious truth*, springing up with the first dawnings of reason in the mind; for there seems never to have been a language on earth, which did not in its essential structure, recognize this class of *unseen beings.*

99. 4. *Mental qualities.* Mind as well as matter has its *qualities*; a recognition of which enters into the general principles of language. *Wisdom, benevolence, cunning*, belong to *mind*, as *light, heat*, and *smoothness* do to *bodies:* but there is nothing in the organization of speech, connected with the inquiry how mental qualities exist in the mind itself: for, among all nations, language must have received its general cast, and made great advances, before men learn to reason concerning their own reasoning powers. There is an other reason, which may explain this principle, hitherto unexplained, as it is connected with the structure of language. The *idea* of the *mind itself*, as a separate existence, is *inferential.* Its *qualities* therefore are deduced

by *secondary inference;* and both these classes of *inferential conceptions* must be referred to sensible objects, before they can acquire a definite perceptible form, and be communicated from one intelligent being to an other.

100. 5. *Attendant circumstances.* This class of words Mr. Locke calls modes of matter; as, *evening, morning, motion, weather,* a *storm,* an *earthquake,* a *fever*: the fall of the leaf. Here it will be observed that *fall* is not the name of the leaf, nor of any thing which inheres in it, or essentially belongs to it; but the mere *happening,* which affects it only for a moment. *Evening* is not the name of a substance, nor of any inherent quality of the earth or the air. As the earth turns on its axis, it intercepts, at regular periods, the rays of the sun, and darkness ensues. The name of this *circumstance,* attendant on the earth's revolution, is called *night,* and in its first approaches, *evening.* The same observations apply to the very numerous words of this class. *Mental existences,* as well as material bodies, have their attendant circumstances. *Soul* is a *mental object. Consciousness* is one of its *essential qualities: joy* and *grief, anger, shame, gratitude, resentment,* &c. are its temporary affections, or *attendant circumstances.*

It is found in philosophic parsing, that the *affections of the mind,* as they exist in human beings, and extend to the structure of speech, are so closely allied to "*modes of matter,*" that it is not expedient for any purpose of practical utility, to attempt a complete separation between them.

101. 6. *Fictions of the imagination,* as *Polyphemus;* the *Goddess Calypso; Queen Mab* of the *Fays* or *Fairies;* a *golden mountain;* the dog

Cerberus; Utopia; Lilliput; a firy flying *Dragon;* a *griffin;* a *Titan; Raw Head* and *Bloody Bones.* A *Phenix;* A *Mermaid; Midas's Ears. Aladdin's Lamp.*

102. 7. *Complex Ideas.* Though it is convenient to give a separate contemplation to this class of words, it is impossible accurately to mark its outline: because the ideas comprehended under nouns in general, are more or less complex. Many names, however, embrace more particularly a great number of objects, as an aggregate whole. Such are the terms, *landscape, city, nation, universe.* A *history* is not the name of a single object; but includes in its complex idea all the varied scenes and events which history records.

Nouns which name groups of *similar objects,* as a collective whole, are called nouns of multitude; as, an *army* of men; a *flock* of wild geese; an *assembly* of divines; a *society;* a *company;* a *congress* of kings. Here the idea of the single group is plural, in reference to the individuals, yet the noun superadds the plural form for the numeral increase of the aggregate.

103. 8. The names applied to our own species, in their absolute and relative capacity, are so numerous, that although they fall in part under the other classes of nouns, it is convenient to place them entirely as a distinct sort. These words may be subdivided into two kinds, absolute and relative. An *absolute name* is one which applies to any being or thing, for what it positively is, and the name remains, while the thing continues unchanged. *Relative names* are given to things, in consequence of some state or condition in which they are placed, in reference to other objects.

Thus the word *person*, is a name applying absolutely to any one of the human species, and the name continues to apply, so long as the being may exist. The name *uncle*, on the other hand, is entirely relative: for the individual so called, can bear this title no longer than while he has a *neph w* or *niece;* but must, independent of any change in himself, cease to be an *uncle*, if all the persons to whom he is thus related should die. *Parent*, *son*, *daughter*, *brother*, *sister*, *king*, *subject*, *citizen*, *teacher*, *captain*, *master*, *servant*, *soldier*, *judge*, *printer*, and a vast number of similar words, which relate to man in his complicated character, are all mere *relative terms*.

The names of sensible objects also are frequently relative; as, the *end* of a stick, the *top* of the house, the *north* and *south poles*, the *Zenith* and *nadir;* an *extract*, *quotation*, *abridgment*, the *essence* of lavender, *valleys*, *mountains*, *hills*, *dales*, *banks*.

104. Though these classes of things exist in the structure of every language, and have their foundation in nature, and the condition of man, at all times, no skill can draw a complete separating line between them. They run into each other by imperceptible degrees, and mingle in endless forms of combination. It is not therefore necessary, in practice, to aim at infallibility in the application of principles, the unerring use of which would require nothing less than the perfection of knowledge. The exercises under this system of explanation will be found exceedingly improving in expanding the mind; increasing its acumen, and forming habits of philosophic investigation: and though the beginning should be very defective, every step in the progress will increase the facility

of ulterior advance. The author has, in the way of his own experience, seen more benefit resulting to pupils from this philosophic adaptation of words to things, than in any other scholastic exercise on the science of language.

105. Having examined the different classes of things, in nature and art, to which nouns are applied, we shall next attend to them as consisting of a *single object*, or a of *plurality*.

The addition of *s* or *es*, or of any other modification to a noun singular, to denote more objects than one, may be called a grammatical plural. The manner of forming this plural depends on the special or conventional regulations of each particular tongue.

106. There are *two ways* of forming the *plural of nouns*, philosophically considered, and this is a principle, common perhaps to all languages.

1st. When for instance we speak of *dollars*, we mean simple *numerical increase*, from the singular. Ten thousand of these *coins* may be cast in the same die, and as to all perceivable qualities, may be exactly alike. Neither does the mind necessarily conceive of them under any idea of *variety*, but mere *increase of number*.

2. But when we speak of *drugs* and medicines, the leading intention of the mind is *variety*; and the idea of *number*, which is vaguely implied, is consequential and subsidiary. The general understanding is, that *no two things of a kind* are included under the idea contained in the expression; but *different articles*, used for medicinal purposes. The conception of specific number is so foreign from this kind of plural, that to say, *twelve drugs* and *fifteen medicines*, strikes the ear of every one as *entirely new* and whimsical.

"*Paints* and *dyewoods*" means *different kinds* of paint and dyewood, no two things of a kind being understood.

> "He found his *fears* of whips and ropes
> By many a dram *outweighed* his *hopes*."—*McFingal.*

This term *outweigh*, is precisely the one recognized by popular language; so little does the thought of counting *hopes* and *fears* enter into the mind. What is intended and understood here, is the different *modifications* of *hope* and *fear*, from *different causes*, *relations*, and objects. *Hope* and *fear* are affections of the mind. Specific number is not applicable to them, and is not implied in their plural forms, farther than as number is unavoidably included in variety. "*Color*" is a quality of matter, and so is "*blackness*." The latter has no plural form; because, however this quality may vary in its *proportion*, or *degree of intensity*, it is always considered as being the same thing in kind. "*Colors*" means different *kinds* of color, or of coloring matter, the import always being variety, and not the numerical augmentation of things like each other. The same observations will apply to *virtues*, *vices*, *terrors*, *remedies*, *crimes*, *punishments*, *laws*, *governments*, *religions*, and a very numerous list of other words. It would be easy to follow these exemplifications through other languages; but this is not necessary to the purpose of the present work. When a merchant advertises "*Sugars* and *Fresh Teas*," he means different kinds of tea and sugar; for no one sort, whatever the quantity may be, can form a plural.

These principles, like many others, hitherto unnoticed, will be found important in their application.

107. Many nouns have no plural. The reasons are founded in philosophy, according to the nature of the case. *Wheat* and *rye* are sensible objects, which have no plural; for the articles to which the names are applied are computed by *bulk* or *quantity*, and not by *number*.

Universe has no plural; because from the extent of the term, there can be but one. *Immensity*, *infinitude*, *eternity*, *omniscience*, *omnipotence*, and other words of this class, can have no plural; because the singular fills all conceivable extension. For the same reason, these terms cannot properly admit any specifying word; and their correlative adjectives, as *eternal*, *infinite*, &c. preclude the idea of comparative degrees. A want of attention to these principles has produced a remarkable vagueness in the expressions of authors who deservedly stand high in other respects.

The *noun* being thus philosophically attended to, it will be seen afterwards how the *pronoun* is substituted for it, the *adjective* refers to it, and the *verb* agrees with it, according to the nature of the *thing*.

PRONOUNS.

108. *Pro* is the Latin preposition *for*.

Pronouns are words used instead of nouns, to prevent their tiresome repetition; as, John Brown is a good scholar: *he* learns well: *we* must reward *him*. The words *he* and *him* stand for John Brown, and the pronoun *we* stands for all the persons whom *the speaker* represents.

109. The pronouns in English are, *I*, *me*, *thou*, *thee*, *he*, *him*, *she*, *her*, *it*, *we*, *ye* or *you*, *they*, *them*, *who* and *whom*.

Each of these words is special and invariable. The nominatives and objectives of these pronouns are indeed correlative by use and application, but one is not necessarily to be deemed a mere modification of the other, as in Greek and Latin declensions. The misconception of this fact has led to great error in practice. The words *I* and *me; we* and *us; she* and *her*, are from totally different roots; and there was no more reason to suppose from their mere relative employment, that one was a derivative from the other, than that William Tell is the objective case of Switzerland, or that the name knifeblade was derived from bucks-horn, because handles are sometimes made of that material. It is the general character of the English language that its distinct words are more numerous, and each word respectively more specific and absolute in its application, than those of almost any other system of human speech. In these respects it has in particular but little affinity with Greek and Latin, with which it has been most compared, and in which analogy has been most industriously sought.

110. Pronouns, like nouns, are of two numbers, the singular and the plural; but they do not form the plural, from the singular, by a different ending of the same word. The simple theory of English pronouns is that a specific and invariable word is prepared for each relative position in which a pronoun can be placed.

Pronouns are of three genders, masculine, feminine, and neuter.

They have three persons, first, second, and third. The first person is the one who speaks; *the second is spoken* to; and the third is spoken of;

or, the first person speaks, to the second, about the third.

111. Pronouns, though very convenient in giving variety to discourse, are not an original, nor an absolutely necessary part of speech. This, like some other branches of knowledge, may be learned from savages and children, if we had no other means of discovering the fact. The tenants of the American forest, in their various dialects, have one general word for the third person singular, which answers for the three genders; and when one of these men, in speaking broken English, mentions a woman, he habitually calls her *he* or *him*. However oddly this may sound to us, it is only the application of e same principle to the singular number, which we ourselves use in the plural; for we say *they* or *them* without distinguishing whether we mean *women* or *men*. It is very natural for an Indian, or any other person, to carry into a foreign language the habits with which he is familiar in his mother tongue. It is no more philosophically improper that savages should say *he*, for one person, *male* or *female*, than that polite scholars should say *they*, for ten of either sex. All English learners, in French, Spanish, Italian, and many other tongues, are liable to turn Indians in misapplying the pronoun plural for *they*.

Children also instruct us in the secondary character of pronouns; for when the little prattler speaks of himself, he commonly makes use of his own name, instead of the words *I* or *me;* as, "*Charley* fall down:" "give *John* drink."

112. Grammatical writers have very generally made out a table of words of three cases, which *they call* personal pronouns. It seems strange that *persons* acquainted with language should fail to

perceive that this personal pronoun in the possessive case is always nominative or objective, and unavoidably so, for it is never used without a direct connexion with a verb, as subject or object.

The following is Mr. Murray's Table:

SINGULAR.

Nom.	*Poss.*	*Obj.*
I	mine	me
Thou	thine	thee
He	his	him
She	hers	her
It	its	it

PLURAL.

Nom.	*Poss.*	*Obj.*
We	ours	us
Ye or you	yours	you
They	theirs	them

The words mine, thine, her's, our's, your's, and their's, are a mere contraction or sinking of a word, always necessarily understood.

A few examples will illustrate this principle.

This is my book; or emphatically my own book.

Here the word book is inserted after my; because perspicuity requires it to be so inserted, if it has not been previously expressed.

This book is mine.

Here the word book, being placed before the verb, its repetition immediately after it, is useless as it regards perspicuity; and that object being accomplished, the only remaining consideration is brevity. If the contraction had not already been made, it is altogether likely that a community of illiterate people would soon fall into it. That this was the manner of formation in England, is corroborated by the vulgar contractions, *hisn*, *hern*, *ourn*, *yourn*, and *theirn*, in the same way.

Among scholars, however, that portion of these words which end in a consonant, have fallen into the more general mode of contraction, as in the changed forms of nouns, called the possessive case.

In all instances then, where mine, ours, and other words of this class occur, they are only to be explained by the fact of their being an adjective with a following noun understood, as being included in a contracted form.

ADJECTIVES.

115. A traveller, on his journey, came to the river Rhone. He met a rustic who had always lived near its border, and had never seen any other large stream. "*Mon bon garcon, dit le voyageur, comment appelle tu ce fleuve?*" My good fellow, said the traveller, what river do you call this? "*C'est le fleuve, Monsieur, je n'en ai jamais entendu d'autre nom.* It is the river, sir; I have never heard any other name for it.

If there was really but one river in the world, it would be as useless for others, as for the clown of the Rhone, to employ a great number of secondary words, to distinguish one river from others.

There would have been no need of the proper names Rhone, Rhine, Seine, Garonne, and others, to denote various streams by appropriate individual designation. We could not say that *one* river is *large* and *an other smaller; some* rivers *limpid, clear,* and *beautiful;* others *turbid* and *unwholesome; this* river *broad, deep,* and *sluggish* in *its*

course; and *that narrow, turbulent,* and *rapid;* nor that *three American* rivers are *larger* and more *majestic* than *any* river on the eastern continent.

A more full exposition of this class of words will be given, from an impression of their great importance, as well as the limited and mistaken principles upon which grammarians have attempted to explain them.

116. The great leading character of the adjective is founded on the countless relations which things bear to each other. They are, like other words, nouns and verbs, by origin: they assume an astonishing variety in their modifications, while their general nature and use are easily distinguished by children.

Though adjectives are secondary words by use, they are an exceedingly numerous class; and it is a great mistake of some learned writers to suppose that any language is without them.

I have before taken occasion to advert to the common error in not distinguishing the *relative* from the *absolute* meaning of words. The nature of this error I shall endeavor to explain.

117. It is asserted by the learned and excellent President Dwight, that from his childhood he learned the language of the Stockbridge tribe of Indians, and afterwards became conversant with the principal dialects of North America. He represents them all as entirely destitute of adjectives. This authority is quoted with approbation by several European writers, and by Horne Tooke among the rest. It is a simple mistake of the form for the substance. When the savage speaks of a ship as a "*water* wigwam;" does not every one perceive that the epithet *water*, instead of being em-

ployed primarily, as the *name* of a *thing*, takes a secondary relation, as descriptive of an other thing; and, with the same specific meaning, as before, acquires a new character, by its "manner of signification?" It is the same when he calls his brandy "*fire* water," and cannon, the "*white men's* thunder."

The latter expression is his simple and natural manner of distinguishing this new discovered fulmination from the thunder of "the Great Spirit."

118. Grammarians, in general, have conceived it necessary to give practical rules for distinguishing the parts of speech; but probably most persons who know the difference between a *chesnut* horse and a *horse* chesnut will find no great difficulty in telling *adjectives* from nouns.

119. Adjectives are words used with nouns to *specify* or *describe* them.

This definition implies two kinds, specifying and describing adjectives. To understand these we must see how they apply to the noun, or to the pronoun, as its substitute, according to the nature of the thing.

Common nouns name things with reference to their general descriptive qualities: for instance, a book is a collection of leaves, fastened together at one edge, enclosed between two covers, to open and shut, for the purpose of containing some form of written language. The idea included in the word *books*, according to its plain meaning, takes the entire range, from two to the whole number ever manufactured; leaving the mind in total uncertainty as to every thing else comprehended under the general definition of the word. Mention *the word books* to any person in conversation. *Several questions* successively and spontaneously

arise in his mind: *what books? which books? how many? what sort of books? how conditioned* or *situated?* Any single word which answers either of these questions, is an adjective.

SPECIFYING ADJECTIVES.

120. These limit, particularize, define, point out,

1st. By identity; or precise relation:

2d. By extension.

First. Many specifying adjectives serve to distinguish things from each other, by reference to their identity or individuality, by *special relative circumstances*, and not according to any mode of *descriptive* classification. They answer to the direct and specific question, which thing? what things? as, which book do you mean? answer, I mean *this* book, or *the* book which is on *the* table, and not *any* of *those* books which are on *that* shelf. The adjectives *this*, *the*, *any*, *those*, *that*, imply nothing respecting the quality or descriptive character of any book; but wholly relate to the identity of the one alluded to. This kind of designation is frequently attended by a farther specification in words, as the allusion to *the* table, or *that* shelf: or it is accompanied by present explaining circumstances, known both to the speaker and hearer. If both books are in sight, the distinction is between the nearest and most distant. Frequently some outward sign, as a look, a motion of the hand, concurs with what is spoken; and this corporeal sign thus makes part of the language. These words have all been called articles; for they come under the definition given to that class; but the article, from its character and use, is necessarily an adjective, and as they run into each other in such various *ways that no* complete dividing line can be drawn

between them, it is most simple and most practically convenient to consider the whole only as modifications of the same thing.

121. The adjectives which specify things with particular reference to their identity, or individuality, and which answer to the questions *which* or *what* things, are *this*, *that*, *both*, *any*, *these*, *those*, *all*, *each*, *every*, *either*, *no*, *first*, *second*, *third*, *last*, and all the *ordinal numbers*. The words *which* and *what* also belong to the same class.

122. *Second.* Adjectives which *limit* or *specify* with immediate reference to *extension*, apply to things, in two ways, according as they are taken by *quantity* or *number*. Any adjective of number will not apply to the word *wheat* for the same reason that the noun itself has no plural; because it is always estimated by *weight* or *measure*, and is never *counted*. If the single grains should be counted, the adjective of number would apply to grains, or kernels, and not to the noun wheat. We can say *much* wheat, but not *many* wheats.

The adjectives which have relation to numerical extension, are all the words known as cardinal numbers: *a*, *one*, *twain*, *two*, *three*, *four*, *few*, *many*, *both*, *several*, *more*, and *most*.

These words, in general, specify with *perfect* precision; but where the exact number is not known, the words *few*, *many*, *several*, and others specify within a limited or discretionary range. *Several* means three or more, up to a moderate number, but not ten thousand, nor one hundred. It comes from the verb to *sever*, or *divide*, and is applied to things, the exact number of which is not known. *Some*, *any*, *no*, and *all*, are common to number, quantity, and identity.

123. Any adjective of number may be converted into a noun of multitude. Ex. "Moses chose able men out of all Israel, and made them heads over the people; rulers of thousands; rulers of hundreds; rulers of fifties; and rulers of tens." Any word of this class is certainly a noun, if it takes a direct plural form, by a discretionary addition to the singular. *One* and *ones*, are nouns applied both to persons and things; and are frequently very convenient, as words of this general latitude of meaning. When used with a noun, expressed or understood, *one* is a defining word, or specifying adjective; but in this character it cannot admit of a plural.

124. An other mode of specifying the identity or individuality of objects, is by their relation to each other. This practice is founded in an important process of the mind, in arriving at the distinct comprehension of things, and forms a general principle of language. It includes the relative conditions of consanguinity; likeness and contrast; locality; cause and consequence; author and performance; objects and their qualities and modifications; moral, civil, and religious rights and duties. Of the various relations of things to each other, that between owner and property being one, has extended its idea and given name to the whole. This, under the name of the possessive case, has been treated by grammatical writers as a slight modification in nouns and pronouns, without amounting to a change in the character of the word. It has been represented as merely denoting possession or ownership; but a little investigation will show that this idea was founded in error. The noun, in the possessive case, is only a mode of designating one thing by its relation to an other, and

is always an adjective by use. The phrase Jupiter's satellites, used in the language of sober philosophy, does not convey to the mind the least idea of owner and property. It is the simple specification of those particular secondary orbs which revolve around that planet. If any man, on examination, can discover any other idea in his mind, from this expression, it does not belong there, but is the mere effect of false teaching.

125. Even where the idea of owner and property is present to the mind, it is still only a mode of specification. In the phrase, "Alexander's horse, Bucephalus," it would be impossible for the mind to arrive at the identity of the horse by any mode of description or specification, but that of his relation to his master. "Peter's wife's mother lay sick of a fever." Peter was the best known person of the three; and the leading purpose of the mind was to designate the woman who stood in the relation of mother-in-law to him. If the wife's mother had been as well known by her own name, as Peter was by his, that form of expression would not have been employed. The mention of the woman would have been direct.

126. It is the natural process of the mind, in judging of new objects, to refer them to some standard, previously known. Most new terms and new applications of them, in all languages, depend on this very active faculty of the human intellect.

This class of relations is almost always reciprocal: it is the master's slave, and the slave's master; the *uncle's* niece, and the *niece's* uncle; it is the *owner's* ox; but the ox also "knoweth *his* owner, and the ass *his master's* crib."

127. It may be profitable to examine this important principle of language somewhat in detail, on account of the strong prejudices which, from its novelty, it must almost necessarily encounter.

1st. The relation betwen actor or author and his performance: "Of man's first disobedience, and the fruit of that forbidden tree," &c. Not the disobedience that Adam owned as his property; but that of which he had been guilty.

"Newton's Philosophy," that is, the doctrines in science which originated with him. "Ptolemy's Astronomy," "Euclid's Elements," "The Apostles' Creed," "Blair's Sermons," "Cook's Voyage round the World," "Pope's Homer's Iliad," "Gen. Washington's March to Yorktown," "Perry's Victory," "Braddock's Defeat," "The Beggar's Petition."

"Ye have set at nought *my* counsels, and would none of *my* reproof: I also will laugh at *your* calamity, and mock when *your* fear cometh."

128. 2d. Relation between a person or thing and some circumstance or occurrence attending him, independent of that person's voluntary act. "The Earl of Strafford's execution;" not the execution which he owned as *his* property; but that which was inflicted on him by *his* enemies for *his* fidelity to *his* royal master. "The *king's* failure in that expedition caused *his* ruin." "Supply *our* wants: make us feel *our* dependence."

129. 3d. Cause and effect; objects and their qualities; similitude, local situation, &c. "An effect may be obvious, while its cause is unknown." "Metalic ores may generally be known by their weight." "Our judgments are often influenced by our feelings." "Heat and cold, with most other *qualities, are best* known by their contrasts."

"*Sir John Oldcastle's* pamphlet, *its* doctrines and *their* consequences."

130. 4th. More remote relations of various kinds are expressed by this form of language: as "Hamlet's grave-digger." Hamlet did not own the grave-digger nor the grave. It was simply a grave-digger whom he saw, and to whom his attention was particularly called. "George the Third's coin;" that is, the coin struck during his reign, bearing his image and superscription. *Pompey's* pillar; the monument of *his* melancholy fate, erected long after *his* assassination.

131. 5th. Arbitrary specific designation, serving as an individual name: as "*St. Paul's* church." "*Hudson's* Bay." *Madison's* Island. *M'Gilly-cudder's* Reeks. *Fingal's* Cave. Martha's Vineyard.

6th. Relation to general ideas or transactions, without allusion to any specific *thing;* as "The king's *attempting to levy ship money by his own arbitrary authority*, gave great offence to the parliament."

7th. But there is still a new and very interesting point of view, in which we may contemplate the relations of things, as they exist in the structure of language; that is, the different *kinds* and *degrees* of relation which frequently exist between the same two objects.

"Benjamin West's portrait." Here the closest relation, and consequently the first conception which arises in the mind, is, a portrait painted as the likeness of Benjamin West. If we are told this is not the meaning of the speaker, the next supposition is, that as Mr. West was a distinguished artist, it is a portrait painted by him, as the

likeness of some other person. When these closest relations, which in the first place irresistibly arise, are removed, the mind may at last be brought, faintly and reluctantly to understand that Benjamin West's portrait, means a painting which he bought at auction, of which he consequently became the legal owner.

"Sound *his* praise in *thy* eternal course, &c."—*Milton.*

"Made vocal by *my* song, and taught *his* praise."

"*My* prayer and praise shall arise with the morning."

133. In these examples it will be seen that the same form of expression conveys ideas of totally opposite kinds. The *Creator's* praise is that which He receives. *Man's* praise is what is offered by him as a religious duty. "*Dr. Franklin's memory* was very retentive." "*Dr. Franklin's memory* will long be cherished by his countrymen."

These two expressions are the same possessive case of the grammars; and they are both as well authorized English as any sentence in the language; but it will be seen that the two relations to Dr. Franklin are of directly opposite bearing. In the first, memory denotes a faculty of Dr. Franklin's own mind. In the second, it is that by which his countrymen retain, cherish, and perpetuate the knowledge of his virtues.

DESCRIBING ADJECTIVES.

134. Adjectives of description apply to nouns in two ways:

1st. They designate the quality, kind, or sort of things; as good, bad; old, new; wise, sensible, ignorant.

2d. They describe the condition, situation, or relative circumstances of things; as, a finished or unfinished house. "A little book *open*."

"An *irritable* man," alludes to the man's general character of irritability. The man was greatly *irritated*, refers only to the man's special situation at a given time. "My son was *dead* and is *alive* again; was *lost* and now is *found*."

"He was *well* yesterday; but is very *sick* this morning."

This class of adjectives, describing by condition, or the relative circumstances of things, includes a large number of words which have generally but erroneously been classed with adverbs, as *here*, *there*, *yonder*, *where*.

Things are described as well as specified by their relation to each other, and the same epithet partakes, frequently, of both characters; as the *antediluvian* inhabitants; the *western* continent; the *northern* hemisphere; the *rear* guard.

Again, things are described by their *actions* or *operations;* as a *trotting* horse; a *spinning* machine; an *intriguing* politician.

136. The noun to which the describing, and sometimes the specifying adjective, refers, is elegantly and properly omitted, wherever it is necessarily understood; as "The *just* shall live by faith." This, of course, cannot mean just *beasts*, nor *birds;* but the class of beings who are capable of exercising Christian faith, and whose spiritual life depends on that exercise; that is, the *human species*. The *righteous*, the *wicked*, the *swift*, the *strong*, are omissions of the noun upon the same principle.

The *English*, the *French*, the *Spanish*, are ex-

pressions which imply the following nouns, *people*, *nation*, *language*, or some other word sufficiently understood.

137. By a contraction of a different kind, the adjective is converted into a noun, and takes the plural. As, *mortals*, instead of *mortal beings*, *regulars* for *regular troops*, *Italians*, an *American*, *marines*, *goods*; the *particulars*, which means the particular *circumstances* or *things*.

Titles are *nouns*, when used alone; as, both *Captains* fought with great bravery. Two amiable young *misses* are made fatherless by the duel.

When titles are prefixed to proper nouns, they are *adjectives*, which in English never vary for *gender*, *number*, nor *case*. Two *Major* Cooks and three *Captain* Porters were at the meeting. Two *Miss** Whites; the two *Miss* Whites; or two of the *Miss* Whites were there. The two *Lord* Lyttletons. All the *Lady* Grays. Many Queen Marys.†

ADJECTIVE PRONOUNS.

138. A few observations on the adjectives and

---

* *Maister* is the old word for *master*, and, till within th last three hundred years, was written alike in French and English. The French now write it *maitre*, dropping the *s*, according to their frequent mode of elision. The English, in one case, omit *i*, and write *master*, denoting authority. Retaining *i* instead of *a* gives the term of politeness, *mister*. So *Maistresse* is altered to *Mistress*, and its modern contraction, *Miss*, is applied to an unmarried lady. This manufacture of many words from one is the common process in the refinement of language.

† The plurals of proper names are formed simply by adding *s*, even where the common noun would end in *ies* or otherwise; as, the eight King *Henrys*, and not *Henries*.

"adjective pronouns," as taught in British colleges, and schools, and hitherto followed in America, as a matter of course, will prepare the way for such farther explanations as appear to belong to this class of words. The remarks offered will be referred to Mr. Murray's grammar; not to decry that particular author; but because he is confessedly the present head of the system, the study of which requires so much expense of time and money, for two of the principal nations of the earth; and from the grammatical mystery, that while this work is so generally received, as the best English system, and the basis of all others, almost every person, who has any thing to do with it, finds it necessary to mend it, in its most important points.

For the purpose of farther avoiding every appearance of unfairness, it will be proper to begin by showing Mr. Murray's high claims to authority.

"Mr. Murray's *English Grammar*, *Exercises*, and *Key* to the *Exercises*, form altogether, *by far*, the *most complete* and *judicious* analysis of the English language, that has hitherto been published. The rules for composition are *excellent*; the examples are selected with *taste* and *judgment*; and the *execution* of the whole displays an unusual degree of *critical acuteness* and *sagacity*."—*Annual Review. London.*

"We have had no *grammarian*, within the compass of our *critical* career, who has employed so much *labor* and *judgment* upon our native language, as the author of these volumes."—*British Critic.*

"We have read this work with sufficient care, to be able to pronounce upon it, as a work of *great correctness* and *perfection*.

We cannot dismiss these volumes without observing, that as they are intended for the *higher classes of readers*, they will be found particularly serviceable to *instructors*, to young persons who have *left school*, and to *foreigners*."—*Christian Observer.*

"The *Grammar* I esteem as a *most excellent* performance. I think it *superior* to any work of that nature we have yet had; and am persuaded that it is, *by much*, the best *grammar* of the English language extant."—*Guardian of Education.*

"They occupy with *distinguished excellence*, a *most important place* in the *science* of the English language; and, as such, we can *warmly recommend them* to the *teachers* of *schools*, as well as to all those who are desirous of attaining *correctness* and *precision* in their native tongue."—*Monthly Review.*

"The very general approbation which this grammar has received from the public, is sufficiently indicative of its merits: and we have much pleasure in confirming the decision of the public, respecting its *superiority* over all other English grammars. We request the author to *continue his exertions* for the instruction of the rising generation."—*Critical Review.*

"Our sentiments with regard to the *omission* or *insertion* of the *relative pronoun*, are *exactly stated* by Mr. Lindley Murray, *the ingenious author of the best English Grammar*, BEYOND ALL COMPARISON, that has yet appeared."—*Imperial Review.*

"Mr. Murray's Grammar, and Selection of Lessons for Reading, are the *best in the English language*."—*Walker's Elements of Elocution*, second edition.

140. This "*best of all*" *expositors* of our language, and other grammatical writers, in general, present a set of words which they call adjective pronouns, and which they commonly agree in subdividing into six classes. These subdivisions of *adjective pronouns* are denominated "*relative* and *interrogative*, *possessive*, *distributive*, *demonstrative*, and *indefinite*." Almost all which is said respecting this class of words will be found irreconcilable with the principles and practice of every language throughout the civilized world. There is no "*adjective pronoun*" in any language. "A *pronoun* stands *for a noun*," and is never used *with one*. An

adjective is *used with a noun*, and *never stands for one*. The line of separation between these two sorts of words *is always complete*. The phrase *adjective pronoun* is not only a contradiction in terms; but every attempt, in every known tongue, to explain these words, under this supposed mixed character, is *necessarily* absurd and inconsistent.

141. The words *I*, *me*, *we*, *us*, *who* and *whom* are *personal pronouns*; strictly so; as they stand only for persons. *Thou*, *ye*, *you*, *he she*, *it*, *they*, are included in the same class, by some occasional latitude of meaning, given to the word personal. No other words but those coming under the general description of personal pronouns, that is, *real substitutes* for *nouns*, are pronouns at all.

Let us compare some of these *pronoun adjectives* with existing grammar rules, and with facts as they exist in the actual forms of speech.

142. 1. The words *who*, *which*, *what*, and *that*, "are called *relative pronouns*, because they *relate* to a *foregoing word*." This *foregoing* word is, honestly enough, called an "*antecedent*." *Who*, *which*, and *what*, are again named *interrogatives*, when they are used in *asking questions*. Two important points are omitted, in Dr. Lowth's system of explanation, which, in substance, has been copied by almost every writer on grammar since his time.

143. 1st. We are left without *name* or *character* for the words *who*, *which*, and *what*, when they neither "*ask questions*," nor "*relate* to a *foregoing word*, called the *antecedent*;" *which circumstance* very often happens; and, in *which case*, it is difficult *to tell* under *which rule*, in *what grammar*, to

what author, to look for aid; or in *which class* of *adjective pronouns* to place these nondescript words, belonging at once to two parts of speech, and finding no quarters with either. We know not *who* can explain, nor to *whom* to refer, where all are silent; in *which contingency* we have no guide but common sense, and the obvious principles of language.

144. 2d. If *who*, *which*, and *what* are called *interrogative pronouns*, because they *ask questions*; by what neglect has it happened that *why*, *when*, and *how*, are not called *interrogative adverbs*, for the same reason? It is known, to every person conversant with language, that almost any term in the whole vocabulary may be made the emphatic word in a question. Why, in that case, are they not all "*interrogatives?*"

145. 3. Again, when the words *who*, *which*, and *what*, are contained in an *interrogation*, it does not necessarily follow that they are the words on which the question turns. "Will you tell me *which book* of the two you like best?" Here the whole force of the question is contained in the first four words, and the adjective *which* has no other kind of meaning but that which relates to the assertive *identity* of the book. The true "*interrogative*" in this question, is the verb *will*: but all attempts to classify words on principles like these, are only calculated to mislead.

145. 4. Again, we are presented with the words *who* and *which*, in a particular manner, inseparably connected, in all explanations upon them, as "adjective pronouns," *relative* and *interrogative*; but we are not told why it happens, with

these *grammatical twins*, that one *always* preserves its *distinct forms* and *relations*, as *subject* and *object*, and the other *never*; that one always "stands for a noun," and cannot be used with one; and the other is *always* used with *direct* and *specific reference to a noun*, and *never* as its *substitute*: or, in plain English, what oversight has thus kept together two words, which, without exception, as unequivocally belong to different parts of speech, as any two words in Johnson's Dictionary?

147. *Who* is equivalent to *which* or *what*, and its *personal noun*; as, *Who* was there? that is, *what man, what woman, which person*, was there? So *who* can *always* be substituted for *which* or *what man, woman* or *person*, and convey the same sense. The same reciprocal substitution will also apply in the plural number.

Any pronoun is equal to a *specifying adjective* and a *noun*; for *pronouns* must necessarily be *specific* words. They stand for *nouns* whose *number, gender, case*, and *identity* are understood: else these *substitutes* themselves would be constantly liable to be misemployed.

Describing adjectives refer to *pronouns*, in the same manner as to the *nouns* for which they stand. Thus we may say, "the *man* is *good*, or *he* is *good*. We can say *that, this*, or *the man*; but not *this, that*, or *the he*: for *pronouns* being *substituted* only for words or ideas *already specifically understood*, the *specifying word* is redundant, and, as we are totally unaccustomed to the association, it strikes us as particularly awkward.

148. The word *which* is always used as an *adjective*, without the least mixture of any other *character*; serving the purpose of *identical speci-*

fication, always having direct reference to a following noun, *which (following noun)* must be expressed, if it is not necessarily understood.

EXAMPLES.

"*Which thing* I also did in Jerusalem." "Unto *which promise* our twelve tribes hope to come." "For *which hope's sake*, king Agrippa, I am accused of the Jews." *Acts* xxvi.

"Early in the morning Cyrus made a sacrifice, during *which time* his army took some refreshment."—*Translation of Rollin.*

By *which degrees* men myght climben from the neytherest letter to the upperest."—*Boecius, Boke* 1. *Folium* 221.

"All *which things* succeeded to his desire." "The falseness of *which pretence* manifestly appeared." "*Which thing*, though he had ever desired, and at last acted, yet he did not lay aside his mask, &c."—*Lord Bacon, Character of Cesar. P.* 5.

"*Which doctrine* also the lordes, bothe spirituall and temporall, with the nether house of our parliament, have bothe sene and lyke very wel." A necessary doctrine and erudition for any Christen man: set furthe by the Kynges Maiestie of Englande.—1543.

149. The language of legal proceedings, where words are multiplied beyond what is allowable in elegant literature, furnishes very numerous examples of this *subsequent*, "foregoing word, called the antecedent;" As, "I, John Doe, am held and firmly bound unto Richard Roe, in the full and just sum of one thousand dollars, for *which sum*, well and truly to be paid, I hereby bind myself," &c.—*Form of a Bond.*

"A. B. bought a farm, for *which farm* he agreed to pay ten thousand dollars, and *which said sum* he has not paid." So in the declaration by the bailiffs or occupants of a toll bridge, against Mr. C. D. "For divers tolls and duties, due, and of right payable, by the said C. D. to the said bailiffs, for the passage of divers loaded wagons, and

loaded carts, of the said C. D. before that time, drawn over a certain bridge, situated &c. *which said bridge* the said bailiffs and their predecessors," &c.

Every tolerable scholar can supply the omitted word, or there is a want of perspicuity in the construction of the sentence: as,

"Beware of false prophets, which [prophets] come to you in sheep's clothing." "For so persecuted they the prophets which [prophets] were before you." "Thy disciples do *that* [thing] *which* [thing] it is not lawful to do on the sabbath day." "I will utter things which [things] have been kept secret from the foundation of the world."

It will be observed, in all these examples, and in every other of similar structure, throughout the language, that where persons are spoken of, the *pronoun who* may be substituted for the *specifying adjective* and the *noun*; as, Beware of false prophets *who* come to you in sheep's clothing; and, except for the sake of variety, this is decidedly the best expression.

150. The words called *relative pronouns*, while they *always specify* as *adjectives*, answer also the purpose of *connecting words*. The reasons of their origin and use, in this latter character, are obvious.

In the early and restricted forms of language, sentences are commonly limited to single propositions. Among a rude people the expression is, "I took corn: I pounded corn in the mortar: I made bread of corn." This is the form of construction used by deaf mutes, in their essays at composition. So children talk. So all people speak, in a language with which they are not familiar. But when literature has made considerable progress, and men by practice grow expert *in the combinations* of words, various methods

are adopted to connect propositions into compound sentences, so as at once to lessen the prolixity and obviate the stiff monotony, which prevail in the earlier forms of speech. The words called *relative pronouns* are one of the contrivances of language for this purpose. They are duplicate adjectives, specifying the identity of things. Their effect is to add a *new* member of a sentence, by connecting its *beginning* with the *ending* of the *old*. In an improved state of language, the form of expression, instead of three sentences, as given above, is, We procured some corn, which [corn] we carried to the mill, and of which [corn] we made bread.

"Tribulation worketh patience, and patience experience, and experience hope, and hope maketh not ashamed."

Tribulation worketh patience, which [patience] worketh experience, which [experience] worketh hope, which [hope] maketh not ashamed.

It is to be observed that except in writings where great formality is required, the words in brackets are to be omitted as being necessarily understood.

151. The difference between *and* and *which*, as conjunctive words is this—*and* connects in a general manner, and *which* with identical limitation.

"Tribulation worketh patience, and patience experience:" that is, patience, in general, worketh experience.

"Tribulation worketh patience, *which worketh experience*," &c. the meaning of this is, that the *same* or *identical patience*, which *tribulation produces*, worketh experience.

As a word answering this double purpose of

specification and conjunction, *that* may be substituted in most cases for *which;* as, tribulation worketh patience; that patience worketh experience; that experience hope; &c.

152. *That* and *the* are from the same Saxon word, [Ðæt þæ tha] that. The two words are now substantially the same, and may be substituted for each other, in a large proportion of the instances in which they occur; as, "*That* (or *the*) enjoyment which a wise man should most desire, is peace of mind."

That is no longer, like *the*, used with direct reference to a following plural, as it formerly was. There is no other difference in their *manner* of *signification*. In *degree* of force *that* is the most definite and emphatic word.

The word *that*, whether the *demonstrative pronoun*, the *relative pronoun*, or the *conjunction* of the grammars, is always a *specifying adjective*. If, on this point, the least doubt remains, in the mind of any one, a reference to the "Diversions of Purley," Vol. I. p. 67, will set the matter at rest.

153. The word *what* is a *compound* of *two specifying adjectives*, each, of course, referring to a *noun*, expressed or understood. It is equivalent to *the which; that which; which that;* or *that that;* used also in the plural. At different periods, and in different authors, it appears in the varying forms, *tha qua, qua tha, qu'tha, quthat, quhat, hwat*, and *what*. This word is found in other forms; but it is needless to multiply them. The letters which answer to *qu* and *w* were often interchanged, and appear to have been similarly sounded, by most of the ancient nations of Europe. The reciprocal sub-

stitution of these letters, as well as *g* and *y* and *w*, are habitual, in the *Gothic*, *Gaelic*, and *Saxon* languages.

154. This compounding of words need occasion no surprise. There must be a greater tendency to it in spoken than in written language; a striking proof of which is shown in the various Indian dialects of North America; yet we see the same constantly practised at the present day, in the words something, nothing, don't, can't, and many others.

The word *what*, like *which* and *that*, is never used without a noun after it, expressed, or necessarily understood in construction.

"It is not material *what names* are assigned to them."—*Campbell's Rhetoric*, I. 1.

> " *What*'er a blooming world contains,
> That wings the air, that skims the plains,
> United praise bestow."

That is, *Whatever Being*, &c..

" I am *what*soever is, *what* so ever has been; *what* so ever shall be; and the veil which is over my face no mortal hath removed."—*Inscription on the Temple of Isis, or Nature.*

Here the idea is the most general: *what*ever conceivable *being* or *thing*, in the whole range of cretion.

" I know not what [ ] to do."

155. Any *pronoun*, a *common noun* with a *specifying adjective* or a *proper noun*, without an adjective, may be made to connect different propositions, in a compound sentence. This may be illustrated by the celebrated syllogism of Themistocles.

My *little boy* governs the world: *that is,*
He controlls his mother;
She rules me;
I govern Athens;
Athens gives laws to Greece;
Greece commands the world:
So *my son* governs the world.

The principle of language, here, as connected with the mental or logical process, is this: an important idea is caught from each proposition; for *which idea* a *specific substitute* is adopted, and made the leading word in the next member of the sentence. This is frequently an important use of conjunctive words; however their radical meanings, or original forms, may become disguised by gradual change.

156. An other subdivision of the words called *adjective pronouns*, is the *possessive*. The list comprehends *my*, *thy*, *his*, *her*, *our*, *your*, and *their*. *Its* and *whose* belong with them, and should have been included. An attempt has already been made, under the description of adjectives, to show what these words are; it remains to show that they are not *pronouns*, either wholly or in part.

What are called *personal pronouns*, in the *possessive case*, too, will be examined at the same time, for the purpose of dismissing all these *possessive words* at once. These words are *mine*, *thine*, *his*, *her's*, *our's*, *your's*, *their's*, and *whose:* for the words *his* and *whose*, without changing their forms, belong to both classes.

157. The traditional teaching has been that *I*, *mine*, *my*, and *me*, were all *pronouns* of the *first person*, as being only modifications of the same word. Such a supposition is contradicted by the facts, as they

are presented through every page of the English language. As to any relation which *my* and *mine* may have to *I* and *me*, that circumstance cannot make them *pronouns*, more than *golden* and *snowy* are *nouns*, because derived from *gold* and *snow*. The word *my*, instead of standing for a noun, wholly or in part, is so obstinate and pertinacious in its character, as an adjective, that it is *never used without its noun*, actually inserted after it, in unbroken connexion. Many adjectives have the noun omitted after them, where it is necessarily understood: but we can not say *my*, without using the word to which *my*, as an *adjective*, directly refers.

The same remarks will apply to all the *possessive adjective pronouns*, wherever they occur.

158. We will next examine the personal pronoun, in the possessive case. This will best be done in a practical way.

You have *one* book,
I have *two*,
Mine are old,
Yours is new.

It was before observed that this *possessive case* of the personal pronoun is always *nominative* or *objective*, and unavoidably so, wherever used; involving a strange absurdity, which has been strangely overlooked, of employing a word in two distinct cases, at the same time, without the least explanation of such a palpable inconsistency.

159. But there is still a greater difficulty; in trying to surmount which, we shall obtain no aid from the standing theory of adjectives and pronouns.

In the example given above, the word *mine*, if a *pronoun* at all, is in the *first person singular*, as we are told by a hundred writers on grammar: yet it

is the *nominative case* to the verb *are*, which is always *plural*. In like manner the word *your's*, which is the *second person plural* of the grammars, is *nominative case* to the verb *is*, which must always be *third person singular*.

"His subject is things: *your's*, on the contrary, *is* persons."—*Campbell's Rhetoric.*

Here the pronoun of the *second person plural*, in the *possessive case*, is *nominative case* to the verb *is*, which is always *third person singular*.

This *house* is* *our's*, and that is *your's*. "*Their's is*† very commodious,"—*Murray's Grammar*, example under personal pronouns, possessive case.

These are a few instances of the difference between *good English* and *bad grammar*, in relation to *possessive adjective pronouns*, and personal pronouns in the *possessive case*.

160. It seems hardly necessary to observe that, if a word could be half adjective and half pronoun, the pronoun part, of course, should predominate, according to the general principle of grammatical agreement.

"Quid, *meus Æneas*, in te committere tantum," &c.
Virg. Lib. I. 245.

Here *meus*, *masculine*, if a *pronoun*, stands for the *Goddess Venus*.

"Fando aliquid, si forte *tuas* pervenit ad *aures*."
Virg. Lib. XI. 18.

Here *tuas*, in the *feminine plural*, is the "possessive adjective *pronoun*" for *King Priam*.

---

* The verb *to be* has the *same case after it* as *before it*, through all the moods and tenses."—*Murray's Grammar.*

† The *verb* agrees with its *nominative case* in number and person."—*Murray's Syntax*, Rule 1.

So *meus*, *tuus*, and *suus*; *noster*, and *vester*, through the whole Latin language, will be found to take their agreement as *mere adjectives*, without the least attention to any representative character in them as *pronouns*. As words of *relation*, they have reference to persons, whether *speaking*, *spoken to*, or *spoken of*.

In French the lady says *mon fils*, *mes garçons*, where the *adjective pronouns*, *mon* and *mes*, my, represent the *lady*, so far as they have a particle of the pronoun character in them; yet both these words are *masculine*; one singular and the other plural. So the *man* says *ma fille*, putting his *pronoun* in the *feminine*. The same principle runs through the whole French language, as is well known to every person familiar with it.

162. In *Spanish*, *Italian*, *Portuguese*, and other languages, where every thing in the construction of speech is *he* or *she*, there is the same occurrence of these *possessive pronouns*; contradicting every idea of the system on which their scholastic exposition has been founded. These *pronominal representatives*, therefore, entirely forsaking the character of their *principals*, and conforming to every other word with which they come in contact, appear, like their grammatical advocates, to be more influenced by *precedent*, than by *truth* and *propriety*.

The *distributive*, *indefinite*, and all the other classes of "adjective pronouns" are, on the same principle, misconceived and misinterpreted, in the general systems of grammar, as taught among the principal nations of the earth.

A and *THE*.

163. A strange error has long prevailed, of arbitrarily selecting two of the specifying adjectives, and, under the unmeaning name of *articles*, trying to explain them as a distinct sort of words. The French, Spanish, and Italian grammarians generally make three articles, though they have not separate terms for this purpose; but employ such as are frequently acknowledged to belong to other parts of speech.

164. The Abbé Girard tells us that the French *article* has *no meaning*, and belongs to *no part of speech; but is only an* "*avant coureur*," that is, a *fore-runner*, to let the reader know that a *noun* is coming, not far behind. A Portuguese grammarian, Dom Hamoniere, very soberly lays down, as a rule of syntax, that "the *noun* agrees with the *article* in number and gender." These ideas are well adapted to the system of grammatical philosophy which has prevailed for centuries in European schools.

165. The *traditionary account* respecting *a* and *the*, is this.

1. "*Articles* are words set before nouns, to limit and define them." "To determine the extent of their meaning:" "*Particles* established to *specify* the *extent* of the *sense in which the noun is to be taken*:" or according to the "best of all English grammars," "*Words set before nouns to point them out, and show how far their signification extends.*"

This is an important purpose, to be answered, in any language; and if the "*articles*" *a* and *the* could indeed *define* and *limit nouns*, in all the relations

in which it is necessary "to show how far their signification extends," they would, by their utility, compensate for the smallness of their number. They should not only be a separate part of speech; but like the privileged *I* and *O*, should always appear in capitals.

166. A is the "*indefinite article*;" that is, the *indefinite defining word*; set before a noun to "limit" and "determine" the "*extent of its meaning*:" and yet, this *defining word* A, necessarily "*points out*," "*limits*," "*specifies*," "*defines*," and "*determines*," in a *vague*, *indefinite*, *unlimited*, and *indeterminate sense*. Such is the absurdity of attempting to class these two adjectives as a separate part of speech, and ascribe a distinctive character to each, without regarding the *real signification* of the words. If "*indefinite article*" means *indefinite article*, then it would take as many of these words to show *how far* the signification of a noun extends, as it would of *witch hazel rods*, to *point out* a gold mine, or of *levers*, *wheels*, and *balls*, to make a *perpetual motion*.

167. The word *article*, Latin *articulus*, Greek ἄρθρον, a *joint* or *knuckle*, has no appropriate meaning, as applied to *a* and *the*; and as these two words, according to the grammarians, differ almost diametrically from each other, it would be far the most simple plan of teaching, to adopt at once, a *proper noun* for each. The names *Robin Riddle* and *Peter Particular* would be readily learned by scholars, and applied to *a* and *the*, as significant of their grammatical character.

168. *A* is always *perfectly* "*definite*," as to extension; it means *half of two*, or a *quarter of four*,

and never either more or less. A moment's examination will show how far *a* refers to an object, *necessarily* "vague and indeterminate," even in reference to *individual identity*.

"There was *a certain man*, in Cesarea, called *Cornelius, a centurion* of the band, called the Italian band: *a devout man*," &c. "And *a certain Jew*, named *Apollos*, born at Alexandria, *an eloquent man*, and mighty in the scriptures, came to Ephesus." Surely *a* is not here *used in a vague and indeterminate sense:* these expressions "*ascertain*," as well as any form of words can ascertain, *what particular persons are meant.*

"And *the rib*, which the Lord God had taken from *the man*, he made *a woman*, and brought *her* unto the man."

"Creation surely is the prerogative of *a Self-Existent, uncaused Being*." Presdt. Maxey's Sermon "On the Existence of God."

"For *I, the Lord thy God*, am *a jealous God*." —Decalogue.

General Washington possessed *a clear head* and *a patriotic heart*.

The only possible "*vagueness*" here, must depend on the question whether Washington possessed *his own head* and *heart*, or some body's else.

169. It is impossible that language can make any thing more "*definite*" than the declaration of the angel to the Shepherds of Bethlehem.

"For unto you is born, this day, in the city of David, *a Savior*, which is Christ the Lord: and *this* shall be *a sign* unto you, ye shall find the babe, wrapped in swaddling clothes, and lying in *a manger*."

On the 8th of Jan. 1814, *a sanguinary battle* was fought at New Orleans, in which the British *troops* were signally defeated.

Any other number may be *perfectly definite* in reference to *identity*, as well as extension; as, "Geographers commonly divide the earth into *four quarters*, Europe, Asia, Africa and America." The week consists of *seven days*.

170. *A* is the Saxon *ane*, *an*, one: not the letter "*n added before a vowel*," but *dropped before a consonant*, "to make the pronunciation more easy."

"To name the God that war *ane* manifest *lee*."

"Is but *ane God* makar of euery thing." *Gawin Douglas, Translation of Virgil. Prologue to sixth Booke.*

171. Since the Norman conquest the word *one*, corrupted from the French *une*, has, in part, usurped the place of the Saxon prime number. The language of the heptarchy has fared better in Scotland, where *ane* and *twa* continue to be the words in current use, and, though they are slightly disguised in modern English, they are easily known by their acquaintances.

I shall go in *a* day or *two*.

A bird in the hand is worth *two* in the bush.

A stitch in time saves *nine*.

172. These popular expressions give the meaning of the adjective *a*, much more clearly than it is explained in English grammars and dictionaries.

Twa, *tway*, *twey*, *tweyn*, and *twain*, from which we have *between*, *twins*, *twenty*, [i. e. *twain-ten*,] and other words, are less obvious in our present literature, though they still appear.

"And whosoever shall compel thee to go *a* mile go with him *twain*." "Math. v. 41. "And they shall no more be *twain* but *one* flesh."

"Yet at leist thare may fall, stop or delay,
In sa grete matteris *ane* yere or tway."
G. Douglass, Booke 1.

173. *A* is the first letter of the alphabet, and the character answering to it was, previous to the Arabian figures, used for the number one, in most known languages, except the Coptic, or Ethiopian, in which it was the eleventh. This letter, with a trifling addition, became *an* or *ane*. It made the first number, as actually written, in the *Syriac*, Teutonic, and Scandinavian dialects, and runs through most languages of northern Europe at the present day.

The difference between *a* and *two* belongs to arithmetic, and not to grammar.

174. The errors into which men may be carried through traditionary prejudice, is a subject of curious contemplation. The following, from Murray's grammar, Chapter II. "Of the Articles," is an attempt to illustrate the distinctive force of *a* and *the*, according to the received theory of these two words, as a separate part of speech. "*Thou art A man*," is a very general and harmless position; but "*Thou art The man*," as Nathan said to David, is an assertion capable of striking terror and remorse into the heart."

This may sound well to persons inclined to take upon trust whatever is offered as a rule of language. A moment's attention will show whether the operation, here imputed to *a* and *the*, has any existence, except in imagination, or the connexion with other words.

175. Suppose that, after the treacherous attempt to deliver West Point to Sir Henry Clinton, the three American patriots had met and arrested Arnold, with the declaration, "thou art A traitor!" would not "this *very harmless position have struck terror and remorse into the heart*" of the culprit?

and suppose that Major André, instead of being executed in America, had gone home triumphant, to meet Miss Sneyd, and received from her the declaration, "My heart long since determined the husband of my choice, and *Thou art the man*:" would it probably have produced the same effect on the British lover, as Nathan's assertion did on King David? Whatever *terror* or *joy* might be conveyed by either of these expressions, does not depend on the adjective *a* or *the*, but on the association of circumstances.

176. According to most Greek grammarians, there is one article in that language; and the noun is *indefinitely defined* by the "*negation*" of an article.

"*Articulus* est *duplex;* prepositivus ὁ, ἡ, τὸ, hic, *hæc, hoc;* subjunctivus, ὅς, ἥ, ὅ, *qui, quæ, quod.*" —*Westminster Greek Grammar.* Art.

177. The learned Dr. Adam, in his Latin Grammar, states that there is no article in that language, and that this want is a great defect. This defect is one which Cicero and Quinctillian seem never to have suspected; and the greatest difficulty, in explaining on this point, is the seeming presumption of even remotely hinting that the *Rector of the high school of Edinburgh* had not read his Latin books with sufficient attention. It is altogether probable that Dr. Adam would not have found this defect in a language abounding in *articles*, if Dr. Wilkins, and other authors, of more reputation than sound philosophy, had not made it before him.

"Appius decreto præfatus quam libertati faverit, *eam ipsam legem* declarare, *quam* Virginii amici postulatione suæ prætendant."—*T. Livii*, III. 45.

"The Romans, in solemn oaths, used to hold a

flint stone in their right hand, saying, "Si sciens fallo, tum me, diespiter, salva urbe, arceque, bonis ejiciat, ut ego *hunc* lapidem. *Festus in Lapis.*"—Adam's "Antiquities." Ch. VI. p. 264.

178. Dr. Adam's example is *Filius Regis*, which he says may mean, a son of a king, the son of the king, a son of the king, or the son of a king.

As he leaves the matter, one would suppose the Latin language afforded no means of rendering this idea more specific.

The phrase means, of course, *a* son of *a* king, or *one* son of *one* king; for it is most clearly restricted to the singular number. If it was necessary to specify *identity* as well as *extension*, it would be donē by employing some of the many words with which the Latin language abounds for that purpose: is, quis, hic, ipse, ille, iste, meus, tuus, suus, noster, vester, and others.

179. Besides that a word precisely equivalent to an article, or specifying adjective, is contained in the Latin and Greek terminations, additional articles are often prefixed, and sometimes *two* or *three* to the same noun, "to point them out" *more definitely*, and show with *great precision* "how far the signification extends." In the very example, "*filius regis*," which Dr. Adam has given, the Latin books supply the deficiency which he has alleged, under every form of its supposed existence. *Ipse filius regis*, and filius ipsius regis, are too well known to good Latin scholars to need special quotations.

180. One mistake of the grammarians has led to considerable errors in practice. It has been common to represent *these* and *those*, as the direct plural forms of *this* and *that*. They have, in some degree,

a correlative application: but *those* is no more the plural of *that*, than *five* and *ten* are simple plurals of *one*.

The nice distinction between the "*definite article*," and the "*demonstrative adjective pronouns*," as to their *measure* of meaning, is commonly this:

181. *The* is applied to a thing which is before sufficiently understood, or where it is not necessary to be particularly "definite;" and *this*, *that*, *these*, and *those*, refer to nouns more emphatically, with some concomitant explanation.

The moon.

"*This* moon *that* rose last night, round as my shield."

Give me *the* news-paper.

Give me *that* news-paper *which lies yonder*.

"*The* Heavens declare the glory of God."

"Above *these* Heavens, *to us invisible, or dimly seen*, in *these thy* lower works."

182. In the colloquial use of these words, some visible sign, as a look or motion, often forms the attendant explanation; as, give me *that* volume and take *this*. Such allusions are, from familiar habit, carried into written language, with some reference to surrounding objects.

The satellites of Jupiter.

Those satellites which revolve around Jupiter.

183. But the specifying adjective of *relation*, where it can be used, is the best "*article*" to point out nouns, and show how far their signification extends; as, *Jupiter's* satellites; which means, with *precise limitation* and *identity*, *those four particular* satellites *which* revolve around the planet Jupiter.

A father, *the* father, *my* father, *John's* father.

23186

Does not every person see, at once, that these "possessives," as words to "*ascertain what particular thing or things are meant*," are better "definite articles" than *the*?

184. There is one other rule of the grammars, respecting the adjectives *a* and *the*, which will require a moment's attention.

"A substantive without *any** *article* to limit it, is generally taken in its widest sense; as "man is mortal."

"A candid temper is proper for man; that is, for all mankind." The application is correct in this particular instance; but for a different reason from any thing which is to be understood by the rule. *All mankind* partake of a *common nature*, and the same *mortality* and the same *moral temper* which belong to one, extend to the whole.

"So God created *man* in his own *image*."—*Ex.* I.

To explain this sentence by the same principle, it would read "*All Gods*, true and false, created in one day, the *whole human race* in *every possible form*."

185. If we should ask "what is the price of *flour* in *market*?" it would, by this rule of construction, mean *all flour kind* in *all the markets* in the world. This would give an extent and importance to the question which a merchant, unacquainted with grammar, would never suspect.

"Seven candlesticks," according to the same system, would imply *all the candlesticks*, to the greatest conceivable extent; because seven is not

* Any article means, according to Mr. Murray, any one of the two, *a* and *the*.

a nor *the*, and therefore the noun is to be taken in its greatest latitude of meaning.

The true and only rule is, that *specifying words*, of any kind, are not in general employed, where they are not necessary to perspicuity.

186. "And Jesus took *clay*, and spit upon it, and anointed the eyes of the blind man," &c.

No one asks *how much clay* was taken. The question would be entirely frivolous. It was equally miraculous that *much* or *little* clay, applied to the eyes of a man, blind from his birth, should immediately restore him to sight. This is the reason why it was not necessary to place *a* or *the*, *some*, or any other "article" before the noun *clay*.

187. "He that hath *ears* to hear, let him hear." The translators of the bible, who were distinguished scholars, knew that the word *ears* must include two, at least, as being in the plural number. They also knew, that according to the common course of nature, any *one man*, implied by the word *he*, would not be expected to have more than that number. They did not, therefore, anticipate the later grammatical version of this passage, ascribing all the *ears* in the world to a single person, by the mere omission of the word *the*.

Why is there an indefinite article in the singular, and none in the plural? Why are not *twain*, *two*, *three*, *some*, *any*, and many other words, as good articles as *a*?

DEGREES OF COMPARISON.

188. Adjectives generally express quality in different degrees, as *blackish*, *black*, *blacker*, *blackest*.

Besides these different forms of the adjective, many subsidiary words are used, which, according to the special meaning of the appended term, may serve to give various turns to the idea conveyed by the adjective *black;* as, *very, extremely, slightly, totally black.* The direct forms of the adjective have been generally called degrees of comparison; though not with strict propriety, as comparison is not always implied, farther than as it belongs to the general nature of adjectives.

189. As there are nouns which admit of no limitation, nor increase, so many adjectives are unalterably fixed by the import of the term.

The Creator alone is *omnipotent* and *omniscient,* we can not say that any other being is *less* or *more* so. No one thing can be less or more *eternal, immeasurable, countless, immaculate,* or *perfect,* than an other. These terms denote quality, to a degree which can neither be increased nor diminished: because that, from the nature of things, more can not be; and less is inconsistent with the meaning of the word.

190. It is found convenient in practice to class adjectives under three degrees: *positive, comparative,* and *superlative;* as *black, blacker, blackest.* To these may be added an other modification of the single word, and which applies in a great number of instances, though not in so general use as the other forms; as *blackish,* inclining to blackness, or partially black. This may be considered as the minor positive degree.

191. Adjectives are commonly compared by adding *er* or *est,* which additions are, by origin, separate and significant words.

Several adjectives, of most frequent use, are made irregular by adopting different radical terms, to express the different degrees of quality.

The regular adjectives in their direct forms, are thus compared.

Minor.	*Pos.*	*Comp.*	*Sup.*
Greenish	green	greener	greenest
Longish	long	longer	longest.

192. Adjectives are also compared by various qualifying words, which augment or diminish their positive meaning, by different relations and degrees; as, wise—*less*, *least*, *more*, *most*, *very*, *exceedingly* wise. Some of these qualifying words, on account of their appropriate meaning, are much used. Those occasionally employed, for the sake of variety or harmony, or to mark the nicer distinctions of thought, are very numerous.

193. It should also be kept in mind, that the form of the adjective, which is assumed as the positive degree, is in fact almost always comparative. Whatever is high, is so, in reference to something else which is lower. The adjective in the positive degree, is associated with the idea of what is appropriate to the thing in which the quality is conceived to exist. The *largest long boat* would make a *very small ship;* and a potter's kiln, *altogether too cool* for baking stone ware, might yet be a *very uncomfortably warm* room, for people to live in.

194. Adjectives also stand connected with nouns, and with each other, by various kinds of relation, in a way which no mere grammar rules can explain: "*The smoky London air*," may mean either the air of smoky London, or the

smoky air of London. "*The new Albany road,*" is either the road to New Albany, or the new road to Albany. *A witch hazel mineral rod.* Russia iron carriage springs. No man could tell how to combine these ideas, by any explanations which could be given, depending on the mere forms of words. It must be known how they are accepted in practice.

"That New *Z*ealand provision ship."

Georgia sea island cotton plantations.

"Some English East India Company's tea ships."

A *beaver* hat, a *beaver* trap, a *beaver* pond, the *beaver* trade.

195. Some nouns, from the nature of the case, require their adjectives in closer connexion than others, in their descriptive application.

An *American ship* means one *owned* and *navigated* by *Americans;* but a *China ship* is merely engaged in the *China trade,* without being owned or managed by Chinese, either wholly or in part.

"A very thick headed gentleman's cane."

"A wild ass's colt."

"Liverpool deep blue earthern pitchers."

"Warranted fine old Jersey Cider,"

"A low Dutch stove." "A new Guinea war club."

"An elegant lady's lace veil."

Is it the lady, the lace, or the veil, which is elegant?

Describing adjectives refer to general ideas and expressions: as, "Behold how *good* and how *pleasant* it is for brethren to dwell together in unity." Here the *thing* which is good and pleasant, is, *the dwelling together of brethren in unity.*

196 Other adjectives were formerly compared by adding the superlative form to the comparative; as,

Uppish	up	upper	upper*est*,	or upper*most*,
	bet	better,	better*est*	better*most*
	in	inner	inner*most*	inmost

The word *bet* is no longer used as an adjective; but, as a noun, retains, virtually the same meaning. "To make a *bet*," is to substantiate an assertion, to make it *good* by a pledge. The word *good*, originally *God*, has gradually come into use in its present form as an adjective. The ancient Persian name of the deity, *Goda*, is extensively diffused through northern Europe and Asia, and is now in use by many other nations, as well as ourselves. We have more recently adopted godlike and godly from the same primitive word.

197. Several other forms, anciently prevailed, which in the progress of time, have been changed; or only retained in part of their forms; as,

Mo mo-er mo-est now *more* and *most*.

Most adjectives, of more than one syllable, make the comparative and superlative degrees by placing before or after them the words *more, most; less, least*. These words, so joined with adjectives, are considered as adverbs: but *less* and *most* are frequently joined to an adjective, as parts of one compound word.

198. It has been objected to the present general system of teaching grammar, that it is addressed solely to the *memory*, as a mere form of words, without employing the *reasoning faculties*. This objection does not appear to be entirely true; for, by laying down arbitrary rules without reason, the student is left at full liberty to find proofs and

smoky air of London. "*The new Albany road*," is either the road to New Albany, or the new road to Albany. *A witch hazel mineral rod.* Russia iron carriage springs. No man could tell how to combine these ideas, by any explanations which could be given, depending on the mere forms of words. It must be known how they are accepted in practice.

"That New *Z*ealand provision ship."

Georgia sea island cotton plantations.

"Some English East India Company's tea ships."

A *beaver* hat, a *beaver* trap, a *beaver* pond, the *beaver* trade.

195. Some nouns, from the nature of the case, require their adjectives in closer connexion than others, in their descriptive application.

An *American ship* means one *owned* and *navigated* by *Americans;* but a *China ship* is merely engaged in the *China trade*, without being owned or managed by Chinese, either wholly or in part.

"A very thick headed gentleman's cane."

"A wild ass's colt."

"Liverpool deep blue earthern pitchers."

"Warranted fine old Jersey Cider,"

"A low Dutch stove." "A new Guinea war club."

"An elegant lady's lace veil."

Is it the lady, the lace, or the veil, which is elegant?

Describing adjectives refer to general ideas and expressions: [illegible] *good* and how *pleasant* [illegible] dwell together in [illegible] is good and pleasant [illegible] *thren in unity.*

196 Other adjectives were formerly compared by adding the superlative form to the comparative; as,

Uppish	up	upper	upper*est*,	or upper*most*,
	bet	better,	better*est*	better*most*
	in	inner	inner*most*	inmost

The word *bet* is no longer used as an adjective; but, as a noun, retains, virtually the same meaning. "To make a *bet*," is to substantiate an assertion, to make it *good* by a pledge. The word *good*, originally *God*, has gradually come into use in its present form as an adjective. The ancient Persian name of the dejty, *Goda*, is extensively diffused through northern Europe and Asia, and is now in use by many other nations, as well as ourselves. We have more recently adopted god-like and godly from the same primitive word.

197. Several other forms, anciently prevailed, which in the progress of time, have been changed; or only retained in part of their forms; as,

Mo mo-er mo-est now *more* and *most*.

Most adjectives, of more than one syllable, make the comparative and superlative degrees by placing before or after them the words *more*, *most*; *less*, *least*. These words, so joined with adjectives, are considered as adverbs: but *less* and *most* are frequently joined to an adjective, as parts of one compound word.



arguments for himself. In the exercise of this privilege it may be well to inquire why the comparatives of some adjectives can not be construed with *than*: such, for instance, as inner, outer, upper, anterior, posterior, exterior, interior, superior, inferior, and others.

There are, in logic and philosophy, two kinds of comparison; that of like qualities, existing in different degrees; or the comparison of similitude: and that of attributes and relations opposed to each other; or the comparison of contrast. It would be childishness to say the inside of a vessel is inner than the outside. To say that heat is warmer than cold is not comparing degrees of quality; and it is certainly not giving information to any one who previously knows the meaning of the words. One thing is brighter than an other, when both are bright in different degrees.

When the west side of the town is mentioned, it is understood, of course, that the other sides are not west, and therefore there is no comparison between them, but simply that of local relation.

199. Some adjectives are compared, not by their own direct forms, but by habitual connexion with other words, as down, *more* and *most completely* down.

It appeared necessary to be more particular in trying to explain adjectives; because the system attempted in this work, so greatly varies from the theory long received and taught, that it must encounter opposition from those, whose prejudices, self-interest, or honest difference of opinion, will lead them to defend the *antecedent* course, as being necessarily right, because it has long been practised.

VERBS.

200. *Verb* is derived from the Latin, *verbum, a word.* This term is applied, by way of eminence, to mark the importance of this part of speech, as the foundation of language: for there can be no possible operation of human thought, but by its instrumentality.

Verbs are words signifying *action*; as the horse *runs*: the birds *sing*; we *live, move,* and *have* our being: I *am* here; he *is* well; La Fayette *aided* America.

Actions necessarily suppose an agent, or acting power to produce them: this idea, like many others on which the structure of speech depends, is to be understood as the great leading principle, and, though subject to no real exception, has various secondary modifications, as adapted to the diversified nature of things.

201. Verbs do not always imply direct, perceivable *action*; but that kind of *affirmation*, which for all purposes of discourse, is perfectly equivalent to it; as, a man going by accident against a rock, says, "*It hurt* me." This it will be readily seen, does not contradict; but is only a modification of the broad rule: for though the rock, in this instance, does not obviously *act*, as an *agent*, yet it does *operate* as a cause, producing the effect of hurting the man. The rock in this case *hurts* the person, not by its visible *action* or *motion*; but by its *inherent nature.* The *apple hangs* on the tree; the *glass stands* on the table; the *ship sails* well, are the same kind of assertion, so far as language is concerned, as the bird *flies*; "the horse *runs.*"

The *degree* of *activity* forms no rule for classifying verbs; and the *motives* of *action* belongs not to the essential structure of speech. To say the *beam fell*, and *killed* the man, is, for all the purposes of speech, precisely the same kind of *action*, as to assert that one *man killed* an other with premeditated malice.

202. *Verbs* are divided into *regular* and *irregular*. The regular verbs form the past tense and participle, by adding *d* or *ed*; as please, pleased; treat, treated. All which differ from this form are irregular; as, *know, knew, known*; *drive, drove, driven*. Other verbs have no variation of tense; and these also are classed among the irregular; as, *cost, cost, cost; split, split, split*.

Verbs are again divided by grammarians into *transitive* and intransitive; according as they *suppose* the action represented terminates on some object, or is confined to what is generally and vaguely affirmed of the subject, independent of any thing which the verb affects.

Example of the transitive verb; "*Franklin invented the lightning rod.*" Here, *Franklin* is the subject of the verb; that is, the agent, the actor, or nominative word; *invented* is the verb expressing the action; *lightning rod* is the object, to which the action tends, and on which it terminates.

203. Writers on logic and mental philosophy explain this principle in different words; but amounting to the same thing.

John strikes *Thomas.*
He strikes *him.*

John is the *predicate* or *subject* of a proposition; *strikes* contains the *affirmation* or *assertion*, respecting that subject; and *Thomas* is the *object* to which *the affirmation tends*, and at which it *terminates*.

To find the *subject* or *actor*, ask *who* did the action? *who* strikes? Answer. *He* or *John* strikes. To find the *object*, place the word what or whom after the verb: strikes *what* or *whom*? Answer. Strikes *Thomas* or *him*.

204. Other verbs are called intransitive, because it is supposed by the learned writers and teachers of language, that they have no objective words.

With most of the verbs, set down in grammars and dictionaries as having no objects, the mistake may be seen at once.

To dream, is a standard word, selected by the writers, as an example of *intransitive* or *neuter* verbs; but the man who dreams, always *dreams some thing*; even though, as, with Nebuchadnezzar, the particular "*thing* should be gone from him," and he can only remember that he "*dreamed a dream*." The word *fight*, has a long series of definitions, as a neuter verb; but St. Paul, while he disclaimed all other warfare, "*fought* the good *fight*."

205. Omissions in language commonly result from convenience and propriety. They are too numerous to be reduced to rule; but are learned by practice, through the whole course of life.

For omitting the objects of verbs, in numerous instances, several reasons may be offered, which need only be mentioned to produce a ready conviction of their truth and force.

First. It often happens that the *object* of a verb is not a *single word*; but includes a long statement; as, "Xenophon *says* that the ten thousand Greeks retreated," &c. that is, he says that whole *book of sayings*, which details this historical event.

Secondly. Many verbs admit very little variety in their application to objects, which are therefore necessarily understood, with sufficient clearness for all the purposes of ordinary communication. The *person sleeps*, either the ordinary *sleep* of the night, or *he sleeps* a short *nap*; and this *dormant action* is not conceived of under any other variety, till *he shall* "*sleep* the *sleep of death.*"

206. *Thirdly.* An other reason, nearly allied to the last mentioned, often leads to the omission of the objective word: that is, to avoid apparent repetition. The phrase to *dream a dream*, though perfectly correct, has a solemn stiffness, unsuited to polite conversation, or elegant literature. To avoid this form, speakers omit the *verbal* or *derivative* noun, after its own verb; or resort to circumlocution. In the second chapter of Daniel, before referred to, as in various other places, we find "to *tell*," "to *show*," "to *make known*," "to *declare*," "to *interpret* a *dream*;" where this *noun*, to avoid monotony, becomes the *object* of various *transitive verbs*, without the least appearance of impropriety.

To fly a flight, is not a common phrase; for it sounds like tautology or pleonasm: but that "the eagle's *flight* is out of sight," is a piece of information familiar to primer readers.

No polite French scholar would say, VOLER *un* VOL: but "*Elle descendit d'un* VOL *rapide, tout aupres de moi*," is from the pen of the elegant Fenelon, for the very purpose of embellishing a fine descriptive narration.

Language is full of constructive *objects*, for this imaginary class of *intransitive verbs*: but any person, inclined to pursue the investigation, may find the "thickening proofs," in the first form of language, from Greek to Tuscarora, to which he *chooses* to refer.

Rex et regina regunt regnum, is perfectly correct Latin; but would not be used by a good writer; because its repetition of similar words makes it unpleasant.

207. *Fourthly.* The last class of supposed intransitive verbs, necessary to mention, are *reflected verbs*, with the *personal objective word* understood. This set of words appears to include the chief secret respecting *intransitive* or *neuter* verbs.

"*Warning was therefore given to Lady Jane to prepare for death.*"—*Hume's History of England.* That is, *to prepare herself.*

I must dress ( ) *and get* ( ) *ready for the ball.* "*He retired* ( ) *from the field:*" that is, he *retired* or *drew* back *himself:* from *retirer*, French: or *re* and *tiro* Latin. *To fall one's self*, is no longer used; yet this is the original expression: we still say, *to fall trees.* "*Cast thyself down*," is a perfectly analogous form of speech. So in French, *s'abattre;* and the same idiom running through the different languages of Europe, showing the general principle, beyond all possibility of doubt. "To repent one's self," was the original form in English, and it still is in other languages. It was sometimes used as an impersonal verb: as, "*It repented him that he had threatened to destroy Nineveh.*" "*No man repented him of his wickedness;*" Jeremiah viii.; which form answers to the Latin *poenitet.* The phrase, as given by the translators, is perfectly good English; and is the exact rendition of the Hebrew original.

In explaining the adjective, some notice was taken of the different kinds and degrees of relation, which are often concealed under the same apparent

grammatical form. Similar principles extend to verbs and other parts of speech.

The *groom* and *bride marry each other;* and the priest *marries them both*, to each other. It is also said by Engligh writers, that the *father marries his daughter*, to the husband whom he selects for her.

In Dr. Goldsmith's song of Miss Hardcastle in the comedy "She stoops to conquer." "O when shall I *marry me?*" that is, *marry myself* to a husband.

208. This class of reflected verbs may be subdivided into three kinds.

1. *Simple reflected verbs* representing actions recurring singly upon the actors, through the different persons, moods, and tenses. "Cornaro *confined himself* to the most temperate course of life."

2. *Reciprocal verbs*, are the actions of different persons, mutually exercised: "They *ruined each other* by litigation."

3. Verbs used only in the third person singular are called *impersonal*; implying that they are not conjugated with different persons. Of this kind are the common phrases, *it rains, it hails, freezes*, or *snows*. In this form the idea is general; the *snow snows:* the *frost freezes* whatever *freezable thing* is in its way.

As an evidence that this is the general philosophic principle, the same idiom appears to prevail with the same class of actions, in all known languages.

209. It is no valid objection to say, like Mr. Murray and others, that *cold* is a *quality*, and *frost* is an *effect* and not an *active cause*. This and other expressions, which form the main structure of language, are not modelled by the modern refinements *in grammar*. The speech of different nations is

full of examples, where these *qualities* and *effects* are considered *operative principles*. The "bitter" "*biting frost*" *kills* tender *plants* and *fruit*; *benumbs* the *limbs*, and *stops* the *raging pestilence*. "*Jack Frost makes bridges*" over the streams. "The third day *comes* a *frost*, a *killing frost*; *nips* his *shoot*; and then he falls."

The *rain pours* down in torrents; that is, *pours itself* down; and the reason why the objective word is not used, is that the rain is not conceived of as pouring down any thing else but itself.

210. The principle of natural and mental philosophy, as connected with this idiom of speech, seems easily to *devolve itself*, and is curiously interesting. The *rain rains rain*. It is not the idea of *one thing acting on an other*. According to the obvious conception of unlettered people, as well as of enlightened philosophers, it is the substance *rain*, generating *action*, within itself, and that *action*, by a consequent influence, affecting the agent which produced it. "*A little leven leveneth the whole lump*," which, by *levening*, becomes *leven*. So we say *carbonates effervesce* ( ) with acids. *Cider works itself* clear by fermentation. How differently does the following sentence *present itself* to the mind! "*Then the Lord rained upon Sodom, and upon Gomorrah, brimstone and fire, from the Lord, out of Heaven.*"

211. The erroneous opinions respecting the verbs, called intransitive or neuter, will be farther seen in the definitions given by the ablest lexicographers to explain them, under this supposed character. Take for instance the familiar *neuter* verb to *act*, as it stands in the last London edition of Todd's Johnson.

"To Act v. n. [*ago, actum*, Lat.] To be in *action*, *not* to *rest*. *Pope.* To *perform* the proper *functions*. *South.* To *practise* arts or duties. *Dryden.* To *produce effects* on some passive subject. *Garth.*

Every one of these definitions, and every other which could be given, so far as it is correct as a definition, has an objective word, expressed or necessarily understood.

212. In contemplating the thousands of verbs, represented as being either *active* or *neuter*, according to their collocation, one *idea presents itself*, as the obvious deduction of common sense. These words were not *originally* introduced in this *double character*; but with *one direct meaning*. They have gradually grown into their multifarious applications, by long habit.

"*Mr. Williams is to move* [ ] into his new house next week." To *move himself*, *family*, and *furniture*, are the associated *objects*, understood by familiar custom.

213. Many of these verbs are vacillating between the supposed characters of *transitive* and *intransitive*. "*How does he conduct* [ ] *in his new situation?*" *When are you to leave* [ ]?" The critics, at first, object to the use of these verbs, without the object expressed; but, in spite of remonstrances, there is an irresistible tendency to avoid the repetition of words which, by familiar practice, are sufficiently understood: and the number of verbs erroneously considered as intransitive is constantly increasing.

"*I* [*A. B.*] *undersyne thee*, [*C. D.*] *for my wedded wyfe, for better, for worse, for richer, for porer, yn sickness, end yn helthe, tyl dethe us departe, as*

holy churche hath ordeyned, end thereto I plyght my trowthe." Marriage Vow, "Missals" of the Church of Hereford, 1502.

"*Tyl dethe us departe;*" that is, till death shall *de-part us*, or *se-parate us*, from each other. The classic scholar, who gives a slight attention to the etymons of these words, will perceive that a constructive object is irresistibly inferred. So "to depart from a place;" "to depart this life," is to *se-parate*, *dis-part*, or *de-part one's self* from a present situation.

214. One obvious reason why the *objects* of reflected verbs are less used in English than in most other tongues, is, that they are *longer* and *harsher words*. The constant repetition of the words *myself*, *himself*, *themselves*, would have a much more clumsy effect, than the Latin or French *se*, or the Italian *si*; or that the slightly articulated Spanish word *lo*, or *la*, appended to the verb.

215. But there is a shorter and more conclusive way to settle the very important question, respecting intransitive verbs, than by any course of mere grammatical reasoning.

All verbs denote action; for it will be shown hereafter, how unfounded is the attempted distinction between *action*, *passion*, and *existence*.

216. Every *action* necessarily implies the *motion*, *operation*, or *change* of some *material substance*; and no *movement* or *change* of matter can possibly take place, without affecting the *moving body*, or some thing else, or *both*. The *verb* affirms this *movement*, *action*, *operation* or *change*; always affirming it, under all the modifications of speech,

as *real action;* and the *thing affected* by such *action* or *movement,* whether the moving body, or any other portion of matter, is the *object* of the *verb.*

217. Philosophically and strictly speaking, every action must be contemplated as producing two or more effects; as, water in evaporating, *turns itself* to vapor, *exhausts itself,* and *increases* the *bulk* of air with which it *mingles itself,* and to which it *imparts* its *qualities.* But, in the structure of speech, *one effect* is referred to, as connected with the verbal affirmation. No *action* or *movement* can be produced, without both a *mover,* and some *thing moved:* consequently, there can be *no verb* without both a *subject* and an *object,* expressed or irresistibly inferred.

All objections, apparent exceptions, and minor applications, which can be imagined, will not contradict this general proposition. To say that a verb has no object, is to assert that an *efficient cause* may *operate* without *producing any effect:* for if the *cause* was not *efficient,* it would not produce the *action.*

218. In the practical adaptation of this broad rule, to the several classes of things, actions or affirmations are to be understood as applying to various subjects, according to their general nature and qualities.

This reference to the different classes of things, extends only to minor circumstances, and never varies the leading principles before laid down.

Man *moves himself,* and *acts his part,* in various ways, according to the impulse of his fancy, or the determinations of his *judgment:* An *ox seeks the shade,* by animal *instinct* or *aptitude,* to obviate a bodily suffering which he feels: a stone, *thrown into* the air, *falls* to the earth, and

would fall to the center of attraction, if not resisted by some prevailing obstruction. *Iron sinks* in the water, and a *chip rises* and *swims* on the surface; not like the man or the ox, by *voluntary power* of locomotion: but by an *inherent tendency* to take certain positions according to their specific weight.

219. Even where perceivable action does not, in the special case, exist, that is, where two active principles balance each other, the structure of speech, according to its prevailing rules, always supposes real activity; and consequently includes both actor and object.

Perhaps of all the words which the opposer could offer, the verb *to lie*, in place, should seem to be one of the most difficult to explain. The intricacy with this, and every other verb, ceases, as soon as the meaning of the word is understood. *To lie*, Saxon *liegan*; French *lier*; Latin *ligo*; means, to *bind*, to *tie*, *fasten*, *hold*, *fix* or *keep* in place. The *noun lien*, from the Norman French, a *tie*, *hold* or *claim*, is still retained, as a law term. There is indeed an awkwardness in using the object of the verb *lie*, on account of its accidental interference with other verbs: but this circumstance does not in the least degree affect the general principle.

220. The *action* to *lie*, like other *movements*, may be *directed* by *reason*, *animal aptitude*, or *essential qualities*. The *soldier lies* down, (*prostrates himself*,) in his intrenchment, that balls may pass over him. The *tiger lies*, (conceals himself,) in wait for his prey. The *lever lies*, (keeps itself,) on the deck; because it has not sufficient

specific gravity to go through it, and it is *too heavy* to *rise* into the air, or *glide away* with the breeze.

The *handspike*, by the *constituent properties* which Almighty Wisdom has imparted to it, *retains itself* on the deck, as the *trembling, unconscious, magnetic needle*, by its *inherent tendency*, *points itself* to the pole.

As *nouns* are sometimes *negatively supposed*, as in the instance of nothingness, so many *actions* are *negatively asserted*; as, "His pain was so great, he was *not able*, possibly *to lie still*."

221. It is no matter by what remote or prime *cause* an *action* is *produced*. The *main spring* of the watch *vibrates the crown wheel;* the whole *machinery moves*; and the *hands point the hours*. The factory water-*wheel turns* the *trundle head:* the *bands move* round the *drum*; and the *throstle frame twists* the *yarn*. In all this bustle of activity, nothing appears, but mere *inanimate operators*; *producing their effects*, in sucession, from the water, which *forces itself* on the buckets, to every spindle in the cotton mill.

222. Language applies to these objects, as they appear, and as they are, *moving* and *moved*. A speech could not be framed with appropriate reference to each particular subject; or adapted, like a system of jurisprudence, to the *motives* of activity. The greatest philosopher would be very slow of speech, if it was necessary to use verbs with strict reference to the *secret springs* of action. The *freight* that *sinks the ship*, acts with no other kind of power than the *lever* which *lies* on the deck; that is, by its *force of gravitation*.

223. *In* the *movements* of the natural world,

there is no neutrality. The stupendous machine of the universe, and every portion of matter of which it is composed, are constantly in *action*, according to the oppositely harmonious laws of gravitation, propulsion, affinity, cohesion, electricity, and other influences, some yet unknown to human thought. Through all parts of this measureless whole, is a succession of continuous *actions*, from each microscopic atom, of unnumbered intervolving worlds, to the Eternal, Unseen, Guiding Hand.

224. As in the great system of nature, so in the transmission of thought, every thing is regarded as possessing an acting power, and as capable of exercising some kind and degree of option. There is a philosophic reason why the statue sustains itself, still in its place, instead of conveying itself away, like its living antetype; and on the most rigid scrutiny of the intellectual powers, it will be found that the Author of Mind, by a barrier which never can be passed, has compelled us to ascribe in speech, to marble and bronze, that species of choice which belongs to the aptitude of their nature.

In many minor particulars, it is well that verbal expression has received its main cast, not in the schools of half-way learning, but among plain men, applying its principles, in the only way in which finite wisdom could properly apply them, to the operations in nature, as they are seen, heard, and felt.

225. The whole system of explanation upon verbs, and consequently the whole theory of speech, as taught among the European nations, appears to be remarkably unphilosophic and contrary to the appearance of truth. Dr. Johnson, and all the principal British expounders of language, agree

in giving "*revolve*," to roll round in a circle, as a *neuter verb*. According to this grammatical astronomy, then, the earth performs its revolution round the sun, without the least possible *effect*, *change*, or resulting *influence*, wrought upon *itself*, or any other *object*. Such a system of instruction, when followed into its consequences, is derogatory to the Divine Wisdom, as well as directly at varience with the dictates of common sense. These errors are not peculiar to England. The same inconsistent theory prevails through all the universities and royal academies of Europe. Let the learned teachers of language turn practical philosophers; make with fire any experiment they please, and satisfy themselves if they can, that *burn* is ever a neuter verb. If persons allow themselves to think, it certainly requires but little logic or knowledge to perceive that in the *action* of *rolling*, some *substance* must be *rolled;* and *some thing*, in every *sinking*, must be *sunk*. Whatever that thing is, is the object of the verb; and to say that a verb has no object, is as contrary to science, as to assert that two straight lines can meet in a point, without forming an angle.

226. *Eat* and *drink*, among others, are set down as *neuter verbs*. To those who think them such, but who, contrary to their own creed, use them several times a day, as *active* and *transitive*, it is recommended that they try to reconcile their *practice* with their *doctrine*, and employ these two verbs *without objects*, as long as they believe them *neuter*.

Mental *actions* follow the analogy of *corporeal things*, and will be most properly explained under the head of figurative language. The reader, in attending to this investigation, will be led to consider the great point of union between *physical* and

intellectual philosophy; *literature*, and the *active concerns of life.*

227. English verbs receive *four* kinds of modification, denoted by the technical words, *mood*, *tense*, *person*, and *number*.

MOOD.

Mood is the distinctive manner in which actions are represented. There are are three moods, distinguished by personal relation. These are named the indicative, or declaring; the imperative, or commanding; and the infinitive, or unrestricted. These take their respective names from the leading idea; but are subject to many secondary modifications.

Some writers attempt to explain one or more moods, in addition to these; but as such additional moods have no existence in fact, it is unphilosophic and unprofitable to invent artificial systems to create them.

228. The *indicative* is used to *assert*, *deny*, or *interrogate*, and has reference to the simple *fact* of the action's being done, or not done. It has *one personal relation;* that is, of *direct agreement with the actor*; as "*Brutus saw* a vision." "*Bonaparte issued* the Berlin decree."

The distinctive trait of the *imperative mood* is, that it implies the *volition* of a *first person*, addressed to the *agency* of a *second*, to do or not to do an action. Whether the imperative mood is to be considered under the idea of *authoritative command*, of *supplication*, or of *request*, depends on the countless relative conditions in which men may stand, with reference to each other. As no dividing line can

be drawn, between these *minor circumstances*, they can not be made the basis of any consistent classification.

"*Pull* out this javelin, and *let* me bleed."—*Epaminondas to his attendants.*

Who can say whether this expression is the dying man's *request* to his friends, to relieve him from excruciating pain, or the last *command* of the military chieftain to his subalterns?

"*Bear witness* for me to my countrymen, that I die like a brave man."—*Col. Hale.*

229. As the *imperative mood* is always addressed to a *second person, thou, you*, or an equivalent noun, is necessarily understood: but the verb itself is *never varied* in English, for *number, person*, nor *tense;* though it is *always future* by construction. There needs no argument to prove the absurdity of commanding a person to do an action, *yesterday*, or at any other time than *after* the *command is expressed.* Nearly all which is said in European grammars respecting the tenses of this verb, is perfectly childish. No sophistry can make it any thing else but *future*. If a man sees instant danger threaten his friend, and says, "take care," all he can mean is, that his friend may take care, *in consequence* of his warning.

The *infinitive mood* expresses *action*, without any *direct* connexion with the *actor*. It is seldom governed by a single word, as has been supposed; but generally depends on an *indicative proposition.*

He tries to learn. *I am now ready* to be offered. It sometimes follows an imperative verb. *Try* to shun evil, *learn* to do well.

An *affirmation* must of course contain a *verb*, and on this *verb* the *infinitive* is commonly considered

as more *immediately* depending. This partial modification, however, is no way contrary to the general rule above advanced.

The *infinitive verb* some times makes part of the *affirmation*, as, "To see *is pleasant*." In this kind of sentence the infinitive may be the *subject* or *object* of an indicative verb.

As the radical verb may almost always be used as a noun, in English, without change of the word, it is made a convenient practice, to prefix, to the *infinitive mood*, the word *to*, by way of distinction.

The ideas of *mood* and *tense* are very intimately combined. Farther explanations will therefore be made upon them in connexion.

TENSE.

230. Writers on language have very generally adopted the technical word *tense*, to denote *different verbal references to the order of time*.

According to philosophic understanding, there are *three tenses*, or relative periods, which include the whole extent of duration. The *present* instant, taken as a *point*, or *crossing line*, in the progress of time, is *without measure of continuance*, the ever-advancing *now*, dividing the *past* from the *untried future*.

Though each word appears to have had one only original form, yet, in the progress of several languages, the verb has assumed different changes, to express these periods of time; and, in some, has more numerous variations to mark the *relative order* of events.

231. An English verb has, in form, two tenses only; the present and the past. The organization

of our language, which, in this particular, is simple and philosophic, has left other relations of time to depend on logical construction.

Present	*Past.*
I *write*	I *wrote*
I *am*	I *was*
I *walk*	I *walked*
I *have*	I *had*

Had is the contraction for *haved*, as in many other words of similar structure.

132. The *future*, in English, can only be expressed by *two distinct verbs*, one depending on the other; as, I *intend to go* tomorrow. In this expression, the idea of the *future*, which is unequivocal, even without the word *tomorrow*, depends on this simple deduction. The verb *intend* is *present tense*, in form and meaning. It declares a *purpose of the mind* to do an *action*: that action *not commenced*, and therefore *future*. Neither can this deduction of the future be, in substance, varied by any qualifying words. Whether I *intend* to go *instantly*, *next week*, or *next year*, the grammar and the logic are the same: for it is not the business of either to inquire, *how far* the *proposed action* is in advance of the present moment. What *is to be*, in *one second* of time, is as absolutely *future*, as the praises which *are to be offered* after the lapse of *ten thousand ages*.

I *wish*, I *will*, I *must*, I *propose*, *to go*, with every similar form of expression, are all to be explained in the same manner. No other kind of future can be expressed in the English language. This future tense, then, strictly speaking, is not one of *grammatical form*; but of *logical deduction*.

233. The principle is the same if the reference is

to an action *now doing:* as, I *have been writing* two hours, and I *intend to write* an hour longer. This *intention* refers entirely to that portion of the action *which remains unfinished*, that is, the *future.*

If the first verb is put in the past tense, the second is *future* in relation to the *time* of the *intention*, and not to the *present time;* as, I *intended*, last Monday, *to write* on Tuesday.

This *relative future* may exist, when both the verbs signify *present* and *continuing action;* as "He *causeth* the sun *to shine* on the just and on the unjust." Here the idea is a *continuing cause*, and a *consequent continuing action.* The *shining* depends on the *causing*, and is *future* in relation to it. Under these circumstances of *continuance*, the two actions are partly *consecutive*, and partly *concomitant.*

234. The verb *do*, by its meaning and use, when put before the infinitive mood, presents the idea of *two actions* nearly *coeval;* as, I *do write;* "I *do believe;* help thou my unbelief." The close connexion in the time of the two verbs, in this instance, depends on the special meaning of the word *do*, which signifies *immediate* and *efficient action.* In the phrase, "I *dare write*," the grammatical structure is precisely the same; but the logical expositions are different; and the assertion may be understood that I *do* write, or that I *do not.*

The same close relation exists between the *indicative* and the *infinitive* verb, in point of time, when they *both* imply the *affections of the mind;* as, "*will* you *admit* the correctness of my statement?" Ans. I *will admit* it. There is no *constructive future*, in English, which can come nearer to an *absolute present* than this. *To will*, is the *present act* of the *mind.* *Admit* also implies an *act* of pure vo-

lition. To will, what depends solely on the *will*, is a *purpose* of the *mind* which is unavoidably accompanied by its own *instantaneous* fulfilment.

235. The word *will* conveys no more idea of futurity than is generally implied by *imperative* and *infinitive verbs*, and by all the "*auxiliaries*."

"If a yong jentleman *will venture himselfe* into the companie of ruffians, it is over great a jeopardie, lest their facions, maners, thoughts, taulke, and dedes, *will* verie sone *be* over like."—*R. Ascham's "Scholemaster."*

If a young gentleman *inclines to venture* (himself) at any time.

Will is the Latin *volo*, Gr. ἐλω, ἐλομαι, anciently written in England, *voll*, afterwards *woll*, as it is still pronounced in Yorkshire, and some other counties. It made its past tense wolde, and was, and still is, used in frequent instances, without a following infinitive verb.

"Graunt mercy, good frende, quod he, I thanke thee that thou *woldest* so."—*Dream of Chaucer*, fol. 256.

Will, like other verbs, formerly required the usual sign of the infinitive mood after it, when followed by an other verb.

This verb runs through all the present languages of Europe, northern and southern, having nothing but its great importance, and consequent frequency of use, to distinguish it from other *principal verbs*. In modern French literature it may, like four others, specially privileged, take or omit the usual infinitive preposition, though not the infinitive form, after it; but in other tongues, generally, the proper infinitive forms are required, in the consecutive verb.

The principle here explained respecting this formation is most strikingly illustrated by reference to the other languages of northern Europe. In German, the most extensive of them, the plural is generally made by the verb to be; as, *Ich werde seyn*, I am to be: *wir waren seyn*, we were to be. In this, and several other tongues, it is perfectly understood by every person familiar with them, that there is no other way of forming a plural but by an *infinitive verb*, depending on its proper correlative expression.

Nothing is more foreign from a true philosophic principle, than the arbitrary selection of shall and will, as the exclusive signs of the future. This results from a mistaken idea of the character and meaning of these words, of which more will be said under the head of "*auxiliaries*."

137. The *modified relations* of a word, with the same *general meaning*, as explained under the *adjectives*, have an extensive application to *verbs*. Want of attention to this has led to much confusion in grammars.

To *dust* furniture, is to clear it from dust,

To *dust* gunpowder is to make it fine.

To *dust* [ ] often signifies to sprinkle or cover with dust, either as a protection from injury, or by way of reproach.

2. Samuel, xvi. 13. "And as David and his men went by, Shimei went along on the hill's side, over against him, and cursed (him) as he went and threw stones at him, and (*dusted him* with dust."*)

---

* This is the literal version: but the translators have given the same meaning in different words: "and cast dust" upon him.

AUXILIARIES.

These words form a most deeply interesting part in the science of language; and it is difficult to conceive any thing more contrary to philosophy, than to adduce them, as having no meaning, and as entirely *subsidiary*, for the very reasons which show their *primary importance*.

A slight degree of preliminary reasoning leads strongly to an other reflection. The words of *obscure meaning*, and the general *prefixes* and *terminations* of nouns, adjectives, and verbs, could not, as they now exist, have belonged to the *original structure:* for these appendages of refinement and convenience belong to cultivated speech, and were not adapted to suit the wants of savage man.

One broad rule may be laid down in relation to these, as well as all other words. They all had their origin in ideas *directly relating to persons and things* in the *material world*.

239. All original verbal expressions were signs of some thing obvious to the corporeal organs: and prefixes, terminations, or modifying words grew, subsequently, from compounding and refining these elementary terms. They were not *invented* as qualifying words. To suppose such a process, is to reject all the lessons of experience. The *first words* used among men, and consequently those denoting the *most important ideas*, were, if we may so say, worn down by long familiarity, and gradually blended with newer formed words.

The thunder was heard, and the name applied was direct, according to what was obvious to the *sense*. A cause was supposed, and this inferential

notion of a God, was expressed by a word equivalent to a thunderer. The termination *er* is formed from an elementary word for *man*, and probably one of the first words ever used by man. It is traced, in numerous variations, through many ancient tongues, *er*, *or*, *wer*, *ar*, *var*, *ver*, *vir*, and others; and *thunderer** means the *thunder man*, or the *Being* who governs the thunder. This, like other primitive words, was both a noun and a verb.

240. With these views, the reader will be prepared to examine the unmeaning terms employed, for the sake of convenience, to conjugate principal verbs. As a particular exposition of the whole number, would extend beyond the bounds prescribed to this essay, it will suffice to explain the leading principle, which applies to all, and exemplify it, by a few words which appear to have been least understood.

1st. The nature and use of "auxiliaries" may be best explained in a practical way.

"And the four and twenty elders, who sat before God, on their seats, fell upon their faces, saying, We thank thee, O Lord God Almighty, who *art*, and *wast*, and *art to come*; because thou hast taken to thee thy great power, and hast reigned." Rev. xi. 16, 17.

241. *Wast*, and *art*, and *art to come*. This is the simple and proper expression of all conceivable time, *past*, *present* and *future*. It is the idea of duration, as fixed in the eternal nature of the Most High, and the laws of the universe as an interminable whole. It excludes every extraneous admixture of *temporary volition*; of *accidental change*; of *superior permission*; of *external force*.

* This word will be more fully explained under the verb to *be*.

This is the philosophic, logical, and grammatical exposition of the tenses, as they now exist, through the English language, and as they are found in the early forms of others. Every different manner of expression, relating time, is only an incidental or conditional modification of this original form.

The *future*, in this, as in other expressions of it, employs an *infinitive verb*, depending a preceding or correlative proposition; and it is a self-evident truth, that *two consecutive actions* can not *both* be *present*, precisely within the same time.

124. Language, however, is chiefly constructed, with immediate reference to beings who are not, like him who *was*, and *is*, and *is to come*, subject to no higher power, and liable to "no shadow of turning." The actions of men depend on occasional necessity, will, or superior authority; and to the numerous vicissitudes to which our species are every where subjected. The ideas so blended with the condition of human life, are denoted by words which are of frequent occurrence. Such terms, by constant repetition, become exceedingly familiar, and assume the most contracted form. Of this kind are *must*,* from *muessen*, Teutonic; *mussen*, Saxon, to *bind*, *confine*, *constrain*, or *ob-ligate*; and generally, among nations, the most significant word to express *bondage*, *constraint*, and *obligation*, *must* be very often used.

243. The words which the English grammarians usually *select*, as helping verbs, are now all

* It is needless to spend time on this word. It is of extensive use in various tongues, through all the moods and tenses. *The air in* a cask grows *musty* by being confined.

reduced to one syllable, subject to very little variation, and to give still greater brevity to their employment, they commonly drop the following word to, used with other verbs, as the *sign* of the *infinitive mood*. They denote actions, depending on the contingencies of human affairs; thus, I *may*, *can*, *will*, *must*, *dare* go, next week, all refer to some relative condition in which the actor is placed. When, on the contrary, we speak of the actions of men, unconnected with extraneous circumstances, we adopt the same form of expression, as is used in reference to the Being who is above all change. "They *are to go*, tomorrow;" that is, the thing is understood and determined; and, independent of any expected intervention, or alteration of purpose, *is so to be*.

244. If words of constant occurrence in language were long and regular, their repetition would be irksomely monotonous. By their familiarity they are easily understood, in all their modified forms; while words seldom used, have need of being confined to the prevailing rules of speech. In some instances, parts of two or more words are taken, to make out the moods and tenses, of what comes at last to be considered as the variations of a single verb.

Of this kind are *go*, *went*, *gone*. The verb *to wend*, so common in the old books, is seldom seen in modern literature; while its past tense, *went*, familiarly retained, has long been represented as a part of the verb *to go*. This latter term, too, should seem from grammar books, never to have had any other past tense.

These remarks apply to the verb meaning *to go*, in nearly every known language. It is necessary, however, to un[illegible]hat the verb *go* has ac-

quired a more definite application, in modern practice, than in its original acceptation; for it primarily included the meaning of the Latin *ago*, and, instead of implying only progressive motion, denoted almost every kind of activity.

245. In languages designating the relations of actions and things, by various inflexions, in single words, the modified beginnings or endings for this purpose are *distinct original terms*, generally in a contracted form. The prefixes and postfixes, in *Hebrew*, *Chaldean*, *Arabian*, *Samaritan*, and other eastern tongues, are too evidently of this kind, to need any time in explanation.

These observations have no reference to affixing a pronoun to a verb, and which has relation to *persons*, and not to *tenses*: neither do they apply to the appended terminations of *nouns*, serving the purpose of *specifying adjectives*, or *articles*, as in *Persian*, *Greek*, *Latin*, and other tongues.

246. The changes wrought on what is considered as a single word, to express different relations of time, are made by *adding one verb to an other*; and, in most languages, some form of the verbs *do*, *have*, *be*, or *go*. The same or almost any other verb may be, occasionally and separately, employed for this "auxiliary" purpose.

There is no particular set of words, *distinctively* and properly called "auxiliaries," in any language; because it is not consistent with the intellectual and physical condition of man, that any ever should be so formed.

"Reader, *go tell* at Sparta, that we died here in obedience to her laws."—*Monumental Inscription at Thermopylæ*, as given by Dr. Goldsmith.

It happens, in practice, however, that a limited

number of verbs, by the fitness of their specific meaning, are more generally employed in this manner.

In Latin, and perhaps other languages generally, the first form of the *imperative mood* appears to be the real *radical verb*, and not the infinitive, nor the indicative of the first person.

247. Any good Latin scholar may soon prepare for himself, a table of verbal formations, much more simple, rational, and correct, than any hitherto proposed. He may take for this purpose the helping verbs *ago*; *eo*, *ire*; and *sum*. *fui*, *esse*; amabam, ama-ibam; ama-vi, ama-ivi; ama-ibo, and so of others. *Sum* is compounded with itself, as well as with other verbs. Fui-eram, fu-issem, fu-ero. Fu-eram, literally translated, is *I was been*, which, though contrary to *modern practice* in *English*, is exactly the philosophic principle, in the general use of verbs. It is extensively illustrated in the practice of many languages; as, in German, Ich bin gewesen, *I am been*, Ich war gewesen, *I was been*; I am to be, I am to be been, I am to shall, I am to can, to will, to must; and so through the other forms. These remarks apply to all the conjugations of the Latin tongue, both in the "*active*" and "*passive*" voices.

A praxis of Latin verbs, according to these principles of analysis, would greatly facilitate the whole progress, in learning that very useful language; and would enable students to think for themselves, and observe their own progress, as they advanced.

248. The following is the long standing explanation, upon the endings of verbs, if it can be called

explanation, contained in Dr. Adam's Latin Grammar, which is one of those in highest repute in colleges and schools.

"There are four principal parts of a verb, from which all the rest are formed; namely, *o*, of the present, *i*, of the perfect, *um* of the supine, and *re* of the infinitive; according to the following *rhyme*:

1. From *o* are formed *am* and *em*.
2. From *i*; *ram*, *rim*, *ro*, *sse*, and *ssem*.
3. *U*, *us*, and *rus*, are formed from *um*.
4. All other parts from *re* do come; as, *bam*, *bo*, *rem*, *a*, *e*, and *i*; *ns*, and *dus*; *dum*, *do*, and *di*; as, amo, em; &c."

The *grammar* of this rule is worse than the *poetry*. Whatever truth it contains, is entirely incidental, and not according to the plain and simple manner in which it is always becoming that truth should be told.

We might suppose that England and America were at the climax of grammatical perplexity, if the books used in the universities of Portugal and Spain did not convince us, that, in a true system of scholastic tradition, one age refining on the visionary theories of an other, may carry the mind beyond all our first conceptions of absurdity.

249. The two modern tongues with which we have most concern, next to our own, present a striking instance to show how the terminations of verbs are formed. The indicative future, both in *French* and *Spanish*, is made by regular endings, which have no exception in either. This ending in both is made by the indicative present of the verb *to have*; contracted, in part, in the French; and in the Spanish, *he*, *has*, *ha*, dropping the initial *h*, which is never sounded. Thus, *j' ir-ai* and *yo ir-e*, both answer, precisely, to the English constructive

future, "*I have to go.*" But as it is not the design of this work to explain the grammar of foreign languages, this particular subject is dismissed with the few preceding hints.

250. In most known tongues, ancient and modern, there is no philosophic principle, nor consistent verbal rule, for ascribing more than three real, or at most five grammatical tenses, to verbs. Mr. Murray makes six; but the attempts to name, classify, and describe them, sufficiently manifest the impropriety of the whole scheme. Mr. Churchill's late London grammar has nine tenses in the *potential* mood: the "Hermes" of Mr. Harris makes twelve; Dr. Beattie has thirty-six, and thinks that a less number "would introduce confusion into the grammatical art." He might have made a hundred and thirty-six, upon the same principle; but the mind of this amiable and excellent man was much better formed for poetry than philosophy. The learned French grammarian, Mr. Bauzee, makes twenty tenses; and others, in that language, by different gradations, lessen the number down to five.

These systems are, all alike, formed on the plan of arbitrarily taking all the verbs in a proposition to make one tense. A plan so radically absurd need occasion no wonder, that hardly any two who adopt it, can understand it in the same way.

251. The names given to these tenses in Latin grammars, and thence derived into modern languages, sufficiently show the impropriety of the system. *Preteritum plus quam perfectum*, preter pluperfect, like other things, *more than perfect*, instead of really going beyond the point of perfection,

comes back half way on the other side. "*I had written the letter before you came,*" is the simple *past tense*, commonly, but improperly, called the *imperfect*. *Had* is a transitive verb, and *letter* is the object of it. Written is an adjective, describing the letter by its condition. I had the *letter written:* it was, at that time, a *written letter.*

252. Concerning any mood in addition to the three which have already been explained, very little need be said. Whether under the name of *optative, conjunctive, potential, hortative, conditional,* or whatever name, no man has yet succeeded in showing a distinctive character, or separating line, for any of them. If can is a sign of the potential mood, then *dare,* is on precisely the same philosophic and grammatical principle, a sign of the courageous, and *need,* of the indigent mood.

The following is Mr. Murray's closing illustration of the *subjunctive mood:*

"Some grammarians apply, what is called the *conjunctive termination,* to the three persons of the *principal verb,* and to its *auxiliaries,* through *all the tenses* of the *subjunctive mood.* But this is certainly contrary to the practice of good writers. *Johnson* applies this termination to the *present* and *perfect tenses only. Lowth* restricts it entirely to the *present tense;* and *Priestly* confines it to the *present* and *imperfect tenses.* This difference of opinion amongst grammarians of such eminence, may have contributed to that *diversity of practice, so observable* in the use of the *subjunctive mood.* Uniformity in this point is highly desirable. It would materially assist both teachers and learners, and would constitute a considerable improvement in our language. On this subject, we adopt the opinion of *Dr. Lowth,* and conceive we are fully

warranted by his authority, and that of the most correct and elegant writers, in *limiting* the *conjunctive termination* of the principal verb, to the *second* and *third persons singular* of the *present tense.*"

253. The opinion of the three eminent doctors, mentioned by Mr. Murray in the foregoing paragraph, is certainly entitled to great consideration, on any subject in which they could agree. That they should differ in their conjectures respecting an English subjunctive mood, is not so much to be wondered at, as it is that men of their literary standing, and acquaintance with the language, should have so misemployed their time. They might as well have agreed in giving the correct natural history of *Bellerophon's chimera*, or the precise form, dimensions, and constituent materials of *Charon's ferry boat.* Among the numerous grammatical errors, there is no one, which, according to its extent, has led to more inconsistency in practice, than the vain attempt to create an English subjunctive mood. If there was any such mood, it would certainly be in the power of some one to find out in what its distinctive character consisted.

254. It is agreed on all hands, that the verb is the most important part of speech, and the only one without which no idea can possibly be affirmed, nor any sentence framed. Dr. Johnson's acknowledged pre-eminence over all other British lexicographers, and his just merit as a moral writer, have thrown a sanctity around his name, which renders it a kind of literary profanation to attempt the exposure of his errors. If, then, it should be made apparent, that this standard expounder of English had no just conception of the meaning of

the words, most essential to the structure of language, and most important in its practical application, and that all English grammarians have built their systems upon a false foundation, the inference is clear, that millions in American colleges and schools should not continue to be led on in a course which is radically wrong.

255. To show how little dependence is to be placed on British explanations of "auxiliaries," I have drawn some of the principal "*definitions*" from Dr. Johnson's dictionary, London edition of 1756, printed under his own immediate inspection. His explanations have hitherto been the standard for all subsequent *writers*.

"Can, v. n. To be able: to have power. It expresses the potential mood; as, *I can do it.*"

Can, con, cunning. Scotch *ken*, German *kann*, Dutch *konnen*, Saxon *canne, connan, cunnan*, Gaelic *cennen*.

In all these words, and many others, in different tongues, the meaning is, to *know*, or *know how;* as, I *can* write short hand; that is, I *know how* to write. The same idiom, in a more modern form, also runs through most European languages.

"Je ne *saurais* y aller aujourdhui." I do not *know how* to go there to-day. This is more polite than to answer to an invitation, I *can* not go. The idea of power, in all the applications of *can*, is the secondary or inferential meaning.

Conor, Latin; to exert knowledge, *cunning*, or skill. "To *con* thanks." *Shakspeare.*

In most languages derived from the *Teutonic*, as, *Dutch, German, Danish, Swedish, Icelandic*, &c. *can* is retained as an acknowledged principal verb. Thus, we find the forms answering to, *canned, can-*

ning, to *can*, I *canned*, I have *canned*, I *shall*, *must*, or *ought* to *can*; through all the moods and tenses.

256. "Shall. Defective. It has no tenses, but shall, future, and should, imperfect. See been."

If *shall* is *future*, and *should*, *imperfect*, then *should* is necessarily the *imperfect* of the *future*, which is a tense not explained in any one of Dr. Beattie's thirty-six.

"Should. This is a kind of auxiliary verb, used in the conjunctive mood, of which the signification is not easily fixed."

This is the abortive attempt of the eminent Dr. Johnson, to explain one of the most familiar words in the language, a word correctly used by the American people, as a nation, which it could not be, if the "signification" was not "fixed," in their minds. The giant of English literature was entangled in his own grammatical net. It was the absurd doctrine of helping verbs, which led the man, who "did as much as forty French academicians had done in forty years," to suppose that a word used every day by every Englishman, had no meaning of its own.

257. It is needless to give the numerous synonyms and etymons of *shall*, as they extend through various northern tongues, ancient and modern. The following is a good example of what was the language, in the national church of England twelve hundred years ago. It is taken from the homilies or form of worship.

To him anum pe rceolan ur gebiddan. he ana ir roþ hlaford ⁊ roþ God. pe biddaþ þingunga æt halgum mannum þ hi rceolan ur þingian to heora dryhtne ⁊ to unum dryhtne. Ne gebidde pe na ðeah hpæþere ur to him rpa rpa pe to Gode doþ.—Bede's Life of St. Cuthbert, p. 291.

For the convenience of those unacquainted with the Saxon alphabet, the same is copied in Roman print.

To him anum *we sceolan us* gebiddan. he ana is soth hlaford and soth God. we biddath thingunga aet halgum mannum that *hi sceolan us* thingian to heora drihtne and to urum drihtne. Ne gebidde we na theah hwaethere us to him swa. swa we to Gode doth.

Translation.

To him only *we shall us* to devote ourselves. He alone is truth Lord and truth God. We proffer worship to holy men, that *they shall us* to think [address pious thoughts or exercises] to their Ruler and our Ruler. But, nevertheless, we do not pray to them as we do to God.

Shall and *must* both signify to *bind*, *constrain*, or *obligate*; but with this difference. *Must* signifies compliance with the obligations of strong necessity, or mere physical binding force; and *shall* includes the idea of *debt*, *just obligation*, or *duty*. The same idiom is contained in the ordinary form of a penal bond: I A. B. am *held* and firmly *bound*, and hereby *obligate* and *bind* myself, heirs and executors, unto C. D. The air in a cask is *musty*, or *mustied*, because it is *bound* or *confined*.

In the two first Saxon sentences above quoted, it will be seen that *shall* is twice used as a transitive verb, with the pronoun *us* as its governed *object*, immediately following it.

A great number of most absurd, complicated,

and contradictory directions are given to enable us to make a grammatical distinction between *shall* and *will*. All the information wanted respecting them is the plain meaning of the words. *Will* signifies *will*, or volition, in all beings capable of exercising it; and when this meaning is extended, it is to what is analagous to will, that is, *inherent nature, qualities*, or *tendency*. *Shall*, according to the explanation already given, always alludes to external necessity, to unavoidable obligation. Set a stick on end, and it *will* fall; because its own nature *will* incline it to fall. "The sun *shall* be darkened;" not darkened by its own natural tendency, but by an extraneous, over-ruling power, or inevitable constraint, to which it must yield.

258. But without dwelling longer on the less difficult "auxiliaries," there is, perhaps, a possibility of drawing aside, at once, the great curtain of mystery.

The following is the information obtained from Dr. Johnson's Dictionary, respecting the verb *to be*, under its different forms.

"AM. The first person of the verb To Be. [See To Be.] *Exodus.*

ARE. The third person plural of the present tense of the verb To Be.

To BE. v. n. To have some certain state. *Shakspeare.* The auxiliary verb by which the verb passive is formed. *Shakspeare.* To exist: to have existence. *Dryden.* To have something by appointment or rule. *Locke.* Let BE. Do not meddle with. *Dryden.*

BEING. particip. [*beond*, Sax.] Existing. *Att.*

BEEN. [*beon*, Sax.] The participle preterite of To Be. *Pope.* The present tense plural of To Be. *Spencer.*

IS. [*is*, Sax.] The third person singular of To Be: I am, thou art, he *is*. *St. John*, vii.

WAS. The preterite of To Be. Gen. v.

WAST. The second person of *was*, from To Be.

WERE. Of the verb To Be. The plural in all persons of indicative imperfect, and all the persons of the subjunctive imperfect, except the second, which is *wert*. Gen. xxxiv."

Among all these words, the only attempt at definition is on the infinitive *to be*, and the participle *being*. The rest furnishes, probably, the best remaining specimen of Dr. Johnson's grammatical *parsing*.

259. This strangely disguised and intricate "auxiliary" appears to lie at the bottom of all the rest; and is the last one for a grammarian to suspect of being an active, transitive verb.

Be, *being*, *been*.

I am, thou *art*, he is, we *are*, you *are*, they *are*.

The idea conveyed by the verb *to be*, is the most important and essential in the structure of every language on earth. Many circumstances unite to make it so.

A passage from Exodus iii. among others, shows that there is something in this insignificant word extremely different from all which has hitherto been said, respecting *auxiliary*, *intransitive*, and *neuter* verbs.

"And Moses said unto God, Behold, when I shall come unto them, and shall say unto them, the God of your fathers hath sent me unto you; and they shall say, what is his *Name*, what shall I say unto them?

"And God said unto Moses, I AM that I AM; and he said, thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel: I AM hath sent me unto you."

260. This is the place in which, more than any other, the fifty-four translators of the Bible, under King James, could not find English expression adequately to convey the idea.

It is the general character of this verb, in various tongues, and for reasons before given, to be extremely irregular. Its prevailing form in English is *are*, which is both a *noun* and a *verb:* for *air* and *are* present only a convenient modification of the same word. *Thou art*, is a contraction of *thou aren't*, by dropping *e* and *s*, as the sounds of many other words are shortened, for the facility of pronunciation. Of the *six* persons of the indicative mood, present tense, then, the verb *are* belongs to *four*.

261. The Hebrew language contains several words remarkably significant, as the representatives of *being*, and the names of its great *Author*.

FIRST.

Hebrew,	אוֹר aor, *aur*, *air*, or *light*.	
English,	*air*	*are*
French,	*air*	*aerer*, v.
Portuguese,	*air*	
Spanish,	*ayre*	
German,	*arie*	*art*
Italian,	*aere*	
Saxon,	*aire*	*ayr*
Scandinavian	*aer*	
Teutonic or Gothic,	*aer*	*er*
Arabian,	*ar*	
Persian,	*arr*	
Latin,	*aer*	*aura*
Greek,	αηρ	αυρα *aer aura*

Aurora: the *air*, the *light*, the morning *dawn*, deified in the pagan mythology.

The same word appears in *Syriac*, *Chaldean*, and *Samaritan*, with no other difference from the *Hebrew*, than the different kinds of letters used to represent it in their several alphabets. Numerous other synonyms might be given; but it is needless to increase them. In the old English books, of standard authors, examined through a period of seven hundred years, from the time of king Alfred, the variations are as great as in all the instances here given.

262. A simple reason may explain what might otherwise occasion doubt; and may satisfy the mere English scholar of the consistency of these quotations, and the inferences to be drawn from them.

The sound of the letter *r* is so produced by the organs of speech, that it is least liable to change of all the articulations of the human voice. This letter, or sound, is a well known and most important radical, in Hebrew, and other ancient tongues, representing the general idea of activity, motion, or operating cause. It is connected with this elementary and hieroglyphic idea, as it is distributed at the present day, through all the most cultivated languages of the earth. Next to *r*, one of the least variable sounds is the *broad a*, the hieroglyphic sign of priority, unity, and power, and which appears to have been common to the word *air*, in all the ancient, and most of the modern tongues. Those qualified to make the investigation, will farther observe, that, from the organic formation of the sounds, it is not very material which other vowel, or whether any one, is placed between broad *a* and *r*. The different appearances, then, adduced from so many ages and nations, are substantially the same thing. The whole range of

human learning can produce no other instance of a word, which, through all the desolating changes in human affairs, has, for thousands of years, so nearly preserved its identity of form and meaning, as interwrought, in constant popular use, with all the great leading languages of the globe.

263. The *primary* meaning of the Hebrew אוֹר *aur*, is *light*. By changing the point belonging to the mediate character, it made אוֹר aor; which denoted *fire*, and its extended meanings, *warmth, ardor, affection*, and *genial influence*. *Aur, light, incidentally* included *air*, as being considered the same thing as *light:* for in those primeval times, men neither tried experiments with *air* pumps, nor traversed *aer*ial regions in balloons. They were unskilled in the *pneumatic* philosophy of modern days, and judged from the simple appearances of nature around them. *Oxygen* and *hydrogen* were unconsciously respired by the early fathers of our race. No Dr. Priestley had delivered lectures on *air:* the chymical nomenclature of Lavoisier, and the discoveries of Morveau, Lussac, Chaptal, and Davy, were unknown.

264. The *inferential* meaning of *AUR, light*, was GOD, the author and source of *light*, the *being of beings*, who said,

יהי־אוֹר וַיהי אוֹר

"*Let there be light, and there was light.*"

Aur, figuratively signified instruction, the *light* of the mind, intellectual talent. In English, the noun *art* is a participial formation from the verb, as *cleft* is from *cleave*. A person's *art* is that with which he is *lighted*, instructed, or *skilled*. *Ars*, in

Latin, and a prodigious number of words, in various tongues, are to be properly explained only in the same way.

266. "To *air* clothes;" "to *air* a room," is to expose them to the *air*. A person takes an *airing*, to *air* and exercise himself, promote health and preserve *life*. They *are*, is, with precisely the same meaning, they *air* themselves; they breathe the *air*; "*Vitales aures carpere;*" they *light* themselves; they behold, inhale, and enjoy the *light;* they *live*. *Light*, *life*, and *live*, are but the modifications of the same word. So close is the relation, in speech, as well as in nature, between *air* and *light*, that the words denoting them are often substituted for each other. The German *luft*, *light*, is generally, and the Dutch *lucht*, habitually, used for *air*, the atmosphere.

"To enjoy the *light*," appears to be an idiom as extensive as language itself, and under all its applications, signifies to *live*, or *exist*.

"Il *jouit* encore de la *luminere* et attend que son fils revienne pour lui *fermer les yeux*."—*Telemaque.

Here is the double application of the idea in a short sentence.

"But soon a wonder *came to light*." Dr. Goldsmith. *Came into being*, for it had no *existence* before.

In every German, book of biography, in every family, "to *see the light*," means to *come into life*; to be born.

The "*breath* of *life*," "the *vital air*," and many similar expressions, are familiar to all.

---

* "He still *enjoys the light*, and is waiting for his son to return *to close his eyes*."

266. The collateral meanings of *air* and *light*, all center in the same point. *Light*, not heavy, is like the *air;* or like Adam's sleep, which, Milton says, was "*airy light.*"

Air, aspect, appearance. A lady has a pleasing *air:* that is, the *light*, the point of *light*, in which she appears, is pleasing. An other assumes affected *airs*, to exhibit herself in the most striking *light*, to attract attention.

Lights, lungs, inhale the *light* or *air*.

Air, in music, is a modern and scientific application of the term. It means the tremulous vibrations of the *air* on the tympans of the ear.

Let it not be supposed that this is idle theory. It is supported by an astonishing body of facts, from numerous tongues, through thousands of years, showing the original structure and present meaning of the verb *are*, in a manner simple as the patriarchs, for whose early use it was formed, and clear as the *light* which it so expressively represents.

267. The different relations in which the same idea may be viewed, are manifested in this verb, as in so many other terms.

The guest *lights* himself, or the servant *lights* him to his room; which means, to carry the sensible *light* before him.

"Thais led the way, to *light* him to his prey!
And, like an other Helen, fired an other Troy."

"*Enlighten our hearts;*" cause the "*candle* of the Lord;" the *enlivening* influence of heavenly *wisdom*, to *quicken*, *vivify*, and *animate* our hearts in the love of divine truth.

268. Some very important principles, illustrative of the human intellect, and of language, which

is its practical exposition, are to be sought chiefly among a savage people. The untutored children of the wilderness may instruct philosophers in the deepest sciences which can employ the mind, or adorn the most refined community.

There is nothing more interesting to man, than to contemplate his own species, in all their variety: to reflect, that whether enlightened or ignorant, mild or ferocious; fainting under the vertical sun, or half naked in the wintry blast; however degraded by circumstance, or perverted by error; these members of the human family are of our own nature, and a kindred blood. In common with ourselves, they inherit from their Creator the distinguishing gifts of reason and speech; hearts to feel; tears for wo; and souls for immortality.

It is in comparing the minds of different people, as exhibited in their varying conditions, habits, and language, that the errors of the schools are corrected. Among all the Indian tribes of North America, there is no separate word for *air*. To them, as to the ancient nations, the *darkness* and the *light* are the *visible substances*, which alternately come and go. They feel the *breeze*, and apply the noun to it as *wind*; but *air*, at rest, is neither seen nor felt. Of this, they have no distinct conception; and, consequently, no name.

269. An allusion has been made to the diversified changes of an important original term. The words signifying the Deity, man, or being in general, are very much used in combination. An exemplification of this is contained in the form of the oath administered, in the eighth century, to the German Saxons, on their renunciation of heathenism, and profession of Christianity, as quoted by F. Schlegel, from an ancient record at Vienna.

"I renounce all the words and works of the Devil, *Thun-aer* [that is, the *God* of *Thunder*, or Thor,] and Woden, and Saxon Odin, and all the unholy that are their kindred."

This syllable *aer*, and its branching forms and meanings, acquire an extent in language entirely beyond the conception of those who have not paid particular attention to the subject. From the evanescent nature of vocal sounds, and the unavoidable fluctuation in human affairs, the variations necessarily produced in applying the elements of speech, soon transcend the powers of the strongest intellect, and render man a stranger to his own species.

WERE.

270. This is the form of the verb *to be*, next in order of importance in the present use of this irregular auxiliary.

John i. 1. "In the beginning was the WORD, and the WORD was with God, and the WORD was God."

Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ ΛΟΓΟΣ, καὶ ὁ ΛΟΓΟΣ ἦν πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν, καὶ Θεὸς ἦν ὁ ΛΟΓΟΣ.

In principio erat VERBUM, et VERBUM erat apud Deum, et Deus erat VERBUM.

Dutch *Verb*, *Worden*, to be.

Indic. present.

Ik *word*, gy *wordt*, hy *wordt*, wy *worden*, gy *wordt*, zy *worden*.

I *am*, thou *art*, he *is*, we *are*, you *are*, they *are*

Past tense.

Ik *wierd*, gy *wierdt*, he *wierd*, wy *wierden*, gy *wierdt*, zy *wierden*

I *was*, thou *wast*, he *was*, we *were*, you *were*, they *were*

GERMAN.

Ich *war*, du *warest*, er *war*, wir *waren*, ihr *waret*, sie *waren*

Imperative.

Word, be.

Participles.

wordende, being *geworden*, been

German *verb*, *Werden*, to *be*, to *become*, begin to *be*, or come into a state or condition of *existence*.

Indicative present.

Ich werde, du wirst, er wird, wir werden, ihr werdet, sie werden

Ich wurde, du wurdest, er wurde, wir wurden, ihr wurdet, sie
or *ward* or *wardst* or *ward* [*wurden*

271. As *aur* is a primary word in Hebrew, and its cognate languages, so *word*, *weord*, *waurd*, is one of the radicals, first in order and importance, in *Teutonic* and its various dialects. It is a prevailing term in *German*, *Dutch*, *Swedish*, *Danish*, *Icelandic*, and other branches of the parent stock, from which it comes to us through the *Anglo-Saxon*.

The nice distinction between *aur* and *word*, is, that as the first, in its strict and original meaning, denoted *light*, so the other primarily signified *life*, *being*, the *vital principle*, as perceived in its obvious effects, *existing* in *animal* bodies. It was seen to *vivify* the natural *world*, and the idea was irresistibly associated with the *Prime* and *all-pervading Cause* of *vitality*. It has been subsequently and more popularly applied, to express whatever *is*, or

exists, the *being* or *thing*, in general; and, in language, that which is its *type* or *representative*.

272. *Word* was originally opposed to *death*; and *aur* to *darkness*; to *exclusion* from *air* and *light*. These perceptions are every where primary ideas in the human mind, and, from the nature of the case, among the first to which words were ever applied. From the uniform tendency to divide, subdivide, and modify an important radical word, these shoots, in their branching growth, have become intertwined with every language known.

World is a modification of *word*. It is the system of beings, collection of existing things. The idea was confined to the earth; because the popular conceptions of early times did not, of course, extend to the present astronomical science of the universe. The Hebrew word אֶרֶץ *ar-etz*, *earth*, is formed in the same way; and means that which was brought into *light* or *being*. The modern Arabian *ar-eds*, is but a slight alteration of the same word, with the same meaning.

273. A person of *worth* is one who is full of *spirit*, *animation*, efficiency, and who does much *active* good. *Worthy* is a participial formation from the *verb*, and signifies having worth, or *virtue*, which in Latin originally had the same meaning.

Work is the industrious exercise of this active principle. *Wort* is produced by working, fermentation, or excitement, and, in its turn, works new beer, or whatever is subject to its influence.

The more modern English noun and verb *spirit*, Latin *spiro*, *spirare*, *spiritus*, has a present application very similar to the ancient *word*.

274. The remaining forms of the verb to *be* are

of similar import to what has been already explained; and that no portion of this *auxiliary* may fail of its interest, it is connected with some of the most specially striking associations in the history of language, or of man.

In offering a few remarks, which may seem out of any ordinary course of verbal explanation, it is to be observed that they are given simply as illustrative of important principles of speech, in their close connexion with the nature and progress of the human intellect.

275. The various Hebrew names of the Most High, are formed of the noun or verb of *being*, and they are remarkably expressive. The most familiar appellation אֱלֹהִים Alohim, is a singularly constructed compound word, with the common *plural* ending, meaning *one;* and answers, perhaps, as nearly as can be given in English, to "*The One Being of beings.*"

276. We learn both from sacred and profane writers, that the immediately appropriate name of the living God was held in that awful reverence by the Hebrews, that it was not to be spoken but under circumstances of the greatest solemnity. Among all the Jewish nation, such were the associations connected with this sacred and mysterious word, that it was pronounced but once a year, even by the High Priest in the temple; and that on the day of atonement, after extraordinary preparatory sacrifices and ablutions, and accompanied by the most solemn ceremonies which could impress themselves on the mind. Persons who are much acquainted with respectable Jews, know the fact, that to this day, the irreverant mention of their Maker's name occasions, in the minds of those *living witnesses*, a

kind of involuntary horror, which it is difficult for others to conceive: and no Rabbin would dare to pronounce it in the worship of the synagogue. The true mysterious word was not written in the holy of holies, in the ordinary letters of their alphabet, but a peculiar character was employed for that purpose, and only to be read by an explanatory key.

277. In the series of calamities preceding and during the captivity in Babylon, it was supposed that the consecrated written word, and every copy of the law were entirely lost; till after the restoration to Jerusalem, they were found, and the sacred writings were subsequently arranged and copied with great care by the prophet Ezra, his own book being added to the rest.

278. During this period, the extreme sufferings of the Jews, the various events which had taken place in the Assyrian capital, but particularly the splendid reign, the proclamation, and edicts of Cyrus, the declared friend of the Hebrews, concurred to produce, among the contiguous nations, great interest respecting this singular people. Among other subjects of curiosity, the interdicted word, composed in a remarkable manner of the verb to *be*, like other primitive names of the Deity, was eagerly sought. It was obtained, or something which was accepted for it; adopted by various people, in their several forms; but the words thus diffused were not like *aur*, if we may so say, fastened to the organs of speech. They were made up of vowel sounds, particularly liable to change; and as traced through numerous tongues, are as remarkable for their variations, as *aur* for its long preserved sameness.

279. Every change of this word, or its substitutes, from one alphabet or dialect to an other, must have been the transmission of a striking idea, rather than of a definite sound. It would be presumption for any human learning to pretend to trace this verb with certainty to its origin, through all its mutations, and say when, where, and how, any one form was combined with the others; and if this could be done, it would take volumes to explain it. One general fact, however, is easily understood. The verb to *be*, in all its forms, as now used by the greater part, if not all, the inhabitants of the earth, stands immediately connected with the explanations already given. The Jews indeed had similar words previous to these transactions, and which had probably been in use from the time of the creation; but their ideas of being and its Author, acquired additional interest, and the words denoting them, new forms, from the circumstances here adduced.

280. From the time of Moses, the Lawgiver of the Jews, the cotemporary of Cadmus, these facts, and their resulting influence, are traced. As far as human knowledge extends, then, they are from the very time of the invention of letters. This brings us to an other important principle, in early written language, barely alluded to in the Introductory Dissertation, page 17.

281. Whoever may have been the inventer of letters, Moses appears to have been among the number of those who first employed them, to any considerable extent. Independent of any extraordinary divine influence upon the mind of this individual, he was, as a man, one of the first for the times in which he lived. He was educated at the court of Pharaoh, "in all the learning of the Egyptians," which was,

of course, in all the sciences then known. This learning was necessarily communicated in connexion with the Egyptian system of hieroglyphics; and the other principal Jews, long resident in that country, must have become more or less acquainted with this system of instruction, with which the monuments of every kind throughout this then populous kingdom, were covered. According to all the ordinary principles of human nature, then, Moses, the primeval writer among the Jews; their teacher and guide for so many years, must have had a very uncommon share in giving the general cast to their national written language. He must have done this according to those previously acquired principles which had been wrought into habit, by the practice of all his early life; or, in other words, he must infallibly have blended a system of hieroglyphics, to a considerable extent, with the alphabetic writing.

282. This reasoning, founded in the nature of man, agrees in a remarkable manner with the recorded facts, and with the structure of the Hebrew language, as actually transmitted to us, in its written forms, at the present day.

This combination of circumstances, is the master key in discovering the elements of modern speech. The radical Hebrew letters, while they denoted various sounds, were also hieroglyphic representations of most important actions and objects.

283. It may be important to dwell for a moment on those philosophic principles which had so large a share in the formation of the Hebrew language and its kindred tongues, at a period so remote; and which by derivation have since extended their influence over a large portion, if not the whole

of the globe. In the glimpse of this subject which will be presented, the interest is increased by reflecting that some of the first books known, are, considered merely as specimens of language, among the most strikingly sublime and exquisitely beautiful, ever opened to human view.

284. In the few remarks here offered, it will be understood that it is not the design to explain the grammar of a foreign tongue; but to call the reader's notice to historic facts and philosophic principles, which, through the countless vicissitudes of thirty four hundred years, have extended their evident influence to the language of our present daily use.

285. In the word אוֹר *light*, the first or right hand letter, *aleph*, is the hieroglyphic emblem of *unity*, *stability*, and *power:* not on any principle resembling picture writing, but by a system much more intellectual and refined. The middle character was the appropriate symbol of *natural* or *sensible light*. The last letter, *raish*, *r*, was the general sign of *movement* or *action*. The letter answering to *r*, will be found very generally appended to *radical words* or *ideas*, to denote the *acting principle*, the immediate *cause* of *movement:* as, in *actor*, *mover*, and others, and enters into the infinitive verbs, in most known languages: for these primitive ideas, having given their impulse, to a great extent, the course was continued from habit, when the original associations were lost.

The three seemingly trifling marks, then, here adduced, stood in this double character, that while, as hieroglyphic symbols, they conveyed these combined ideas, they at the same time, as alphabetic letters, represented the sounds of the spoken word.

286. Without pretending to special means of knowledge, or designing to invade the rights of any sanctuary, it may be permitted to explain the mysterious word, so far as it stands connected with important principles in the structure of speech.

This word is understood to be radically the same that the translators have rendered by the name JEHOVAH. It is the subject of remarkable variety, in its pronunciation, and is very differently written, in modern letters, by different Hebrew scholars. The mystery of the ancient word was understood to consist in the articulation, and in placing the minor points; for its meaning was liable to great change by slight appendages to the radical word.

287. The Hebrew ה *hai*, is understood to correspond with our *h*. Orthographic writers very generally agree in considering this letter not as a distinct sound, but merely a mark of aspiration, or strong breathing. It was therefore very naturally, by the ancients, made the hieroglyphic emblem of *life*, or *being*, and the root of the verb to *be*.

The radical letters of the Jewish appropriate name of the Almighty are,

יהוה

The first, or right hand character, was the hieroglyphic sign of duration; and when unaccompanied by any restricting mark, denoted *eternity*, or duration without beginning or end.

The second character was the typical representation of *being*, noun and verb, as was said before; and, in its unrestricted form, meant *self-existent* and unchanging *being*. The third letter has been before explained. That *light* and that *genial warmth* it typified, are the life-communicating medium to all created things.

The repetitition of the sign of *independent exis-*

tence, to form the last character, is such a multiplication and compounding of the idea of *being*, *into itself*, as no English phrase can adequately convey to the mind.

In the passage quoted from Exodus iii. the sacred name was expressed, by making the typical emblem of eternal duration the intermediate character, and substituting, at the beginning of the word, the symbol of boundless power. In this form, it became an altogether peculiar verbal assertion, which could only be uttered in the first person singular, and by Him alone, who could ever truly say,

אהיה אשר אהיה
I AM that I AM.

The expression, according to the structure of the Hebrew language, presents an idea of the incomprehensible Sovereign, who *was*, and *is*, and *is* to *be*, in a manner which it would be presumptuous in the writer of this essay to attempt farther to explain.

288. Having given a faint view of the meaning of the verb to be, it remains to show its practical application.

It will be seen that this verb is, in all its forms, *active* and *transitive*, and has nothing, except its very great importance in meaning and use, to distinguish it from others.

It certainly implies, in all its uses, positive *activity*, or the real *doing* of something. A living *be-ing* must, of course, be one that *does* some kind of *act*, or at least *exercises* some *inherent quality* or *attribute* in order to *be*.

The Germans say, ein Seiender, or ein Gewesener, *a be-ing*, a *be*-er, one that *bees* or has *been*; as we

say, an *operator*, one who *operates*, or has *operated* or *performed* some *action*.

In the extensive comparison of languages, the strikingly apparent singularity in one, of the same idiom, which is perfectly familiar in an other, will be found a very efficient aid to the philosophic investigator.

PASSIVE VERBS.

289. 1st. "A passive verb expresses a passion, or a suffering, or the receiving of an action; and necessarily implies an object acted upon, and an agent by which it is acted upon: as, to be loved; "Penelope is loved by me."—*Murray's Grammar.*

2d. "A passive verb is conjugated by adding the perfect participle to the *auxiliary to be*, through all its changes of number, mood, and tense, in the following manner."—*The same.*

3d. "The learner will perceive that the preceding auxiliary verbs *to have* and *to be*, could not be conjugated through all the moods and tenses, without the help of other auxiliary verbs, namely *may*, *can*, *will*, *shall*, and their variations. That auxiliary verbs, in their simple state, and unassisted by others, are of a very limited extent; and that they are chiefly useful, in the aid which they afford in conjugating the principal verbs, will clearly appear to the scholar, by a distinct conjugation of each of them, uncombined with any other. They are exhibited for his inspection; not to be committed to memory."—*The same.*

Penelope	is	loved by me.
The scepter	is	departed from Judah.

The man is addicted to intemperance.
The criminal is found guilty of murder.

"Penelope is loved by me."

This is the *passive* verb to *love*, in the indicative mood, present tense. The grammatical resolution of it is, that *me*, in the objective case, *acting* backwards, through the preposition *by*, performs the *present* action, denoted by the *perfect participle* loved. This objective love causes the suffering of the lady, whose name is the leading word of the sentence.

290. "The scepter is departed from Judah."

This is precisely the same grammatical structure as the other sentence, except the "definite article." It is accordingly to be resolved in the same way. Judah, the real *actor*, disguised under the apparent government of a preposition, exerting his activity from this ambush, departs the scepter; and what is still more wonderful, differing entirely in disposition from other monarchs, departs this symbol of his authority from himself; yet Judah is no way affected by this circumstance, but the whole weight of suffering falls on the scepter.

"Penelope is loved by me," is turned to the active voice by saying, "I love Penelope." If this theory of passive verbs is a good one, the other sentences will bear the same change: Intemperance addicts the man. Murder finds the criminal guilty, and the criminal suffers the finding.

Passive verb. Penelope is sent to England.
Active do. England sends Penelope.

291. An other difficulty arises in the passive verb. This relates to the tense.

According to the principles laid down in the grammars, the verbs *have* and *be*, as auxiliaries, are both neuter, and in this character have very little meaning of their own; being both used merely to conjugate other verbs. They agree then in all the essential points; they must of course have the same manner of meaning, and there can be but a slight shade of special difference between them.

He has gone.
He is gone.

These two sentences, it will be seen, are precisely alike, except the auxiliaries. These helping verbs *has* and *is* are both in the present tense of the indicative mood, third person singular. Every rational person, therefore, must of course expect the structure of the two sentences to be explained on similar principles. Yet, by the touch of a grammarian's pen, as of a conjuror's wand, one of these sentences is *active*, in the *second degree* of *past* tense, and the other is *passive*, and in the *present* tense. Such is the difference between two terms, belonging in all respects, to the same special class of words, and used precisely in the same manner.

Passive. Penelope is loved for my sake.
Active. My sake loves Penelope.

It is undoubtedly true that if Penelope *is* loved, somebody loves her; but this is the inference of common sense, and does not depend on grammatical construction.

The passive verb, nine times in ten, is turned into downright nonsense, by the mere change of the preposition. It needs a new grammar, therefore, to explain on what principle a preposition can go-

vern an objective case after it, and at the same time, like a two edged sword, turn back, and totally change the character of a preceding verb.

292. Persons of candor and talent, who will give themselves the trouble to examine the principles alluded to in the preceding pages, will see at once, how much the whole business of learning and teaching language is simplified, by adopting the self-proving fact, that all verbs are necessarily active and transitive; the verb to *be*, among the rest, for which an other transitive verb may always be substituted, without altering the grammatical construction.

"The very populace in Athens *were* [rendered themselves] critics in pronunciation, in language, and even in eloquence; and, in Rome, at present, the most illiterate shopkeeper *is* [proves himself] a better judge of statues and pictures than many persons of refined education in London.—*Lord Kaime's Elements of Criticism.*

" The soldiers *are* [hold themselves] ready to march at a moment's warning."

293. It is not pretended that an other word of precisely the same specific meaning, can be substituted for the verb to *be*. What is insisted on is, that a transitive verb, with its governed object, can be substituted, in every possible case, for the verb to *be*, substantially preserving the sense, and without changing the grammatical construction. This is sufficient to show that the verb to *be*, is itself an active and transitive verb, and has nothing in its manner of meaning to distinguish it from others.

The tree was very high.

The tree grew very high.

They were ready.

They made themselves ready.

She is respected and happy.

She lives respected and happy.

He is in good health.

He keeps himself in good health.

The light *was* the life of men.

The light *caused* or produced the life of men.

The people of New Holland *are* opposite to us.

The people of New Holland pass their lives opposite to us

He is convicted.

He stands convicted.

He is guilty.

He confesses himself guilty.

The stream is beautifully clear.

The stream runs [ ] beautifully clear.

They *are* pleasantly situated.

Once for all: the meaning of this expression is, they *are* or *air themselves*, they *enjoy* the *air* or *light* or *life*, pleasantly situated. *They "spirit" or "inspirit themselves,"* are expressions used with perfect correctness, according to the standing definitions in the dictionaries, though these words are not so convenient, nor so appropriately expressive as the different parts of the verb to *be;* and they are therefore not in fashionable use.

294. Again, the doctrine of passive verbs, as to their relation to time, is totally irreconcilable with the fact.

The following are examples of the present tense.

"The vessel is dashed on the rocks."

If it is *dashed* on the rocks, who or what *dashes* it in the present tense?

The man is gone.	What goes him?
The coat is finished.	What finishes it.
The glass is broken.	Who breaks it?
The bird is killed.	What kills it?

There is not a man living, who is capable of learning the directions laid down in the English grammars, respecting passive verbs, and applying them to practice. The truth is, that the use of verbs is so acquired by habit, in conversation and reading, that such directions, intricate, mistaken, and inconsistent as they are, can not change these essential principles of speech. The whole theory of passive verbs is an accumulated mass of absurdity, handed down by prescription from the dark ages, and ought to be exploded at once, by all nations who have ceased to discourage learning, burn heretics, and hang witches. The time and expense employed in such a study are worse than lost.

295. In this labyrinth of grammatical uncertainty, what is to be done to lighten the scholar's burdensome load, and supply a guiding torch? What glory would redound to the man whose labors could supply *a single rule*, capable of being learned in an hour, easily remembered during life, and every where applied, without exception. How fortunate would it be for whole nations to be freed from the labor of years, in learning volumes of perplexing, inconsistent, and impracticable expositions, which, after the toil of life, are never understood, and lead to no certain result. It is still more fortunate that no such benefaction is required. The rule is before us, and capable of being as clearly understood as the forty-seventh problem of Euclid.

PARTICIPLES.

296. "There are three *participles*, the *present* or *active*, the *perfect* or *passive*, and the *compound perfect*; *loving*, *loved*, *having loved*."—*Murray's Grammar.*

These *participles* are all *adjectives* under all circumstances. Neither is ever used, but in reference to some person or thing which is *loving* or *loved*; and always as descriptive of that thing or person; as, a *loving parent*, the *parent* was *loving* or *affectionate*. A *trotting* horse; the *horse* is *trotting*. What *news* have you received? That which was very *unexpected* and *afflicting*.

Participles denote the resulting effect of verbal action, which resolves itself into quality, or state, or condition of the thing.

The *house* is *finished*.

Mr. Cooper has *finished* his *house*.

Mr. Smith has his new *house finished*.

Each of these participles describes the house, as being in that *state*, *condition*, *circumstance*, or *situation*, in which the action denoted by the verb *finish* has placed it.

"Every *glytteryng* thing is not golde, and under colour of *fayre* speche many vices may be *hyd* and *conseyled*.—*Chaucer.* Test of Love.

297. All participles are adjectives. They are never used in a sentence without a reference to a noun which, in some way, they serve to describe;

generally by *condition*, *circumstance*, *relation*, or *employment*.

Most adjectives are of participial formation, as derived from other tongues, though they may not obviously be so, in the language in which they are at present employed; as, Latin *dependens*, French *dependant*, English *dependent*, *depending*. Here the word *dependent* is in reality the same as *depending*; but, coming to us as a derivative from Latin, is slightly disguised.

"She was then *sad*, *dejected*, and *sorrowful*; but now *contented* and *happy*."

The words in italic are all adjectives, referring to the pronoun *she*. They are at the same time all participles, whether they directly appear so or not. *Sad* is *sadded* or *made gloomy*: *sorrowful* is *sorrow-filled*; and *happy* is *happied*, or *made joyous*.

298. Participles in *ing*, describe things as being engaged in some present action. If put before the noun, they denote the more general, permanent, or essential qualities of the thing, and when placed after it, allude to particular time, or, which is the same, to some accompanying state of things. This principle, however, admits great variety in practice, without any change of its nature.

In what condition, circumstance, or situation, is the brig? It was *lying* in port last week, but is now *cruising* at sea, where it will be *detained* for some time, unless it should become *damaged* or *eaky*.

"Now *gliding*, *remote*, on the verge of the sky,
The *moon*, half *extinguished*, her crescent displays;
But lately I marked when *majestic* on high,
She shone, and the *planets* were *lost* in her blaze."

299. This brings us to the great stumbling block of the grammarians, in trying to get round which, they appear to have bewildered themselves in the intricacy of their own principles.

Thus the most philosophic and judicious grammarian, "beyond all comparison," reasons on this subject.

"The participle is distinguished from the adjective, by the former's expressing the idea of time, and the latter's denoting only a quality. The phrases, "*loving* to give as well as to receive," "*moving* in haste," "*heated* with liquor," contain participles giving the idea of time; but the epithets contained in the expressions, "a *loving* child," "a *moving* spectacle," "a *heated* imagination," mark simply the qualities referred to, without any regard to time; and may properly be called participial adjectives.

"Participles not only convey the notion of time, but they also signify actions, and govern the cases of nouns and pronouns, in the same manner as verbs do; and therefore should be comprehended in the general name of verbs. That they are mere modes of the verb, is manifest, if our definition of a verb be admitted: for they signify being, doing, or suffering, with the designation of time superadded. But if the essence of the verb be made to consist in affirmation or assertion, not only the participle will be excluded from its place in the verb, but the infinitive itself also; which certain ancient grammarians of great authority held to be alone the genuine verb, simple and unconnected with persons and circumstances.

The following phrases, even when considered in themselves, show that participles include the idea of time: "The letter *being written*, or *having been written*;" "Charles *being writing*, *having written*, or *having been writing*. But when arranged in an entire sentence, which they must be to make a complete sense, they show it still more evidently: as, "Charles *having written* the letter, sealed and despatched it."—The participle does indeed associate with different tenses of the verb: as "I am writing," "I was writing," "I shall be writing;" but this forms no just objection to its denoting time. If the time of it is often relative time, this circumstance, far from disproving, supports our position."

The mistake has uniformly been in attaching the participle to the verb, because it has relation to time: for, unfortunately for the cause of learning, it is the long standing error, to consider time or tense as belonging *exclusively* to verbs. In the changing condition of all earthly things, what *description* of sublunary quality, relation, or circumstance, would for ever stand good? The *man* who was *living*, and *prosperous*, and *well*, and obsequiously *obeyed*, day before-yesterday, is *dead* and *buried* today; and will be soon *forgotten* on earth. He who was "*heated* with liquor" is *melancholy* in prison, where he is *confined*, for his crimes: the "*loving child*" has *become* a *misanthropic*, *decrepid*, *old man*: the "*moving* spectacle" is no longer *seen*; and the "*heated* imagination" is *sobered* by experience.

The broad error that participles are to be classed with verbs, because they are associated with the ideas of time, deserves serious attention. On this subject, we may profit by our standing counsellor, Lord Bacon, to whom allusion was early made; "In setting down the definitions of our words, and terms, that others may know how we accept and understand them, and whether they concur with us, or no."

Tense means *time*. What does *time* itself mean? Doct. Johnson says it is the "measure of duration." One thing still remains; which is, to define the definition.

The *measure* of *duration* is the computation of periodical changes in material bodies. What would the *year* be, if the earth performed no annual circuit; and where *day* and *night*, without the rotation by which they are produced? And if no *day*, then, certainly, not *weeks* nor *hours*, which are made of

days. If there was no visible *mooning*, *moneth*, or *month*, that lunar or calendar reckoning could never have entered the mind of man. Without the guiding *chronometers*, made by the Almighty Hand, *dials*, *clocks*, and all the *time* keepers contrived by human skill, would soon cease: for what would *twelve o'clock* be, without a natural *midnight* or *meridian sun*? And what is *eternity* but unmeasured *time*? How can grammar with its subtleties, furnish ideas of that progressive *duration*, of which the mind of man could "take no note?"

301. All *actions*, *conditions*, and *qualities*; the earth and all the *things* of earth, stand in some *relative order* of temporal succession, with reference to other things.

The murders committed, seventy years ago, by savages of the wilderness on the frontier at *Albany*, were when the earth was backward in its course, by seventy periods, from where it is *now*. She who *was* then a *child*, *is* now in second *infancy*, *leaning* on the arm of her grandson. While this same globe has been rolling its last fifty rounds, a Corsican *boy* has become *dictator* of Rome; republican *successor* of Louis XIV; *chieftain* of an empire, and *distributor* of crowns to trembling kings; lonesome *sovereign* of Elba; second *emperor* of the French; *sailor* on a British deck; a *prisoner* and a *corpse*, on a distant island of the southern hemisphere. Such is *time* or *tense*, in relation to sublunary *conditions*, *qualities*, and *objects*. The pronouns, lately in the *first* and *second* persons, are now *third*; for those whom they represented no longer speak or are spoken to. Could not these lessons teach the schools that the idea of *time* was blended with any thing in the concerns of man, except *verbal action*?

302. These relative transitions, of things and of the dependent lords of earth, are the foundation of all which can really exist in language, concerning time; the clew to guide us through the subtleties of Greek and the labyrinthian contradictions of English. A single rule which nature and common reason have furnished; simple in its principle, as broad and useful in its application; and seemingly overlooked by the ornaments of our race, because that in the rich stores of their learning, it appeared too trifling to be noticed, or fit only for the gleaners who might follow them.

"On Linden, when the sun *was low*,
All *bloodless* lay the *untrodden* snow;
And *dark*, as winter, was the flow
Of Iser, *rolling* rapidly.

But Linden *saw* an other sight!
When the drum *beat*, at dead of night,
Commanding fires of death *to light*
The darkness of her scenery."

Campbell.

Was low, when the Ammer mountains had *intercepted* its *setting* rays.

Lay, when the sun was *low*.

Bloodless, before the *slaughtered* victims of ambition made it *bloody*.

Untrodden, at sun-set, when it had recently *fallen* and before the *hostile* armies had *entered* the field

Dark, by contrast with the snow, and *darker* by association of circumstances, on the evening *preceding* the battle.

Was, *during* the same *portentous* eve.

Rolling, to Turkey, its waters, yet *unstained*.

The next verse explains its own tenses.

"But words *are* things; and a small drop of ink,
Falling, like dew, upon a thought, *produces*
That which *makes* thousands, perhaps millions, *think*."
Lord Byron.

Are, at all times, according to their general nature.

Falling, at any time, whenever it may happen.

Produces, within a reasonable time after falling.

Makes, sooner or later, in a greater or less degree, according to its power of making.

Think, in consequence of the making or causing to think.

303. The ideas of time as existing in the structure of speech being not absolute, but relative; and all conceptions which the mind can form, concerning duration, only marked out by the successive *actions* and *conditions* of things, these principles apply to most objects which can come within the contemplation of language itself; and particularly to *participles* and other *adjectives*, which describe things by their *temporary qualities*, *positions* and *relations*.

This principle any good *scholar* may *soon* find himself *prepared*, *able*, and *willing* to prove.

The perfect participle *prepared*, the adjective *able*, and the present participle *willing*, are alike adjectives, describing the *condition* in which the scholar may *soon* place himself.

The active participle, in *ing*, while it always describes, as an adjective, at the same time, and in every possible case, retains its character as a transitive verb, and governs an object, expressed or inevitably inferred. When it ceases to do both these, it ceases to be a participle, and becomes a noun or other part of speech.

Mr. Murray's example to show that the active participle is "*sometimes passive*," is founded in total *misconception* of the principle.

"The Indian prisoner is burning."

This sentence asserts what is untrue; and to make the statement, if possible, still worse, asserts it in bad English, unless we are to understand that the prisoner has volunteered to burn himself.

304. In the following extract from Dr. Johnson's Life of Dryden, the describing adjectives are printed in italic.

"His prefaces have not the formality of a *settled* style, in which the first half of the sentence betrays the other. The clauses are never *balanced*, nor the periods *modeled;* every word seems to drop by chance, though it falls into its *proper* place. Nothing is *cold* or *languid*, the whole is *airy*, *animated*, and *vigorous;* what is *little*, is *gay;* what is *great*, is *splendid*. Though all is *easy*, nothing is *feeble;* though all seems *careless*, there is nothing *harsh;* and though, since his *earlier* works, more than a century has *past*, they have nothing yet *uncouth* or *obsolete*."

"*Dear*, *fatal* name rest ever *unrevealed*,
Nor pass these lips, in *holy* silence *sealed;*
Hide it, my heart, within that *close* disguise,
Where *mixed* with God's his *loved* idea lies.
Pope. "*Eloise to Abelard*"

If any part of Mr. Murray's system of passive verbs could be considered more specially absurd than the rest, it might be the formal table of the imperative mood, commanding the person who neither *wills* nor *acts*, to suffer the effect of an action which he can neither controll nor obviate.

But the whole theory of passive verbs, is so radically and mischievously wrong, that it is difficult to make much distinction between the parts. The *word passive*, itself, comes from the Latin, *patior*, *to suffer*. *Suffer* is from sub and fero, and means

per-*fero tolero*, *sustineo*, *permitto*. It is somewhat singular, that the thought should not have occurred, that no language ever known, had furnished words to define a passive verb, according to what we are required to believe respecting it.

"A verb *passive* expresses a *passion*, or a *suffering*, or the *receiving* of an *action*."

The man who *receives* money is considered as much an actor as he who pays it; and it is for readers to judge whether he does not commonly *act* as much from volition. The word *patience* comes from the same etymon as *passive*, and depends on exactly the same principle for its meaning; yet we are told, by the moral writers, ancient and modern, that patience is one of the cardinal virtues. Where, but in grammar books, have we ever been taught, that one of the chief excellencies of human nature consists in the mere negation of every *active* quality of body and mind? When the British critics praised the moral and *religious* tendency of Mr. Murray's writings, were they aware that, by his doctrine of *passive verbs*, there could be no merit *imputed* to any instance of *passion* or *suffering*: because there is in this *passion* no exercise, or voluntary concurrence, of any corporeal or mental faculty? The inconsistency is uniform through the whole theory. The passive verbs are all conjugated with the "auxiliary," which signifies to *exist*. The word *exist* is from *ex* and *sisto*. Sisto is from *sto*, *stare facio*: yet we are told that *exist* and *stand* are both neuter verbs, expressing "neither *action* nor *passion*, but *being*, or a state of being; as, I *am*, I *sleep*, I *sit*, Cesar *stood*." If *to stand* requires no action, nor exertion of *strength* or *skill*, then the child of three months old can, of course, *stand alone*, as well as "Cesar," or any other person.

305. If the preceding facts and reasons, respecting verbs, are correct, the following brief inferences may be deduced, as important truths, to guide us, in a farther course.

1. Every verb, in every language, is necessarily active and transitive.

2. There are three moods of English verbs; and no other can be distinguished, on principles capable of being explained or understood.

3. These moods are logically and clearly divided from each other by personal relation; and there is no other consistent separating line between them.

4. The indicative proposition may be assertive, negative, suppositive, or interrogative: but whether one or the other, the single and direct personal relation of the action to the actor, under all circumstances, remains unbroken.

5. The directing power always implied by the imperative verb, can only be uttered by the first person. It is always addressed to the agency of a second person: and no man in his right mind expects his command to be obeyed, at any other time, than subsequent to the expression of his will. Consequently the *verb* or *action* of the imperative mood can be nothing else but future.

6. The infinitive mood has no personal relation; but denotes action, consequent on some supposed, or pre-existing state of things, and is, therefore, always consecutive, or future.

7. No simple proposition can contain more than one indicative verb, and this verb of the indicative mood can never be subordinate to an other verb.

306. 8. An indicative verb can only be in the present, or the simple past tense. Imperative verbs are always absolutely future, and infinitives either absolutely or relatively so.

9. The words erroneously called helping verbs,

in English, come before those called principals.— These "auxiliaries" are therefore first in order.— They express the actions which are the efficient causes of those denoted by the following verbs: consequently they are philosophically first in importance.

The words *will*, *may*, *hear*, *see*, *feel*, *can*, *be*, *shall*, *must*, and others of this kind, which govern the infinitive, without the word *to*, are very expressive by their own absolute meaning. They are distinct, and frequently opposite in their signification, from the verbs which follow them: so that they can not be considered as united, to form one compound action; and it is not the nature of verbal expression to blend two or three actions in one.

"We will stop at Philippi."

In this sentence, the action denoted by stop, is the resulting effect of that expressed by will. It is consequent on it; subsidiary to it; in the infinitive mood governed by it: and, till that intellectual power which is the glory of man becomes entirely subordinate to the feet, the word will, in the above sentence, must be the principal, and stop must be the secondary verb.

307. One seeming paradox, respecting verbs, still requires explanation.

Several verbs, formerly used through all the moods and tenses, have lost, in a great degree, their original forms, while they retain their meaning. The consistency of language has been greatly misrepresented, and scholars needlessly and unprofitably perplexed, by an attempt to refer these words to other parts of speech. They are commonly misnamed conjunctions; *as*, *if*, *though*, *unless*, and others.

As a general rule, language is, in its structure, *very simple* and direct. There is nothing like the

legal fictions which are resorted to, as is said for convenience, in the duplicate locality set forth in a *declaration*, "At London, in the kingdom of Great Britain; to wit, at Lexington, in the state of Kentucky;" or like the conduct of the ficticious and benevolent "*Mr. Jackson*" in ejectment suits. There is a very common practice in language, however, which, if not well examined, is liable to lead to mistake. This is the suppositive use of the verb; in which, generally, three propositions are combined, in such a degree of contraction, as almost entirely to disguise the true principle.

If is a verb in the imperative mood from *gifan*, to give or grant.

If all others forsake thee, I will not.

This expression contains three sentences, though in appearance but one:—

All others forsake thee—

If, gif, give, or *grant* that fact—

I will, or resolve, not (to forsake thee.)

Tho', though, is an imperative verb, from thofian, to allow or admit.

"Though he is out of danger, he is still afraid."

Allow this fact;

He is out of danger:

He is still afraid.

Attempts have uniformly been made to explain this part of speech under a mistaken idea of a subjunctive mood; a mood resorted to in English, merely for want of knowing the meaning of words.

"If I *am* right, thy grace impart,
Still in the right to stay;
If I *am* wrong, O, teach my heart
To find that better way."

Pope's Universal Prayer.

Mr. Murray's scheme would alter these phrases to, "If I *be* right:" but Pope was, "beyond all comparison," a better grammarian than Murray, the opinion of the British critics to the contrary notwithstanding.

> If you and Tullia *are* well,
> I and Cicero are well.*

Cicero pays as little regard to Mr. Murray's subjunctive rules, as Pope, Addison, Tillotson, Steele, Temple, Dean Swift, and other ungrammatical scholars of their class.

308. If the four classes of words already alluded to, are properly understood, there remains nothing else to explain; for the other parts of speech are merely nominal, or made up of words unexplained, because not understood. They have been called particles, and thrown into one class, by several respectable writers. Others have exercised much unprofitable labor and ingenuity in a vain attempt to form them into many different classes. It is not possible for any human skill to draw a philosophic separating line between them, as between adjectives and pronouns; because no such division line exists, in practice or in fact.

309. When, therefore, we speak of adverbs, conjunctions, and prepositions, it ought to be well understood, as a mere convenient resort, to get rid of explaining and reducing to practice, what writers, themselves, do not possess sufficient knowledge to develope. The writer of this treatise has an

---

* "Si tu et Tullia *valetis*, ego et Cicero valemus."—*Cicero. Epistles.*

other reason, in addition to that incompetency which he is ready to admit. It is not the plan of his work to enter so much into the special details of language, as would be necessary in explaining English particles, word by word. It will be found, in practice, however, that these parts of speech are much abridged, under the system here proposed.

ADVERBS.

310. This "part of speech" has with propriety been represented as the general lumber heap, where all words are to be thrown, when, in parsing, neither scholar nor teacher knows what else to call them. This practice, from its obvious convenience, has been extensively adopted in schools.

The adverb takes its name from the leading idea attached to its use, as secondary to the verb. In this character, adverbs express the *manner* of action; as, she moves *gracefully*. This is much the most numerous subdivision, in the motley group of words called adverbs; and these are generally formed by adding *ly* to an adjective. This syllable, *ly*, is a contraction of *lyche* or *like*. When added to a noun it forms an adjective, and added to an adjective it is still secondary, or an adverb. There is also a number of words differently formed, which are generally connected with adjectives, and used to express the degree of quality; as, a very good, or truly good man. The real explanation of this practice is, that it employs one, and sometimes two adjectives to qualify an other.

311. Other words of this class are compounded of different terms; but generally in such a manner that they may easily be resolved into their elements; as, nevertheless, howsoever, tomorrow, peradventure, always, and others. The practice has prevailed to a considerable extent, more formerly than at present, of combining these words; and it is still thought more convenient, in many instances, to take the compound, as an adverb, than to explain the parts separately. Many of these words, in their compounded form, are going gradually out of use, as being inelegant and unnecessary.

But besides those adverbs which directly appear as compounds, there are others, the separate parts of which are only to be found by tracing them to their origin.

312. The following is Mr. Murray's list of adverbs.

Once, twice, thrice, &c. First, secondly, thirdly, fourthly, fifthly, lastly, finally. *Here*, *there*, *where*, *elsewhere*, *anywhere*, *somewhere*, *nowhere*, *herein*, whither, hither, thither, upward, downward, forward, backward, whence, hence, thence, whithersoever. Now, to-day, already, before, lately, yesterday, heretofore, hitherto, long since, *long ago*, &c. To-morrow, not yet, hereafter, henceforth, henceforward, by and by, instantly, presently, immediately, straightways. Oft, often, oft-times, often-times, *sometimes*, soon, seldom, daily, weekly, monthly, yearly, always, when, then, ever, never, again, &c. Much, little, sufficiently, *how much*, *how great*, *enough*, abundantly, &c. Wisely, foolishly, justly, unjustly, quickly, slowly. Perhaps, peradventure, possibly, perchance, verily, truly, undoubtedly, *doubtless*, certainly, yea, yes, surely, indeed, really. Nay, no, not, *by no means*,

not at all, in no wise, how, why, wherefore, whether, more, most, better, best, worse, worst, less, least, very, almost, little, alike.

CONJUNCTIVES OR CONJUNCTIONS.

"A conjunction is a part of speech that is used to connect sentences; so as, out of two or more sentences to make but one. It sometimes connects only words."

Mr. Murray, whose definition of these conjunctive words is given above, divides them into two kinds, *copulative* and *disjunctive conjunctives*.

The following is his list of conjunctions.

COPULATIVE.

"And, if, that, both, then, since, for, because, therefore, wherefore."

DISJUNCTIVE.

"But, or, nor, as, then, lest, though, unless, either, neither, yet, notwithstanding."

The *conjunctives both, either, neither,* and *that,* are always *adjectives.*

If, but, though, *unless,* and *yet,* are imperative verbs.

If is gif, give, grant, as was said before.

Though is *thof, theofian,* admit or allow.

But has two meanings, which should not be confounded; *botan,* to boot; superadd. I have rode ten miles, *but* I wish to go ten miles farther.

But is also *be-utan,* be out, leave out, except; as, "all but one." All *be out,* leave out, except, or save, one.

Unless is release, dismiss.

Yet is get, by the usual change of *y* and *g* in the old books, or rather by the use of a character in common for both.

314. The other conjunctions may all be as well considered and explained as adverbs. The word *as* never is a conjunction. The attempted distinction between copulative and disjunctive, and other classes of conjunctives, and all which is called explanation upon them, is a totally absurd, unfounded, and whimsical jargon; not surpassed in any dream book, or treatise on the juggling art. This mass of nonsense is not chargeable on any individual: but has been handed down from one compiler to an other, to the present time, because that no one thinks proper to inquire why seventeen hundred thousand scholars, now in school in the United States, should be taught to believe that joining two words together necessarily produces separation between them.

Mr. Murray's whole list of conjunctions amounts to twenty-two. Several of these never are conjunctions, in any possible instance, by any rational application of the words, according to his own scheme; and all of them may be better explained under other classes of words.

But Mr. Murray's "judicious and philosophical" system sinks down to relative soberness, and almost puts on the appearance of truth, when compared with the following classification of the different sorts of conjunctions, which has been palmed upon the schools, and called learning.

Conjunctive, adjunctive, disjunctive, subdisjunctive, copulative, negative copulative, continuative, subcontinuative, positive, suppositive, causal, collective, effective, approbative, discretive, ablative, presumptive, abnegative, completive, augmenta-

tive, alternative, hypothetical, extensive, periodical, motival, conclusive, explicative, transitive, interrogative, comparative, diminutive, preventive, adequate preventive, adversative, conditional, suspensive, illative, conductive, declarative, &c. &c.

The book of Revelation contains twenty-two chapters, and nineteen of them begin with the copulative conjunction *and*. In this case, which is grammatically connected, "words, or members of a sentence?"

"Et jacet Euxinis vates Romanus in oris."—*Politian's Elegy on the Exile and Death of Ovid; Line I.*

Here is a simple proposition beginning with the copulative conjunction *et*; and no one, probably, will question its Latinity.

PREPOSITIONS.

"Prepositions serve to connect words with one an other, and to show the relation between them. They are, for the most part, put before nouns and pronouns; as, he went *from* London *to* York. She is *above* disguise. They are instructed *by* him."

This is Mr. Murray's definition of this part of speech, and it is about as good as any other which could be made. The following is his list of the words.

Of, to, for, by, with, in, into, within, without, over, under, through, above, below, between, beneath, from, beyond, at, near, up, down, before, behind, off, on, upon, among, after, about, against.

316. Every one of these prepositions is a noun or a verb, capable of being clearly traced and defined as such, with much less trouble than to define the word preposition or adverb.

In, as a noun, is the old word *innan*, *innen*, the *inner* part of the human breast, enclosing the heart and vitals. In its extended meaning, it is the *inner* part of any thing else; an *inn* of court; as, Lincoln's *Inn*; an *in*dwelling place; a traveller's *inn*; a public lodging place.

Inn, as a verb, is from the noun: "to *inn* the harvest or grain," as used by Chaucer, Shakspeare, Lord Bacon, Sir Philip Sydney, and other writers, means to put the harvest into barns. The participle *inning* is from the same. This is also used as a noun.

The adjectives *in*, *inner*, *innest*, *innermost*, *inmost*, *inward*, *innerward*, are from the noun.

The adverbs *inly*, *innerly*, and *inwardly*, are formed from the adjectives.

The word *in* has also many compounds, as *inlet*, *in*mate, *in*land, *in*lay, and others.

All these terms are pure old English.

Such is one of the least of these prepositions, without meaning, used to connect significant words and "show the relation between them."

If the general principles laid down in this work should be acceptable to the American public, an attempt will be made in a future edition, to reduce all words to four classes, in such a manner as to leave no possibility of doubt on the subject. It will greatly facilitate the whole process of teaching language, and is as applicable to other tongues as to our own.

INTERJECTIONS.

317. This department of language does not consist of words, nor belong to conventional speech. It is made up of sounds, which are uttered by different orders of beings, as mere animals; sometimes by man among the rest. The bellowing of a cow, the barking of a dog, the neighing of a horse, are interjections. In many instances among men, sudden and violent starts of surprise, joy, pain, or anger, cause an indistinct sound, not reducible to the language of compact. Laughter, crying, or the groans of pain, are interjections: but if a man says *hush*, *tush*, or *tut*, to his children, meaning to have them be still, and they so understand him, it is as much an imperative verb, as if he said *cease*, *stop*, or any other form of parental command. To say *hah*, in order to call quick attention, is no less a verb than *lo*, *look*, or *see there*, used for the same purpose. The simple question is, on each utterance of this kind, whether it is given and received with a definite form and meaning.

Fruitless attempts have been made to arrange this set of words into different subdivisions, according to their meanings; but all words capable of being so classified, do not belong to interjections.

STRUCTURE OF SENTENCES.

SYNTAX.

RULE I.

317. The noun is *subject* or *object* of a verb, or governed by a preposition; as, *Henry VII.* defeated *Richard III.* in the *battle* of *Bosworth.*

Exception. *Nouns* are sometimes used without grammatical connexion, in which case, they are said to be *independent*, or *absolute*. This takes place in the single words, or broken parts of sentences, placed as heads of chapters, or in terms of direct personal address; as, "It must be so, *Plato*, thou reasonest well."

RULE II.

318. All nouns and pronouns meaning the same thing, and contained in the same member of a sentence, must agree in number, gender, and person, with the thing which they represent; as, ye blind *guides, hypocrites.*

Cicero and *Hortensius* rendered themselves great *orators.*

He showed himself a consummate *general.*

They are (·) excellent *poets.*

These serve to explain each other, without enlarging the idea conveyed by one of the terms.

This form of speech is the identical proposition of the mental philosophers and logicians.

Nouns of multitude may be singular or plural in construction, according to the manner in which they are conceived by the mind.

RULE III.

Pronouns, as substitutes for nouns, take the same relation of *person*, *number*, *gender*, and *case*.

RULE IV.

Pronouns and nouns, connected by *and*, are to be taken together, as a collective plural, in the agreement of verbs or other words: as, *Romulus* and *Remus were* twin *brothers*. *They were grandsons* of Numitor.

RULE V.

Every adjective refers to a noun, expressed or understood; as, "*many* are *called*; but *few* are *chosen*:" that is, many and few *persons*.

English adjectives never vary in their forms for number, gender, nor case.

RULE VI.

320. The indicative verb agrees with the number and person of its subject; as, "Homer *warms* us." "Milton *fixes* us in astonishment." "They *are* both sublime, and *excel* other poets." "I *learn*." "Thou *art* the man."

RULE VII.

The infinitive verb is always consecutive, depending on some pre-supposed condition of things; as, "*He* prepared himself *to go*, at 12 o'clock."

RULE VIII.

Imperative verbs are invariable in form, and future in meaning: as, *go*, *stay*, *depart* in peace.

RULE IX.

Every verb and every participle in *ing* governs an object expressed or understood; as, "go, *flee thee* away, into the land of Judah." The tutor *employs himself* in *teaching* his *pupils*. They *try* (their *skill*) to *learn* (their *lessons*.)

PARSING LESSONS.

321. "*They who forgive, act nobly.*"

They, is a pronoun, standing for a supposed portion of mankind, to whom a certain character is attributed; third person plural, subject of the verb *act*.

Who, an other pronoun for the same persons, subject of the verb forgive, in the third person plural, like they, because standing for the same thing.

Forgive; indicative verb, present tense, meaning, in general, or at any time, agreeing with its subject, who, in the third person, plural; and governing *injuries*, as its object understood.

Act; indicative verb, present tense, agreeing with its subject *they*, third person plural; governing *part*, or an equivalent word understood, as its object.

Nobly, an adverb, expressing the manner of acting.

322 "*Peace and joy are virtue's crown.*"

Peace, a common noun, third person, singular number, neuter gender, subject of the verb *are*.

And, past participle, signifying added, connecting *peace* with joy.

Joy, common noun, third person singular, connected with *peace*, as subject of *are*.

Are, irregular verb, indicative mood, present tense, agreeing with its two subjects, *peace* and *joy*, governing the word *themselves*, as its object, understood.

Virtue's, a specifying adjective, referring to crown, to point out what one is meant.

Crown, common noun, third person singular, subject of are, as being identical with peace and joy, in the same member of the sentence.

"*Wisdom or folly governs us.*"

Wisdom, noun common, third person, singular, conditional subject of *governs*.

Or, adverbial contraction, signifying *otherwise;* and as placed, between wisdom and folly, in this sentence, implies the alternative, that one governs, if the other does not. This is always the character and use of the word *or*.

Folly, common noun, third person, singular, placed alternatively, or conditionally, with *wisdom*, as subject of the verb *governs*.

Governs, regular verb, indicative mood, present tense, agreeing with either *wisdom* or *folly*, according to the alternity; but not with both.

"If *Celia* would be silent, her beholders would adore her; if *Iras* would talk, her hearers would admire her; but *Celia's* tongue runs incessantly, while *Iras* gives herself silent airs and soft languors; so that it is difficult to persuade one's self that *Celia* has beauty, and *Iras* wit; each neglects her own excellence, and is ambitious of the other's character; *Iras* would be thought to have as much beauty as *Celia*, and *Celia* as much wit as *Iras*."—*Addison*.

If, verb, in the imperative mood, with the words *that fact*, understood after it, as the governed object. Give that fact—Celia would be silent—(the consequence would be) her beholders would adore her.

Celia, proper noun, feminine, singular, subject of the verb *would*.

Would, irregular verb, denoting volition or inherent propensity, put conditionally or suppositively in the past tense, implying the admitted truth that *Celia* is not silent, and agreeing with its subject *Celia*, which is third person singular.

Be, an infinitive verb, depending on the words *Celia would*, and governing the compounded word *herself*, as its object.

Silent, adjective, referring to *Celia*.

Her, specifying adjective, referring to *beholders*.

Beholders, noun plural, subject of *would*.

Would, as before.

Adore, infinitive verb, depending on the phrase, "her beholders would," governing *her*, as its object.

If, as before.

Iras, proper noun, subject of *would*.

Would, as before.

Talk, infinitive verb, following the phrase, "Iras would."

Her, specifying adjective, referring to *hearers*, to identify them.

Would, as before.

Admire, infinitive verb, following *would*.

Her, pronoun, object of the verb *admire*, third person, singular, feminine, standing for *Iras*.

But, imperative verb, add, (understand farther.)

Celia's, specifying adjective, formed from the noun, denoting the particular tongue which is meant.

Tongue, common noun, subject of *runs*.

Runs, irregular verb, indicative mood, present tense, agreeing with its subject *tongue*, third person singular.

Incessantly, adverb, expressing the manner of running.

While, noun, meaning, *whirl, revolution, period, time;* and generally parsed as an adverb of *time*.

Iras, proper noun, subject of *gives*.

Herself, compounded of specifying adjective *her*, and noun *self*, meaning, identical person, in the objective case, or position, governed by the preposition *to*, understood.

Silent, describing adjective, referring to *airs*.

And, conjunctive participle, connecting *airs* and *languors*.

Soft, adjective, describing languors.

So, like *as*, formerly used as an adjective, meaning that or these: now generally signifying, *in such manner*, and parsed as an adverb. The words "*so that*," taken together, are a contracted form of expression, which save the repetition of what has gone before, and a part of what follows.

It, an assumed term for the *thing*, or the general idea which follows the verb.

Is, irregular verb, it, (the idea or the thing,) is, (makes itself) difficult.

To, past participle, signifying acted, finished, done: used here as the convenient distinctive sign of the infinitive mood, and generally in parsing, taken together with the following verb, as denoting one idea.

Persuade, infinitive verb, depending on the preceding phrase, it is difficult.

One's, specifying adjective, referring to the noun *self*.

That, specifying adjective; the preposition of, or into, is understood before it, and fact, belief, or other equivalent word after it; as, to persuade one's self *into that belief*, or *of that fact*.

Celia, proper noun.

Has, irregular verb, agreeing with *Celia*, governing beauty.

Beauty, common noun.

Iras.

Wit, common noun, formed from the old verb, *witan*, to know, object of *has*.

Each, specifying adjective, referring to *person*, *woman*, or *lady*, understood.

Neglects, verb, indicative mood, present tense, agreeing with *lady*, understood.

Her, specifying adjective, referring to *excellence*.

Own, participial adjective, referring to *excellence*.

Ambitious, describing adjective, referring to each *lady*.

Of, participle, used as a preposition, governing character.

The, specifying adjective, referring to character.

Other's, specifying adjective, in contraction for other person's, referring to character.

Character, noun, governed by *of*.

Iras, noun, subject of *would*.

Would, indicative verb, from will, suppositive past tense.

Be, irregular infinitive, following the phrase, "Iras would."

Thought, participial adjective, referring to Iras.

To have, infinitive verb, depending on the whole preceding phrase.

As, adjective, referring to *much*.

Much, noun common, signifying considerable quantity, object of the verb *to have*.

Beauty, common noun, governed by *of*, understood.

The rest as before.

PRACTICAL EXERCISES.

323. Find the nouns or persons to which each of the following adjectives refers.

We are *told* by Diodorus Siculus *that*, *adjoining the* sepulchre of Osymandyas, king of Egypt, was a *magnificent* library, over *the* door of *which* was *inscribed*, in letters of gold, "Food for the mind." In *a conspicuous* place on *the* wall was *a sculptured* figure of *a* judge, with *the* image of truth *suspended* from *his* neck, and *a* number of books *lying* before him.

Who are told? What was adjoining? What was inscribed? What was suspended?

324. All verbs are transitive, and active.

"Bliss, a native of the sky,
Never wanders (herself.) Mortals try (your efforts;)
There you can not seek (Bliss) in vain;
For to seek her is to gain (her.)"

The word, in each parenthesis is supplied in grammatical construction.

"He enters (himself into) the territory of the peaceable inhabitants; he fights (the people) and *conquers* (them;) takes an immense booty which

(booty) he divides among his soldiers and returns (himself) home, to enjoy (himself with) an empty triumph."

325. It often happens that the *apparent* is not the *real* object of the verb; as, in the above sentence, where it is evident, on proper examination, that it is not the *triumph* which was to receive the *joy;* but the boastful *conqueror* by means of a *triumph.*— Those who can compare English with almost any other language, will need no farther elucidation on this subject.

"Murdre is waltsome and abhominable
To God that so just is and reasonable
That he ne wol* it suffre healed to be
Though it abide a yere, two or thre
Murdre wol† out."—*Chaucer.* Tale of the Nonnes Priest. Vol. III. p. 1.

That he not wills it to suffer (itself) concealed to be.

Murder *wills* out, or *wills* itself out, by the conscientious restlessness of its *will.*

326. Language, as generally used, is very elliptical and its contractions are particularly great, in verbs of primary importance, and consequent frequency of use.

"A bird that *can* sing and *will* not sing *must be made* to sing."

A bird, that (bird) *knows the way* to sing (songs or tunes) and (that bird) *wills (the determination)* not to sing (any tune) (that bird) ought (without excuse to) be) made to sing (some tune or notes.)

However clumsy this phraseology may appear, no one should pretend to have a true philosophic or grammatical knowledge of language, till he can

complete it, by supplying every word, necessary to the whole construction.

The great art of writing and speaking is to make these contractions, in the most compendious manner, without being deficient in perspicuity.

To the foregoing lessons in parsing, the following are added, which may serve, at once, as exercises for the scholar, and as specimens of the progressive changes in the language.

The first is a Saxon specimen from King Alfred.

Nu ꝑe ſceolan heriȝean
Heoſon riceſ ꝑeard
Metodeſ mihte
And hiſ mod ȝeþanc
Yeorc ꝑuldor ſæder.
Swa he ꝑuldreſ ȝehꝑæſ
Ece drihten
Ord onſtealde.
He ærest ȝeſcop
Eorþan bearnum
Heoſon to roſe.
Halig ſcyppend.
Ða middan ȝeard
Mon cynneſ ꝑeard
Ece Drihtne
Æfter teode.
Firum ſoldan
Frea ælmihtiȝ.

For the convenience of those unacquainted with the Saxon alphabet, the same is given in Roman letters.

"Nu we sceolan herigean
Heofon rices weard
Metodes mihte
And his mod gethanc
Yeorc wuldor fæder.
Swa he wuldres gehwaes
Ece drihten
Ord onstealde.
He ærest gescop
Eorthan bearnum
Heofon to rofe
Halig scyppend
Tha middan geard

Mon cynnes weard
Ece drihtne
Æfter teode.
Firum foldan
Frea ælmihtig."—*Alfred's Translation of Bede.* P. 597.

LITERAL TRANSLATION.

Now we should to praise
Heaven's riches Guardian:
Maker's might
And his mind thoughts
Works of glory Father.
How he glorious was,
Eternal Lord;
Made the beginning.
He first formed
Earthen children,
Heaven to roof:
Holy Creator!
The middle expansion
Man kind's Guardian,
Eternal Lord,
Afterwards made.
The earth for man.
Ruler Almighty.

The reader will certainly be struck with the seeming awkwardness of this translation; so destitute of "articles," conjunctions, adverbs, or prepositions; but barren as it is of these modernized appendages, he will perceive that the number is greater than in the original

In this construction the sense is determined, in a considerable degree, by the relative collocation of the words.

Much also depended on their accepted import in practice.

"He first formed

Earthen chidren
Heaven to roof:
Holy Creator."

With these identical words the sense will be plain by changing the arrangement.

"Holy Creator!
He first formed
Heaven, to roof
Earthen children."

To shelter or protect the children belonging or pertaining to earth. This kind of translation gives the reader a more clear idea of the real structure of the original, than one which should be rendered in more elegant modern English.

This piece, singular as it may appear, is the language of the man who was at once the chief glory of the English throne, and one of the best scholars in the kingdom for the age in which he lived.

328. The following is given as an exact copy of the xiii. chapter of 1 Corinthians, from an ancient manuscript, and which is the oldest English translation of the New Testament, at present known to exist. The precise date of it is not known; but supposed to be about the year 1350, or about twenty years before the introduction of printing into England.

It is taken from a copy given by Dr. Adam Clarke, the only alteration being the substitution of Roman print for the old black letter English.

"Gif I speke with tungis of men and aungels sotheli I have not charitee: I am maad as brasse soundynge or a symbale tinking. And gif I schal have prophecie and have knowen alle mysteries and alle kunnynge or science. And gif I schal have al *feithe so that* I over bere hills fro on place to an *other. forsothe* gif I schal not have charitee: I am

nought. And gif I schal departe al my goodis into metis of pore men. And gif I schal bitake my body so that I brenne forsothe gif I schal not have charitee, it profiteth to me no thing. Charite is pacient or sufferinge. It is benynge or of good will. Charity envyeth not. It doth not gyle. It is not inblowen with pride it is not ambyciouse or covetouse of wirschippis. It seekyth not the thingis that ben her own. It is not stirrid to wrath it thinketh not yvil. it joyeth not on wickednesse. forsothe it joyeth to gydre to treuthe. It suffreth alle thingis. it bilieveth alle thingis. It hopith alle thingis. it susteeneth alle thingis. Charite fallith not doun. Whether prophecies schuln be doid eyther langagis schulen ceese: eyther science schal be destruyed. Forsothe of party we han knowen: and of partye prophecien. Forsothe whenne that schal cum to that is perfit: that thing that is of partye schal be avoydid. When I was a litil chiilde: I spake as a litil chiilde. I understode as a litil chiilde: I thoughte as a litil chiilde. Forsothe when I was maad a man: I avoyded tho thingis that weren of a litil chiilde. Forsothe we seen now bi a miror in darcnesse: thanne forsothe face to face. Nowe I know of partye: thanne forsothe I schal know as I am knowen. Now forsothe dwellen feith hoope charite. These three: forsothe the more of hem is charite."

329. Example in philosophic parsing.

You may show a *child* a *house* and teach him the *fact* that such an *edifice* could not have made itself; in *proof* of which *opinion*, you may show him *masons* and *carpenters* at their *work*. Then direct his *attention* to the heavenly *orbs;* the *earth;* and the numerous *animals* and *vegetables*, and minerals

which God has formed for the *use* of *man*, and say to the little *boy* or *girl*, how much superior is the *world* we inhabit, to that *house!* Can the *universe*, then, have organized its own *structure*. How ought our *souls* to glow with *gratitude* and *admiration* for the *Author* of such *wisdom* and *goodness*.—*Paraphrase from Fenelon.*

Child, absolute name of persons.

All names of persons are mixed or complex ideas, including the union of body and mind.

House, sensible object.

Fact, attendant circumstance of matter.

It alludes to some operation on material substances.

Edifice, sensible object.

This name is general and always in some degree relative, as implying what is raised, built, or constructed.

Proof, attendant circumstance having a mixed relation to matter and mind.

Opinion, attendant circumstance of mind.

Masons, relative name of persons.

Carpenters, same as masons.

Work, attendant circumstance of matter and mind.

Attention, attendant circumstance, chiefly of mind.

Orbs, sensible objects.

This name is always in some degree relative, as implying a body rolling in a circle.

Earth, sensible object; but extensive and complex in its idea.

Animals, class of sensible objects, including the relative idea of life.

Vegetables, sensible objects; but the name always relates to the manner of growth.

Minerals, sensible objects; but always relative, as *being found* in mines.

God, highest mental object.

As mind is superior to matter, and the Creator is the highest mental existence, so the idea is the most *sublime* which the mind can conceive.

Man, general and absolute name of the human species.

Boy, name of persons.

Girl, same.

World, complex idea.

House, as before.

Universe, most complex of all ideas, including all objects, qualities, and relations, as a collective whole.

Structure, attendant circumstance of matter.

Souls, mental object.

Gratitude, mental affection, or attendant circumstance.

Admiration, attendant circumstance of mind.

Author, relative name, applied here to the Creator.

Wisdom and *goodness*, mental qualities.

330. "These our *actors*,
(As I foretold you) were all *spirits*, and
Are melted into *ayre*, into thin *ayre*;
And, like the baselesse *fabricke* of this *vision*,
The clowd-capt *towres*, the gorgeous *pallaces*,
The solemne *temples*, the great *globe itselfe*,
Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolue,
And, like this insubstantiall *pageant* faded,
Leaue not a *racke* behind."—Shakspeare. *Tempest*, *page* 15, *vol.* 1.

Philosophic parsing of the nouns in the foregoing paragraph. The words in this exercise are to be taken in their literal meaning.

Actors, relative name of persons.

Spirits, mental object.

Ayre, air is matter and therefore a sensible object, though not, in its pure form, directly obvious.

Fabric, sensible object, but relative, as being made or fabricated.

Vision, attendant circumstance of matter.

Towers, sensible object.

Palaces, sensible object.

Temples, sensible object, but including the relative idea of their design and use.

Globe, sensible object with the relative idea of form.

Pageant, name of a sensible object, but relatively applied.

Racke, rack is from the verb to *reek* or *smoke*, and means a *steam*, *mist* or *vapor*. It is an attendant circumstance of matter; because it denotes no particular substance; but an appearance capable of being assumed by the exhalation of most fluid bodies.

331. " It fortuned, faire Venus having lost
Her little sonne, the winged god of Love,
Who for some light displeasure, which him crost,
Was from her fled, as flit as *ayery* dove,
And left her blissful bowre of joy above;
(So from her often he had fled away,
When she for ought him did reprove,)
And wandered in the world in strawnge array,
Disguised in thousand shapes, that none might him bewray

Him for to seeke, she left her heavenly hous,
The hous of goodly forms and faire aspect.

And searched everie way, through which his wings
Had borne him, or his tract she mote detect;
First she him sought in court, where most he us'd
Whylome to haunt, but there she found him not;
But many there she found which sore accus'd
His falshood, and with fowle infamous blot
His cruell deedes and wicked wyles did spot:

Ladies and lordes she every where mote heare,
Complayning, how with his empoysned shot
Their woful hearts he wounded had whyleare,
And so had left them languishing twixt hope and feare."
Spencer's "Faerie Queene."

332. Examples of the conditional or suppositive past tense.

I *was* to pass the river tomorrow; but the bridge *is* carried away.

I *should* cross the river tomorrow, but the bridge *is* carried away.

If I *had* passed the river yesterday, I *could* not now return.

If I *was* on the other side, I *could* not get back.

The logic concealed under this form of expression is the most subtle and ingenious, which is to be found, in the essential structure of speech; and yet, it is one of the broadest general principles of language. Probably no single rule has more completely escaped detection, or done more to mislead the entire body of grammatical writers. After all, however, this ingenious mental expedient becomes very clear, when devested of the disguise which has been cast over it by a mistaken theory of instruction.

The verbs printed in italics, in all the above examples, depend on a common principle. In each of the sentences, two actions are principally referred to, one depending on the other. In each a certain fact is alluded to, as being known, or assumed, by the speaker and hearer; and the pre-admission, or conditional assertion, of this fact is denoted, by putting the verb in the past tense.

I *was* to pass the river tomorrow; but I *am* not to pass tomorrow; because that the condition of

things on which the determination to pass depended, has become changed, by one of the numerous casualties on which the actions of man so generally depend.

I *should* cross, &c.
I shall not cross.

The idea here is a pre-existing obligation, from which the actor is released, by an unexpected change of circumstances, which has increased the difficulty, or prevented the possibility of fulfilment.

These few hints will be sufficient to enable the intelligent scholar to make the application of this principle, in its very extensive use; and to adapt it to any language with which he may be familiar. It is one of the striking instances of that rational logic which the Author of our being has firmly fixed in the intellect of man; for, it will be seen, that, in the most rapid utterance, the mind, consistent with itself and with the nature of things, will habitually represent the proper class of actions in the past tense. This is done, not only without the help of formal teaching, but in opposition to all scholastic rules and mistaken attempts at explanation. If then it should be asked whether it is, in part, the design of this train of reasoning to degrade the instruction of the schools; nothing is farther from it: but if the splendid universities of Europe have done so much for human improvement, under a theory of teaching which is radically bad; what might they not do, with their rich endowments, their learning and talents, their zeal, enterprise, and philanthropy, if they would consent to adopt a system of inculcation in language, accordant with facts, worthy of their character, and of the cause *which their* ample resources are calculated to promote?

The very extensive rule above alluded to, and which exists alike in language, in the mind, and in the nature of things, removes at once all the perplexing contradictions of an imaginary conjunctive mood, and obviates the necessity of all minor explanations and exceptions.

333. Ambiguity from wrong collocation.

Harry. "Nothing is better, Peter, than roast beef."

Peter. "I ask your pardon, friend Harry, I think roast beef is better than nothing."

I saw a ship gliding under full sail through a spy glass.

A man may see how the world goes with half an eye.

ERRORS.

The reader is desired to rectify the following mistakes, which were not observed till too late for the correction of the press.

Page 4, line 3d from the bottom, for *difficult* read *deficient*.

Page 67, paragraph 117, for *Dwight* read *Edwards*.

Page 127, lines 4 and 9, for *plural* read *future*.

Some more trifling typographical errors were not observed in reading the proof sheets.